There is a famous saying, whose origin is uncertain, that no good deed goes unpunished. Although not cited by him, this was no doubt the thought that inspired George Mavrodes’s (1986) well-known article “Religion and the Queerness of Morality.” In it he argued that although not logically incoherent, a certain sort of world in which moral obligations existed would be “absurd . . . a crazy world” (Mavrodes 1986, 581). The world he had in mind was what he called “Russellian,” (...) after a notorious passage in Bertrand Russell’s essay “The Free Man’s Worship” (Russell 1903). There, Russell portrayed us as living in a wholly materialistic universe governed by impersonal forces and “accidental collocations of atoms,” with no objective purpose or meaning to existence. The greatest of human achievements would ultimately be buried “beneath the debris of a universe in ruins.” We could only, concluded Russell, safely build the “soul’s habitation” [sic] on a “firm foundation of unyielding despair” (Russell 1903, 32). In such a world, according to Mavrodes, the performance of moral obligations does, at least sometimes, lead to no net Russellian benefit, that is, any benefit to the agent that is possible within a Russellian world. Indeed, such actions sometimes confer a net Russellian loss. “We have,” he says, “moral obligations whose fulfillment will result in a net loss of good to the one who fulfils them” (Mavrodes 1986, 581). That such a world would be “queer,” “crazy” and “absurd,” according to Mavrodes, should only strike those who believe that moral obligations are wholly objective and run deep in the fabric of reality. He does not purport to address the sceptic, the subjectivist, the expressivist, the nihilist or the existentialist. His aim is at those who believe in a rational moral.. (shrink)

One of the distinctive features of Gerald Gaus’s public justification theory is his extensive use of the empirical data from the social sciences to support his normative claims. One such claim which stands out for its importance, within the context of Gaus’s theory, is the evolution of strong reciprocity: over time, members of large societies develop a tendency to follow social rules and punish defectors. This claim, in turn, is supported by several studies in experimental economics involving mixed motive games, (...) which show how subjects are inclined to punish, even at a net cost for themselves, any perceived violation of social norms such as fairness. While critics of Gaus’s theory focused mainly on whether the use of empirical evidence in a normative theory is prima facie admissible, in this paper I address two different issues. The first concerns the accuracy of the empirical evidence used by Gaus’s theory, and whether the conclusions advanced by the social scientists on the grounds of this evidence are actually sound. The second issue, on the other hand, concerns the consistency between the empirical assumptions underlying these experiments and the claims of Gaus’s theory. I argue that both concerns are warranted. On the one hand, there is empirical evidence that the rule-following behavior observed in experiments involving mixed motive games is context dependent: the tendency of subjects to follow rules and punish defectors is strongly correlated to the epistemic constraints, such as anonymity, commonly imposed during the experiments. On the other hand, these constraints hardly reflect the circumstances of life in modern societies, which is the context assumed by Gaus’s justificatory theory. I conclude that Gaus’s account of rule-following punishers is not altogether invalidated, but the empirical evidence from experimental economics is insufficient to support it. (shrink)