- The Hard Problem Isn’t Getting any Easier: Thoughts on Chalmers’ “Meta-Problem”.Ben White - 2021 - Philosophia 49:495-506.details
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Vagueness and Zombies: Why ‘Phenomenally Conscious’ has No Borderline Cases.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2105-2123.details
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Revelation and physicalism.Kelly Trogdon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2345-2366.details
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The cognitive significance of phenomenal knowledge.Bénédicte Veillet - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2955-2974.details
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Mind-Body Meets Metaethics: A Moral Concept Strategy.Helen Yetter-Chappell & Richard Yetter Chappell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):865-878.details
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The Rise and Fall of the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - forthcoming - In Corine Besson, Anandi Hattiangadi & Romina Padro (eds.), Meaning, Modality and Mind: Essays Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Naming and Necessity. Oxford University Press.details
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Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Phenomenal Knowledge, Imagination, and Hermeneutical Injustice.Martina Fürst - 2024 - In Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran & Christiana Werner (eds.), Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Knowing What It's Like.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):187-209.details
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Acquaintance, knowledge, and value.Emad H. Atiq - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14035-14062.details
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Post-Kantian Idealism and Self-Transformation.G. Anthony Bruno - 2023 - In G. Anthony Bruno & Justin Vlasits (eds.), Transformation and the History of Philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Powerful Qualities, Phenomenal Concepts, and the New Challenge to Physicalism.Henry Taylor - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):53-66.details
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Explanation and the Explanatory Gap.Elanor Taylor - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):77-88.details
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Having it Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not Otherworldly.Andreas Elpidorou - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1181-1203.details
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(1 other version)The sensory basis of the epistemic gap: an alternative to phenomenal concepts.Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2105-2124.details
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Exemplarization: a solution to the problem of consciousness?Martina Fürst - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):141-151.details
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