Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Normativity of Memory Modification.S. Matthew Liao & Anders Sandberg - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (2):85-99.
    The prospect of using memory modifying technologies raises interesting and important normative concerns. We first point out that those developing desirable memory modifying technologies should keep in mind certain technical and user-limitation issues. We next discuss certain normative issues that the use of these technologies can raise such as truthfulness, appropriate moral reaction, self-knowledge, agency, and moral obligations. Finally, we propose that as long as individuals using these technologies do not harm others and themselves in certain ways, and as long (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Treating Yourself as an Object: Self-Objectification and the Ethical Dimensions of Antidepressant Use.Ginger A. Hoffman - 2012 - Neuroethics 6 (1):165-178.
    In this paper, I offer one moral reason to eschew antidepressant medication in favor of cognitive therapy, all other things being equal: taking antidepressants can be a form of self-objectification. This means that, by taking antidepressants, one treats oneself, in some sense and some cases, like a mere object. I contend that, morally, this amounts to a specific form of devaluing oneself. I argue this as follows. First, I offer a detailed definition of “objectification” and argue for the possibility of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • A Bundle Definition of Scientific Understanding and its Application to Quantum Physics.Vera Spillner - 2009 - Philosophia Naturalis 46 (2):279-305.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Macht uns die Veranderung unserer selbst autonom? Uberlegungen zur Rechtfertigung von Neuro-Enhancement der Emotionen.Monika Betzler - 2009 - Philosophia Naturalis 46 (2):167-212.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Collectively ill: a preliminary case that groups can have psychiatric disorders.Ginger A. Hoffman - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2217-2241.
    In the 2000s, several psychiatrists cited the lack of relational disorders in the DSM-IV as one of the two most glaring gaps in psychiatric nosology, and campaigned for their inclusion in the DSM-5. This campaign failed, however, presumably in part due to serious “ontological concerns” haunting such disorders. Here, I offer a path to quell such ontological concerns, adding to previous conceptual work by Jerome Wakefield and Christian Perring. Specifically, I adduce reasons to think that collective disorders are compatible with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations