During the Covid-19 pandemic we increasingly turned to technology to stay in touch with our family, friends, and colleagues. Even as lockdowns and restrictions ease many are encouraging us to embrace the replacement of face-to-face encounters with technologically mediated ones. Yet, as philosophers of technology have highlighted, technology can transform the situations we find ourselves in. Drawing insights from the phenomenology of sociality, we consider how digitally-enabled forms of communication and sociality impact our experience of one another. In particular, we (...) draw attention to the way in which our embodied experience of one another is altered when we meet in digital spaces, taking as our focus the themes of perceptual access, intercorporeality, shared space, transitional spaces, and self-presentation. In light of the way in which technological mediation alters various dimensions of our social encounters, we argue that digital encounters constitute their own forms of sociality requiring their own phenomenological analysis. We conclude our paper by raising some broader concerns about the very framework of thinking about digitally and non-digitally mediated social encounters simply in terms of replacement. (shrink)

Medical decision making by patients is respected as a lawful exercise of free will and agency unless patients are found to lack “competence.” Yet measures of competence in medical decision making typically assess only cognitive abilities. Emotionality is involved in decision making and may affect how far patients’ decisions to accept or refuse medical treatment embody free will. Moreover, neurodivergence, or atypical neurological makeup, is often diagnosed as neurodegeneration, neurodysfunction, neural damage, or neural difference and frequently leads to difficulties in (...) considering the emotional aspects of decisions that standard tests do not measure or disclose. Neurodiversity activists assert that their neural differences are not pathologies to be treated or cured but are alternative ways of being that should be accepted as neuroequal. Nevertheless, who may claim to be neurodiverse is uncertain. We focus on atypical emotionality to consider the limits of neurodiversity in relation to measures of competence, particularly in relation to end-of-life decision making. (shrink)

IntroductionAutism spectrum disorder is a highly heterogeneous diagnosis. When a child is referred to autism services or receives a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder it is not known what their potential adult outcomes could be. We consider the challenge of making predictions of an individual child’s long-term multi-facetted adult outcome, focussing on which aspects are predictable and which are not.MethodsWe used data from 123 adults participating in the Autism Early Diagnosis Cohort. Participants were recruited from age 2 and followed up (...) repeatedly through childhood and adolescence to adulthood. We predicted 14 adult outcome measures including cognitive, behavioral and well-being measures. Continuous outcomes were modeled using lasso regression and ordinal outcomes were modeled using proportional odds regression. Optimism corrected predictive performance was calculated using cross-validation or bootstrap. We also illustrated the prediction of an overall composite formed by weighting outcome measures by priorities elicited from parents.ResultsWe found good predictive performance from age 9 for verbal and non-verbal IQ, and daily living skills. Predictions for symptom severity, hyperactivity and irritability improved with inclusion of behavioral data collected in adolescence but remained modest. For other outcomes covering well-being, depression, and positive and negative affect we found no ability to predict adult outcomes at any age. Predictions of composites based on parental priorities differed in magnitude and precision depending on which parts of the adult outcome were given more weight.ConclusionVerbal and non-verbal IQ, and daily living skills can be predicted well from assessments made in childhood. For other adult outcomes, it is challenging to make meaningful predictions from assessments made in childhood and adolescence using the measures employed in this study. Future work should replicate and validate the present findings in different samples, investigate whether the availability of different measures in childhood and adolescence can improve predictions, and consider systematic differences in priorities. (shrink)

The article provides a conceptualization of self(-illness) ambiguity and investigates to what extent self(-illness) ambiguity is ‘special’. First, we draw on empirical findings to argue that self-ambiguity is a ubiquitous phenomenon. We suggest that these findings are best explained by a multidimensional account, according to which selves consist of various dimensions that mutually affect each other. On such an account, any change to any particular self-aspect may change other self-aspects and thereby alter the overall structural pattern of self-aspects, potentially leading (...) to self-ambiguity. Second, we propose that self-ambiguity comes in degrees and should be understood as a spectrum (as opposed to there being qualitative differences among instances of self-ambiguity). Third, we argue that complexity is the most useful dimension to organize cases of self-ambiguity, with mundane instances of self-ambiguity on the one end and self-illness ambiguity on the other end of the spectrum. Fourth, we address the promises and perils of narrativity with regard to self-ambiguity. Finally, we link our deflationary account of self(-illness) ambiguity to pattern theories of self. (shrink)

The article provides a conceptualization of self(-illness) ambiguity and investigates to what extent self(-illness) ambiguity is ‘special’. First, we draw on empirical findings to argue that self-ambiguity is a ubiquitous phenomenon. We suggest that these findings are best explained by a multidimensional account, according to which selves consist of various dimensions that mutually affect each other. On such an account, any change to any particular self-aspect may change other self-aspects and thereby alter the overall structural pattern of self-aspects, potentially leading (...) to self-ambiguity. Second, we propose that self-ambiguity comes in degrees and should be understood as a spectrum (as opposed to there being qualitative differences among instances of self-ambiguity). Third, we argue that complexity is the most useful dimension to organize cases of self-ambiguity, with mundane instances of self-ambiguity on the one end and self-illness ambiguity on the other end of the spectrum. Fourth, we address the promises and perils of narrativity with regard to self-ambiguity. Finally, we link our deflationary account of self(-illness) ambiguity to pattern theories of self. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2020, Page 35-37.