Purpose. The article aims to comprehend the concept that has a serious anthropological meaning, – a "co-existential educational community" – which points at the real subject and object in the development of the educational reality, as well as to explicate its importance towards understanding the real way of addressing actually to the culture and its acquisition in the pedagogical process. Theoretical basis. To achieve this purpose, the method of categorical-reflexive analysis of texts and problems of real educational realities is used; (...) this allows to involve of such philosophical concepts as "sobornost", "all-unity", "culture" and distinguish their anthropological meaning. Under this approach, philosophical categories are able to appear as internal dimensions of the essence in the educational process, rather than a certain matrix, for which one or another theoretical or practical construction is adjusted. Originality. The originality of the article lies in the actualization of philosophical content in "sobornost" and "all-unity" concepts for philosophical-educational discourse and in solving the question on the real way of entering culture in the context of pedagogical communication. Conclusions. Addressing the idea of a co-existential educational community is able to oppose the widespread superficial notions of the so-called "educational environment" in the pedagogical and psychological literature and orient pedagogical theory and pedagogical practices on the real way of entering the individual into truly human forms of life. It is argued that the co-existential educational community can and should unfold not only "horizontally", but also "vertically", consciously integrating the high culture in itself as a culture of high. The authors emphasized the role of imagination in this process. Education can and should build co-existence with the culture of participants in pedagogical communication. It is with this approach that the education sector can emerge from the systemic crisis and actively oppose those trends in modern social life that increase alienation and depopulation. (shrink)

Various conceptions of philosophy of education have been mooted over the last sixty years. The paper looks at five of these, associated particularly with R. S. Peters, D. W. Hamlyn, David Bakhurst, Philip Kitcher, and Harvey Siegel. It shows differences and sometimes overlaps among these, to do with whether or not philosophy of education should be seen as a branch of philosophy, as central to philosophy as a whole, or as a form of applied philosophy. The paper puts most weight (...) on the last of these while recognizing the importance of work on the enculturation of young human beings as exemplified in Hamlyn’s and Bakhurst’s writings. (shrink)

In recent years there have been increasing calls to ‘decolonize’ the curriculum across different levels of education. This has been met with significant opposition at both the school and university levels. For many, there is a lack of clarity concerning why students, particularly in school, should study a decolonized curriculum. I reflect on the notion of an ‘epistemic urgency’ to decolonize the secondary school curriculum in England, and I focus particularly on History and Religious Education (RE) as examples. Using theories (...) of epistemic injustice, and my own experiences in teaching, I build the case for this ‘urgency’ from two arguments: one from justice and one from purpose. On justice, I argue that current curricula create negative epistemic consequences that we might consider to be unjust. On purpose, I argue that some curricula also fail to meet the purposes that they are intended to meet, thereby creating further negative epistemic consequences. On both arguments, I hope to show that the negative epistemic consequences create an ‘urgency’ to decolonize curricula, which I hope encourages educators in England and beyond to begin considering whether decolonizing their curricula will lead to better outcomes for their learners. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 56, Issue 1, Page 22-28, February 2022.

Paul Hirst’s philosophical ‘conversion’ from forms of knowledge to forms of social practices was largely prompted by his radical reappraisal of the philosophical underpinnings that had validated his classic conception of liberal education. The primary motivation for Hirst’s later works was to remedy his own neglect of practical reason, whose sharp distinction from theoretical reason he acknowledged he had failed to appreciate. There is much to commend in his ‘practical’ turn. The main challenge that remains, however, is that the social (...) practices view is something of a ‘foundationalist’ two-part picture, where overwhelming priority is given to practical reason. I appreciate the importance of the two issues Hirst puts on the table, in his debate with Wilfred Carr particularly and in his later works more generally: the issues of cultivating phronesis and of making sense of the practical character of critical-reflective activities. But I argue that addressing these issues fully requires us to recognize that neither theoretical nor practical rationality can be intelligible apart from the other. To press the point home, I review the analogous debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell over whether to accept, and how to understand, the view that rational conceptuality in a relevant sense pervades not only deliberation and propositional thinking but also perception and embodied coping skills. I conclude by briefly considering the prospect that the legacy of Hirst and recent discussions around human nature, practical rationality, and the formation of reason will interactively enrich our philosophical-educational scholarship. (shrink)