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  1. Situated cognition, prescriptive theory, evolution, and something.Jonathan Baron - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):324-326.
    This response agrees with Stanovich's emphasis on the need for decentering, and, in response to Beyth-Marom, attempts to clarify the normative-prescriptive-descriptive distinction and point in the direction of prescriptive models. It takes issue with Cabanac and with Lindsay & Gorayska.
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  • Decentered thought and consequentialist decision making.Keith E. Stanovich - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):323-324.
    Near the end of his target article, Baron argues that we need to address the question of how to conduct education in consequentialist decision making. However, recent trends in education have deemphasized and denigrated decentered and decontextualized thought. It is argued here that perspective decentering and decontextualized thinking are absolutely essential to the development of consequentialist reasoning.
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  • On the description of the prescription.Ruth Beyth-Marom - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):321-321.
    Barons's target article approaches errors in decision-making by defining three kinds of models: normative, descriptive, and prescriptive. Baron's prescriptive model is at the center of this commentary. From a theoretical perspective, is Baron's prescriptive model a set of rules through which one can move from the descriptive to the normative? Or is it a practical goal one can achieve as opposed to a normative unachievable theoretical ideal? Delineating an efficient prescriptive account for decision making necessarily depends on a very specific (...)
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  • Consequences of basing ethical judgments on heuristics.R. O. Lindsay & Barbara Gorayska - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):322-323.
    Baron assumes that ethical decision-making can be evaluated without specifying more general features of the cognitive system within which it occurs. It is suggested that ethical principles are heuristics employed during goal-oriented action planning. Heuristics are bound to generate suboptimal decisions in some cases. It is rational to replace a particular heuristic only when the cost of associated error exceeds the cost of constructing and installing a more successful alternative.
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  • The evolutionary point of view: Rationality is elsewhere.Michel Cabanac - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):322-322.
    Baron has provided some examples of nonconsequentialism in decision making and describes them as biases; these may be the remnants of the biological origin of decision making. One may argue that decisions are made on the basis not of rationality but affective processes. Behavior follows the trend toward maximizing pleasure. This mechanism might explain apparent nonconsequentialism.
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