We shall examine some conceptual tensions in Hick’s ‘pluralism’ in the light of S. Radhakrishnan’s reformulation of classical Advaita. Hick himself often quoted Radhakrishnan’s translations from the Hindu scriptures in support of his own claims about divine ineffability, transformative experience and religious pluralism. However, while Hick developed these themes partly through an adaptation of Kantian epistemology, Radhakrishnan derived them ultimately from Śaṁkara, and these two distinctive points of origin lead to somewhat different types of reconstruction of the diversity of world (...) religions. Our argument will highlight the point that Radhakrishnan is not a ‘pluralist’ in terms of Hick’s understanding of the Real. The Advaitin ultimate, while it too like Hick’s Real cannot be encapsulated by human categories, is, however, not strongly ineffable, because some substantive descriptions, according to the Advaitic tradition, are more accurate than others. Our comparative analysis will reveal that they differ because they are located in two somewhat divergent metaphysical schemes. In turn, we will be able to revisit, through this dialogue between Hick and Radhakrishnan, the intensely vexed question of whether Hick’s version of pluralism is in fact a form of covert exclusivism. (shrink)

Jīvanmukti or ‘living liberation’ has been identified as a distinguishing feature of Indian thought; or, upon drawing a narrower circle, of Hindu thought; and upon drawing an even narrower cocentric circle of Vedānta—of Advaita Vedānta. In some recent studies the cogency of its formulation within Advaita Vedānta has been questioned—but without reference to the testimony of its major modern exemplar, Rama a Mahar i. This paper examines the significance of the life and statements of Rama a Mahar i for the (...) current debate in the context of neo-Hinduism. (shrink)

Jvanmukti or 'living liberation' has been identified as a distinguishing feature of Indian thought; or, upon drawing a narrower circle, of Hindu thought; and upon drawing an even narrower cocentric circle of Vedānta - of Advaita Vedānta. In some recent studies the cogency of its formulation within Advaita Vedānta has been questioned - but without reference to the testimony of its major modern exemplar, Rama a Mahar i (1879-1950). This paper examines the significance of the life and statements of Rama (...) a Mahar i for the current debate in the context of neo-Hinduism. (shrink)

Jivanmukti or 'living liberation' has been identified as a distinguishing feature of Indian thought; or, upon drawing a narrower circle, of Hindu thought; and upon drawing an even narrower cocentric circle of Ved nta—of Advaita Ved nta. In some recent studies the cogency of its formulation within Advaita Ved nta has been questioned—but without reference to the testimony of its major modem exemplar, Ramana Maharsi (1879-1950). This paper examines the significance of the life and statements of Ramana Maharsi for the (...) current debate in the context of neo-Hinduism. (shrink)

The phenomenon of recognition is a point of contention in the debate between the orthodox Hindus and Buddhists on whether the self exists. The Hindus, including Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, argue that recognition evidences the existence of the self, while Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita maintains that there is no self and recognition should be explained in another way. This article examined two disputes, focusing on the two subsidiary aspects of a recognition: memory and self-recognition. For Hindus, it is the existence of the (...) self that makes memory and self-recognition possible. For Buddhists, it is due to the phenomena of memories and self-recognitions that people postulate the existence of the self. I argue that Buddhist explanation of memory is more acceptable, while their debates on self-recognition should be considered as a tie. (shrink)