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(How) Is Ethical Neo-Expressivism a Hybrid View?

In Guy Fletcher & Michael R. Ridge (eds.), Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 223-247 (2014)

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  1. (1 other version)Proper Function and Ethical Judgment Towards A Biosemantic Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse.Drew Johnson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2867-2891.
    This paper employs Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic theory of representation to develop a proposal about the function of ethical claims and judgments. I propose that ethical claims and judgments (or ethical ‘affirmations’) have the function of simultaneously tracking the morally salient features of social situations and directing behavior that coordinates in a collectively beneficial way around those features. Thus, ethical affirmations count as a species of what Millikan labels ‘Pushmi-Pullyu’ representations that simultaneously have a descriptive and a directive direction of fit. (...)
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  • (1 other version)Proper Function and Ethical Judgment Towards A Biosemantic Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse.Drew Johnson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2867-2891.
    This paper employs Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic theory of representation to develop a proposal about the function of ethical claims and judgments. I propose that ethical claims and judgments (or ethical ‘affirmations’) have the function of simultaneously tracking the morally salient features of social situations and directing behavior that coordinates in a collectively beneficial way around those features. Thus, ethical affirmations count as a species of what Millikan labels ‘Pushmi-Pullyu’ representations that simultaneously have a descriptive and a directive direction of fit. (...)
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  • (1 other version)Hybrid Speech Acts: A Theory of Normative Thought and Language That ‘Has It Both Ways’.Andrew Morgan - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):785-807.
    In this essay, I propose a novel hybrid metanormative theory. According to this theory, speakers making normative claims express both cognitive and motivational attitudes in virtue of the constitutive norms of the particular speech acts they perform. This view has four principal virtues: it is consistent with traditional semantic theories, it supports a form of motivational judgment internalism that does justice to externalist intuitions, it illuminates the connection between normative language and normative thought, and it explains how speakers can express (...)
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  • (1 other version)Hybrid Speech Acts: A Theory of Normative Thought and Language That ‘Has It Both Ways’.Andrew Morgan - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    In this essay, I propose a novel hybrid metanormative theory. According to this theory, speakers making normative claims express both cognitive and motivational attitudes in virtue of the constitutive norms of the particular speech acts they perform. This view has four principal virtues: it is consistent with traditional semantic theories, it supports a form of motivational judgment internalism that does justice to externalist intuitions, it illuminates the connection between normative language and normative thought, and it explains how speakers can express (...)
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  • Modal Knowledge for Expressivists.Peter Hawke - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (4):1109-1143.
    What does ‘Smith knows that it might be raining’ mean? Expressivism here faces a challenge, as its basic forms entail a pernicious type of transparency, according to which ‘Smith knows that it might be raining’ is equivalent to ‘it is consistent with everything that Smith knows that it is raining’ or ‘Smith doesn’t know that it isn’t raining’. Pernicious transparency has direct counterexamples and undermines vanilla principles of epistemic logic, such as that knowledge entails true belief and that something can (...)
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