Scholars have often thought that a monistic reading of Aristotle’s definition of the human good – in particular, one on which “best and most teleios virtue” refers to theoretical wisdom – cannot follow from the premises of the ergon argument. I explain how a monistic reading can follow from the premises, and I argue that this interpretation gives the correct rationale for Aristotle’s definition. I then explain that even though the best and most teleios virtue must be a single virtue, (...) that virtue could in principle be a whole virtue that arises from the combination of all the others. I also clarify that the definition of the human good aims at capturing the nature of human eudaimonia only in its primary case. (shrink)

Bernard Suits’ account of play as an autotelic activity has been greatly influential in the philosophy of sport. Suits borrows the notion of ‘autotelicity’ from Aristotle’s ethics, formulating diff...

This dissertation is a study of the relation between Aristotle’s ethics and the crafts (or technai). My thesis is that Aristotle’s argument is at key points shaped by models proper to the crafts, this shaping being deeper than is generally acknowledged, and philosophically more problematic. Despite this, I conclude that the arguments I examine can, if revised, be upheld. The plan of the dissertation is as follows – Preface: The relation of my study to the extant secondary literature; Introduction: The (...) pre-Platonic concept of technē, as evidenced in Greek philosophical and literary sources, in particular the early Hippocratic corpus; Chapter one: The Platonic concept of technē, followed by an investigation of whether Plato affirms a virtue-technē in the Protagoras and Republic; Chapter two: Aristotle’s concept of technē, followed by scrutiny of his arguments in NE VI.5 against a virtue-technē, and of his analyses of slavery and deliberation; Chapter three: An exposition of Aristotle’s function argument, followed by a dominantist interpretation of it, and an explanation of dominantism as in part a technē-influenced doctrine; Chapter four: An examination of Aristotle’s ethical mean and its problems, with a diagnosis of these in terms of influence by the Philebus, and by paradigms derived from the crafts; Chapter five: Argument that Aristotle’s theory of habituation suffers from two significant opacities, these being a function of influence both by the Republic, and by models of craft-learning; Conclusion: Response to key objection; Aristotle’s ethics revised, defended. (shrink)

This book provides a balanced and accessible introduction to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. It carefully and comprehensively follows the thread of Aristotle’s argument and sheds light on topics that all too often receive little attention or are entirely ignored in the existing textbooks (such as self-control, legislative science and the legislator, the life of the money-maker, craft-knowledge, comprehension, and beastliness). Its objective is not only to offer an academically reliable presentation of Aristotle’s Ethics but to also defend Aristotle’s main tenets—or, at (...) least, to present them in their most defensible form. It places the Nicomachean Ethics within the study of ethics generally; students are invited to understand Aristotle’s claims in the light of, or in contrast to, other ethical theories or their own intuitions about ethical matters. It follows the reader of the Nicomachean Ethics in action, registering questions, expectations and progress within an insightful exegesis of Aristotle's philosophical argument. It is replete with pedagogical tools including examples from our concrete everyday experience, paintings, films, and literature, end of chapter summaries, internet resources, suggestions for further reading, study questions, and essay questions. (shrink)