AtRepublic9, 583b1–587a2, Socrates argues that the pleasure of the philosophical life is the truest pleasure. I will call this the ‘true pleasure argument’. The true pleasure argument is divisible into two parts: 583b1–585a7 and 585a8–587a2. Each part contains a sub-argument, which I will call ‘the misperception argument’ and ‘the true filling argument’ respectively. In the misperception argument Socrates argues that it is characteristic of irrational men to misperceive as pleasant what in fact is a condition of neither having pleasure nor (...) being pained. In the true filling argument Socrates argues that in so far as pleasure entails somatic or psychic filling and there are more and less true fillings, there are more and less true pleasures. Philosophical filling is the truest filling and thus the truest pleasure. The misperception argument critically contributes to the true pleasure argument by clarifying what pleasure is not: merely an appearance or merely the absence of pain. The misperception argument thereby clears the ground for the constructive contribution of the true filling argument. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of justice fail to recognize that the concepts constitutive of our political practices ? including ?justice? itself? have historically mutable meanings. To recognize the fact of conceptual change entails an alteration in our understanding of justice between generations. Because there can be no transhistorical theory of justice, there can be no valid theory of intergenerational justice either ? especially where the generations in question are distant ones having very different understandings of justice. The upshot is that an earlier (...) generation cannot aspire to act justly toward a later distant generation whose members? understanding of justice differs radically from theirs. Conceptual change and incommensurability render the very idea of intergenerational justice incoherent. Even so, such radical relativism need not entail moral nihilism. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se sostiene que la filosofía práctica de Aristóteles puede dar lugar a dos sentidos distintos de προαίρεσις, los cuales se encuentran relacionados a su vez con dos sentidos distintos de deliberación. El primer sentido de προαίρεσις hace referencia a las elecciones deliberadas particulares, en las que el fin que se busca alcanzar, el deseo relacionado y los medios empleados son de carácter particular y se encuentran circunscritos a la situación concreta en que se realiza la elección. (...) En cambio, el segundo sentido de προαίρεσις se refiere a las elecciones vinculadas con objetivos de mediano y largo plazo, que si bien pueden ser particulares, buscan fines que trascienden la particularidad de la situación dada. Al primer tipo de προαίρεσις le corresponde la "deliberación descendente", mientras que al segundo le corresponde la "deliberación ascendente". Finalmente se presenta un análisis de las características del silogismo práctico de acuerdo a los dos tipos de deliberación. (shrink)