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  1. What Makes Discrimination Morally Wrong? A Harm‐Based View Reconsidered.Shu Ishida - 2021 - Theoria 87 (2):483-499.
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  • Intentionalism and Bald-Faced Lies.Daniel W. Harris - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    In Lying and Insincerity, Andreas Stokke argues that bald-faced lies are genuine lies, and that lies are always assertions. Since bald-faced lies seem not to be aimed at convincing addressees of their contents, Stokke concludes that assertions needn’t have this aim. This conflicts with a traditional version of intentionalism, originally due to Grice, on which asserting something is a matter of communicatively intending for one’s addressee to believe it. I argue that Stokke’s own account of bald-faced lies faces serious problems (...)
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