In the Kuhnian and Post-Kuhnian Philosophy of Science, it is widely accepted that scientific revolutions always involve the replacement of an old paradigm by a new paradigm. This article attempts to refute this assumption by showing that there are paradigm-constellations that conform to the relation of a scientific revolution in a Kuhnian sense without a paradigm-replacement occurring. The paradigms investigated here are the linguistic paradigms of Generative Grammar and Construction Grammar that, contrary to Kuhn’s conception of a sequence of paradigm-replacements, (...) are reconstructed as coexisting competing paradigms. By choosing linguistic paradigms, Kuhn’s assumption that paradigm-led research takes place only in the natural sciences is implicitly challenged, and an insight into linguistic theory-construction largely underrepresented in the philosophy of science is given. (shrink)

In this paper I reconstruct and compare criteria of theoreticity that have been developed by Carnap, Sneed and proponents of the Munich school of structuralist philosophy of science. For this purpose I develop a unified framework in which one can transform model-theoretic theory representations into linguistic ones, and vice versa. This bridges the gap between statement and non-statement view and allows a precise comparison of linguistic and model-theoretic criteria of theoreticity. In the final part I suggest a system of improved (...) definitions of theoreticity and pre-theoreticity. (shrink)