Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Invariance and ontology in relativistic physics.Hans Halvorson - manuscript
    Some philosophers say that in special relativity, four-dimensional stuff is invariant in some sense that three-dimensional stuff is not. I show that this claim is false.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Relativistic Invariance of 4D Shapes.Claudio Calosi - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 50:1-4.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Getting Back in Shape: Persistence, Shape, and Relativity.Jack Himelright & Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In this paper, we will introduce a novel argument (the "Region Argument") that objects do not have frame-independent shapes in special relativity. The Region Argument lacks vulnerabilities present in David Chalmers' argument for that conclusion based on length contraction. We then examine how views on persistence interact with the Region Argument. We argue that this argument and standard four-dimensionalist assumptions entail that nothing in a relativistic world has any shape, not even stages or the regions occupied by them. We also (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Location and Mereology.Cody Gilmore, Claudio Calosi & Damiano Costa - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   83 citations  
  • Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
    Material objects extend through space by having different spatial parts in different places. But how do they persist through time? According to some philosophers, things have temporal parts as well as spatial parts: accepting this is supposed to help us solve a whole bunch of metaphysical problems, and keep our philosophy in line with modern physics. Other philosophers disagree, arguing that neither metaphysics nor physics give us good reason to believe in temporal parts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations