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  1. Introduction: striving for objectivity in space.Tony Cheng & Paul Snowdon - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):791-797.
    In this special issue, we put together papers that explore the theme “objectivity, space, and mind” from various angles. In the introduction we minimally discuss what are involved in this theme.
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  • Object‐Dependent Thought Without Illusion.Solveig Aasen - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):68-84.
    When unknowingly experiencing a perceptual hallucination, a subject can attempt to think specifically about what is, as far as he or she can tell, the perceived object. Is the subject then deceived about his or her cognitive situation? I answer negatively. Moreover, I argue that this answer is compatible with holding that thought specifically about a certain object – singular thought – is object-dependent. By contrast, both critics and advocates of the view that singular thought is object-dependent have assumed this (...)
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  • Belief and Its Neutralization: Husserl’s System of Phenomenology in Ideas I.Marcus Brainard - 2002 - State University of New York Press.
    Presenting the first step-by-step commentary on Husserl’s Ideas I, Marcus Brainard’s Belief and Its Neutralization provides an introduction not only to this central work, but also to the whole of transcendental phenomenology. Brainard offers a clear and lively account of each key element in Ideas I, along with a novel reading of Husserl, one which may well cause scholars to reconsider many long-standing views on his thought, especially on the role of belief, the effect and scope of the epoché, and (...)
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  • Being Somewhere. Egocentic spatial representation as self-representation.Ferdinand Pöhlmann - 2017 - Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler.
    Ferdinand Pöhlmann argues that a sense of one’s own basic abilities to move is a constitutive condition on the ability to perceive the world spatially. This constitutive relation explains why egocentric spatial representation is to be regarded as a kind of self-representation. In arguing for these claims, conceptual as well as empirical questions are discussed and an overview of accounts that take action as a constitutive condition on spatial representation is given. The picture that emerges is linked to the phenomenological (...)
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