Philosophers of biology have developed an extensive literature on biological functions. Here I propose a treatment of the topic based in social studies of science. I posit that the chief philosophical accounts of biological functions all rest upon a realist ontology of biological functions, one that conceives functions as human-independent qualities of things. Rather than being conceptualised as a property of traits or structures, function should be understood as a status granted by communities acting in accordance with specific domains of (...) knowledge and practice. Function becomes not a property of things, but a collective good: not of things, but by communities. I survey the existing explanations of biological functions from the philosophical literature and identify what I take to be those accounts’ shared complications. I then employ Martin Kusch’s communitarian epistemology as a point of departure for a sociological conception of function and develop an explanation of function that rests on an understan.. (shrink)

InExplaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, Ronald Giere (1988), proposes what he calls a cognitive theory of science (p. 2). Giere intends his view to be a broadly scientific account employing the resources of the cognitive sciences (Giere, 1988, p. 2). This paper argues that Giere does not secure a firm foundation for a cognitive theory of science because he leaves the door wide open for social constructivist interpretations of his views. In order to avoid social constructivism, Giere needs to adopt (...) or develop an objective (i.e. non-conventionalist) concept of similarity. (shrink)

By linking the conceptual and social dynamics of change in science, Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions proved tremendously fruitful for research in science studies. But Kuhn’s idea of incommensurability provoked strong criticism from philosophers of science. In this essay I show how Raimo Tuomela’s Philosophy of Sociality illuminates and strengthens Kuhn’s model of scientific change. After recalling the central features and problems of Kuhn’s model, I introduce Tuomela’s approach. I then show (a) how Tuomela’s conception of group ethos aligns with (...) Kuhn’s notion of paradigms as group commitments, and (b) how Tuomela’s distinction between I-mode and we-mode forms of collective intentionality can capture the shifting paradigmatic commitments in Kuhn’s model of change as a cycle of normal and revolutionary science. But Tuomela’s analysis does not rely on meaning holism, and thus does not involve the problematic notion of incommensurability that burdened Kuhn’s analysis. (shrink)

(1997). Sociology of knowledge and the sociology of scientific knowledge. Social Epistemology: Vol. 11, New Directions in the Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 187-192.

For over 50 years, Minerva has been one of the leading independent journals in the study of ‘science, learning and policy’. Its pages have much to say about the origins and conduct of the ‘intellectual Cold War’, the defence of academic freedom, the emergence of modernization theory, and pioneering strategies in the social studies of science. This paper revisits Minerva through the life and times of its founding Editor, Edward Shils, and traces his influence on its early years – from (...) its association with the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the 1950s, to the higher reaches of research policy in the 1990s. At the close of his life, Minerva continued to espouse Shils’ commitment to what he saw as the fundamental Enlightenment traditions of consensus, civility, and community. In the 21st century, with the achievements of science producing rapid change in every walk of life, his legacy so far retains an established place in the history of scholarship. Whether that legacy will endure – and if so, what role Minerva will play in its defence – remain key questions for the coming generation. (shrink)

This article evaluates the structural conception of interests developed by Margaret Archer as part of her dualist version of critical realism. It argues that this structural analysis of interests is untenable because, first, Archer’s account of the causal influence of interests on agents is contradictory and, second, Archer fails to offer a defensible account of her claim that interests influence agents by providing reasons for action. These problems are explored in relation to Archer’s theoretical and empirical work. I argue for (...) an alternative account of interests that focuses on agents’ understandings of their interests and problems with these understandings. (shrink)

(1983). RATIONALISM AND THE STRONG PROGRAMME OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEKE: RECONCILIATION WITHOUT TEARS. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 1-31.

This article presents a qualitative study, descriptive-interpretive in profile, of the effectiveness in learning about the nature of science of an activity relating to the historical controversy between Pasteur and Liebig on fermentation. The activity was implemented during a course for pre-service secondary science teachers specializing in physics and chemistry. The approach was explicit and reflective. Three research questions were posed: What conceptions of NOS do the PSSTs show after a first reflective reading of the historical controversy?, What role is (...) played by the PSSTs’ whole class critical discussion of their first reflections on the aspects of NOS dealt with in the controversy?, and What changes are there in the PSSTs’ conceptions of NOS after concluding the activity? The data for analysis was extracted from the PSSTs’ group reports submitted at the end of the activity and the audio-recorded information from the whole class discussion. A rubric was prepared to assess this data by a process of inter-rater analysis. The results showed overall improvement in understanding the aspects of NOS involved, with there being a significant evolution in some cases and moderate in others. This reveals that the activity has an educational utility for the education of PSSTs in NOS issues. The article concludes with an indication of some educational implications of the experience. (shrink)

Theory-ladenness is the view that observation cannot function in an unbiased way in the testing of theories because observational judgments are affected by the theoretical beliefs of the observer. Its more radical cousin, incommensurability, argues that because there is no theory-neutral language, paradigms, or worldviews, cannot be compared because in different paradigms the meaning of observational terms is different, even when the word used is the same. There are both philosophical and practical components to these problems. I argue, using a (...) procedurally-defined, theory-neutral experiment that paradigms are indeed commensurable. The practical problems of theory ladenness include experimental design, failure to interpret observations correctly, possible experimenter bias, and difficulties in data acquisition. I suggest that there are methods to deal with these problems, although sometimes they cannot be dealt with completely. I believe that the philosophical problems of theory-ladenness have been solved, although the practical problems remain. (shrink)

This paper explicates the philosophical and epistemological background of the MIRRORS project, which is the starting point of the various contributions in this issue. Developments in the philosophy of science will be discussed, especially the watershed work of Kuhn, in order to analyze further developments in the sociology of science, particularly starting from the Strong Programme. Finally, it will be shown how a multidisciplinary approach in Science & Technology (S&T) studies, as opposed to an interdisciplinary one, is to be preferred. (...) Specifically, the connection between this approach and the modelling and idealizational approaches to science is stressed and defended as the best available approach for the formation of a conscientious democratic knowledge-based society. (shrink)

Introduction to Synthese SI: Systematicity: The Nature of Science?

After the setbacks suffered in the 1970s as a result of the ‘Lighthill Report’ (Lighthill, 1973), the science of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has undergone a dramatic revival of fortunes in the 1980s. But despite the obvious enormity and complexity of the problems tackled by AI, it still remains rather parochial in relation to the import of alternative though potentially fruitful ideas from other disciplines. With this in mind, the aim of the present paper is to utilise ideas from the sociology (...) of science in order to explore some current issues in AI and, in particular, the branch of expert systems.It is argued that the sociology of sciences shares a common focus of enquiry along with AI — namely, the nature of knowledge — and has a role to play in the understanding, design and future development of expert systems. (shrink)

There have been few attempts, so far, to document the history of artificial intelligence. It is argued that the “historical sociology of scientific knowledge” can provide a broad historiographical approach for the history of AI, particularly as it has proved fruitful within the history of science in recent years. The article shows how the sociology of knowledge can inform and enrich four types of project within the history of AI; organizational history; AI viewed as technology; AI viewed as cognitive science (...) and historical biography. In the latter area the historical treatments of Darwin and Turing are compared to warn against the pitfalls of “rational reconstructions” of the past. (shrink)