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  1. Interpreting philosophical interpretations of paraconsistency.Jonas R. Becker Arenhart - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-21.
    In this paper, we critically discuss the idea of a ‘philosophical interpretation’ of paraconsistent logics. We do so by considering the epistemic approach to paraconsistency, by Carnielli and Rodrigues, according to which paraconsistent logics should be interpreted exclusively in terms of non-conclusive evidence, and also, by considering counter-arguments by Barrio and Barrio and Da Re, according to whom paraconsistent logics are not specially tied to any specific interpretation. We begin by presenting the positions involved, and by arguing that the debate (...)
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  • The Liar Paradox: Between Evidence and Truth.Jonas Becker Arenhart & Ederson Safra Melo - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1-23.
    Systems of paraconsistent logics violate the law of explosion: from contradictory premises not every formula follows. One of the philosophical options for interpreting the contradictions allowed as premises in these cases was put forward recently by Carnielli and Rodrigues, with their epistemic approach to paraconsistent logics. In a nutshell, the plan consists in interpreting the contradictions in epistemic terms, as indicating the presence of non-conclusive evidence for both a proposition and its negation. Truth, in this approach, is consistent and is (...)
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  • Hegel’s Interpretation of the Liar Paradox.Franca D’Agostini & Elena Ficara - 2021 - History and Philosophy of Logic 43 (2):105-128.
    In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel develops a subtle analysis of Megarian paradoxes: the Liar, the Veiled Man and the Sorites. In this paper, we focus on Hegel's interpretation of...
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  • Conjunctive paraconsistency.Franca D’Agostini - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6845-6874.
    This article is a preliminary presentation of conjunctive paraconsistency, the claim that there might be non-explosive true contradictions, but contradictory propositions cannot be considered separately true. In case of true ‘p and not p’, the conjuncts must be held untrue, Simplification fails. The conjunctive approach is dual to non-adjunctive conceptions of inconsistency, informed by the idea that there might be cases in which a proposition is true and its negation is true too, but the conjunction is untrue, Adjunction fails. While (...)
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  • Paraconsistent logic.Graham Priest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems.Diego Tajer & Camillo Fiore - 2022 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 31:1-26.
    Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an argument is valid in this logic just in case it necessarily preserves evidence. The authors appeal to this epistemic interpretation to briefly motivate a kind of logical pluralism: “different accounts of logical consequence may preserve different properties of propositions”. The aim of this paper is to study the prospect of (...)
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  • Volume I: Recovery operators in logics of formal inconsistency.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio & Walter Carnielli - 2020 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 28 (5):615-623.
    There are a considerable number of logics that do not seem to share the same inferential principles. Intuitionistic logics do not include the law of the exclude.
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  • The evidence approach to paraconsistency versus the paraconsistent approach to evidence.Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11537-11559.
    In this paper, we analyze the epistemic approach to paraconsistency. This approach is advanced as an alternative to dialetheism on what concerns interpreting paraconsistency and contradictions; instead of having to accept that there are true contradictions, it is suggested that we may understand such situations as involving only conflicting evidence, which restricts contradictions to a notion of evidence weaker than truth. In this paper, we first distinguish two conflicting programs entangled in the proposal: interpreting paraconsistency in general through the notion (...)
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  • Introduction: The Formalization of Dialectics.Elena Ficara & Graham Priest - 2023 - History and Philosophy of Logic 44 (2):115-118.
    The idea at the basis of this special issue is that reopening the old debate about the logical status of Hegel’s dialectics is extremely interesting, for various reasons.1 The first reason is that...
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  • Happy Unhappiness (and Other Stratified Contradictions).Franca D’Agostini - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (5):2423-2440.
    Stratified properties such as ‘happy unhappiness’, ‘ungrounded ground’, ‘fortunate misfortune’, and evidently ‘true falsity’ may generate dialetheias (true contradictions). The aim of the article is to show that if this is the case, then we will have a special, conjunctive, kind of dialetheia: a true state description of the form ‘Fa and not Fa’ (for some property F and object a), wherein the two conjuncts, separately taken, are to be held untrue. The particular focus of the article is on happy (...)
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  • Contradictory Concepts = True Contradictions?Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):585-602.
    Dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true. One common motivation to the view concerns cases of contradictory concepts obtaining together. Allegedly, in these cases, such concepts lead to a true contradiction. In this paper, we argue that this path is closed as a motivation for dialetheism. There are two basic difficulties to articulate the view: i) once contradictory or incompatible concepts are granted to obtain together, there is no longer any reason to claim that they were incompatible to (...)
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  • Two in one: contradictory Christology without gluts?Franca D’Agostini - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-27.
    The central thesis of JC Beall’s paraconsistent Christology is that Christ, being human and divine, is a contradictory being, and a rational Christology can accept it, since logic nowadays does not exclude the possibility of true contradictions. In this paper, I move from Beall’s theory and I present an alternative view. I quote seven statements of the so-called ‘Athanasian Creed’ which synthesizes the results of conciliar Christology. The aim of the Creed is to combat monophysitism by stressing the duplicity and (...)
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  • Hegel’s Interpretation of the Sorites.Franca D’Agostini - 2023 - History and Philosophy of Logic 44 (2):132-150.
    1. The label conjunctive paraconsistency has been adopted to mean a consequence relation whereby ‘p and not p’ does not imply ‘p’ and ‘not p’ separately, so that Simplification in case of contradic...
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  • Models & Proofs: LFIs Without a Canonical Interpretations.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (1):87-112.
    In different papers, Carnielli, W. & Rodrigues, A., Carnielli, W. Coniglio, M. & Rodrigues, A. and Rodrigues & Carnielli, present two logics motivated by the idea of capturing contradictions as conflicting evidence. The first logic is called BLE and the second—that is a conservative extension of BLE—is named LETJ. Roughly, BLE and LETJ are two non-classical logics in which the Laws of Explosion and Excluded Middle are not admissible. LETJ is built on top of BLE. Moreover, LETJ is a Logic (...)
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  • On Barrio, Lo Guercio, and Szmuc on Logics of Evidence and Truth.Abilio Rodrigues & Walter Carnielli - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1-26.
    The aim of this text is to reply to criticisms of the logics of evidence and truth and the epistemic approach to paraconsistency advanced by Barrio [2018], and Lo Guercio and Szmuc [2018]. We also clarify the notion of evidence that underlies the intended interpretation of these logics and is a central point of Barrio’s and Lo Guercio & Szmuc’s criticisms.
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  • Hegel, Beall, and the logic of Vereinigung.Elena Ficara - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-13.
    In 2023, Beall and Ficara present what they call Hegelian conjunctions. A Hegelian conjunction is a true conjunction of contradictory opposites in which the conjuncts, separately taken, are untrue and for which simplification fails. The analysis in Beall & Ficara History and Philosophy of Logic 44 (2) 119-131, 2023 is important for various reasons. First, for overcoming the deleterious state of estrangement between two ways of conceiving and practicing logic, the “dialectical” or “continental” and the “analytical” one. Second, for strengthening (...)
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  • First-order Logics of Evidence and Truth with Constant and Variable Domains.Abilio Rodrigues & Henrique Antunes - 2022 - Logica Universalis 16 (3):419-449.
    The main aim of this paper is to introduce first-order versions of logics of evidence and truth, together with corresponding sound and complete Kripke semantics with variable and constant domains. According to the intuitive interpretation proposed here, these logics intend to represent possibly inconsistent and incomplete information bases over time. The paper also discusses the connections between Belnap-Dunn’s and da Costa’s approaches to paraconsistency, and argues that the logics of evidence and truth combine them in a very natural way.
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