Developmentally, adolescence sits in transition between childhood and adulthood. Involving adolescents in their medical decision-making prompts important and complex ethical questions. Originating in the UK, the concept of Gillick competence is a dominant framework for navigating adolescent medical decision-making from legal, ethical and clinical perspectives and is commonly treated as comprehensive. In this paper, we argue that its utility is far more limited, and hence over-reliance on Gillick risks undermining rather than promoting ethically appropriate adolescent involvement. We demonstrate that Gillick (...) only provides guidance in the limited range of cases where legal decisional authority needs to be clarified. The range of cases where use of Gillick actually promotes adolescent involvement is narrower still, because several features must be present for Gillick to be enacted. Each of these features can, and do, act as barriers to adolescent involvement. Within these limited situations, we argue that Gillick is not specific or strong enough and is reliant on ethically contestable principles. Moreover, in most situations in adolescent healthcare, Gillick is silent on the ethical questions around involving adolescents. This is because it focuses on decisional authority—having the final say in decision-making—which is one small subset of the many ways adolescents could be involved in decision-making. The implication of our analysis is that use of Gillick competence tends to limit or undermine adolescent involvement opportunities. We propose that those working with adolescents should be judicious in seeking Gillick’s guidance, instead drawing on and developing alternative frameworks that provide a comprehensive model for adolescent involvement. (shrink)

Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. To be clear, I do not think that blood transfusions necessarily...

Background Research in children is essential for them to benefit from the outcomes of research but involvement must be weighed against potential harms. In many countries and circumstances, medical research legally requires parental consent until the age of 18 years, with poorly defined recommendations for assent prior to this. However, there is little research exploring how these decisions are made by families and the ethical implications of this. Aim To explore key ethical debates in decision-making for participation of children and (...) adolescents in a human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine trial. Methods Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with Tanzanian girls (aged 9–16 years) who had participated in an HPV vaccine trial (n = 13), their parents or guardians (n = 12), and girls together with their parents (in paired parent-child interviews) (n = 6). The interviews were analysed using thematic analysis. Interview data came from a qualitative acceptability study undertaken as part of the Dose Reduction Immunobridging and Safety Study of Two Human Papillomavirus (HPV) Vaccines in Tanzanian Girls (DoRIS) trial. Results Girls and parents desired collaborative decision-making, with parents ultimately making the decision to consent. However, girls wanted a larger part in decision-making. Decisions to consent involved many people, including extended social networks, the trial team, media outlets and healthcare professionals and this resulted in conflicts to be negotiated. Deciding where to place trust was central in participants and parents considering decisions to consent and overcoming rumours about trial involvement. Conclusions Existing models of decision-making help to understand dynamics between parents, adolescents and researchers but neglect the important wider social impacts and the fundamental nature of trust. Children’s roles in discussions can be evaluated using the principles of consent: autonomy, freedom and information. Concepts such as relational autonomy help to explain mechanisms families use to negotiate complex consent decisions. Whilst interviewees supported the maintenance of legal parental consent, researchers must design consent processes centring the child to ensure that whole family decision-making processes are supported. (shrink)

Bioethicists often remind health care professionals to pay close attention to issues of diversity and inclusion. Approaches to ethics consultation, where the perspective of the bioethicist is taken to be more morally correct or necessarily authoritative, have been critiqued as inappropriately authoritarian. Despite such apparent recognition of the importance of respecting moral diversity and the inclusion of different viewpoints, authoritarianism is all too often the approach adopted, especially as bioethics has shifted evermore into concerns for public policy. Yet, secular values (...) and philosophical principles are not morally neutral; nor are the private moral convictions of bioethicists. Such analysis is always grounded in particular understandings of the right and the good, the virtuous and the just. Critical examination of common treatments and new alternatives is essential for the careful scientific practice of medicine. The same is true with regard to bioethics. Stagnating in customary or accepted claims of a common secular morality or a standard set of bioethical principles out of an unwillingness to explore the real diversity of moral thought, including traditional religious and cultural worldviews, fails to tap the human capacity to find innovative solutions to the complex challenges facing medicine. (shrink)

Whether adolescents should be allowed to make their own medical decisions has been a topic of discussion in bioethics for at least two decades now. Are adolescents sufficiently capacitated to make their own medical decisions? Is the mature-minor doctrine, an uncommon legal exception to the rule of parental decision-making authority, something we should expand or eliminate? Bioethicists have dealt with the curious liminality of adolescents—their being neither children nor adults—in a variety of ways. However, recently there has been a trend (...) to rely heavily, and often exclusively, on emerging neuroscientific and psychological data to answer these questions. Using data from magnetic resonance imaging and functional MRI studies on the adolescent brain, authors have argued both that the adolescent brain isn't sufficiently mature to broadly confer capacity on this population and that the adolescent brain is sufficiently mature to assume adolescent capacity. Scholars then accept these data as sufficient for concluding that adolescents should or should not have decision-making authority. Two critical mistakes are being made here. The first is the expectation that neuroscience or psychology is or will be able to answer all our questions about capacity. The second, and more concerning, mistake is the conflation of decision-making capacity with decision-making authority. (shrink)