Commentators generally agree that Foucher presumes the resemblance theory of representation and uses it to substantiate external world skepticism. In this paper, I challenge this picture. First, I argue that he does not assume that representation is reducible to, or even just works through, resemblance between representation and object. Indeed, his functional-similarity theory primarily appeals to resemblance between the respective effects the representation and the object (would) have on our minds. I also propose that his argument for the resemblance-requirement of (...) representation depends on the causal likeness principle, and clarify its role in Foucher’s theory. Second, I show that his main interest lies with representation in the sense of truthfully making the object present. Accordingly, when Foucher concludes that we can only represent our own ideas, he merely means that our ideas reveal the ways objects affect us through our senses, as opposed to how they are in themselves. (shrink)