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Experiencing things together: What is the problem?

Peter Baumann

Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):9 - 26 (2007)

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Two Unities of Consciousness.Elizabeth Schechter - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):197-218.details : This paper argues for a distinction between possession of a unified consciousness and possession of a single stream of consciousness. Although the distinction has widespread applicability in discussions of the structure of consciousness and of pathologies of conscious experience, I will illustrate its importance primarily using the debate about consciousness in split-brain subjects, suggesting that those who have argued that split-brain subjects have two streams of consciousness apiece and those who have argued that they have a unified consciousness may (...) both be right. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 12 citations
How to solve the problem of phenomenal unity: finding alternatives to the single state conception.Wanja Wiese - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (5):811-836.details The problem of phenomenal unity consists in providing a phenomenological characterization of the difference between phenomenally unified and disunified conscious experiences. Potential solutions to PPU are faced with an important challenge. I show that this challenge can be conceived as a phenomenological dual to what is known as Bradley’s regress. This perspective facilitates progress on PPU by finding duals to possible solutions to Bradley’s regress and makes it intelligible why many characterize phenomenal unity in terms of the existence of a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Phenomenology and the unity of consciousness.Graham Peebles - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5455-5477.details The phenomenology of the unity of consciousness can be analyzed in terms of perceptual spatial and object unity. Subject unity—what we commonly understand by “the unity of consciousness”—has no attendant phenomenology. The further, non-phenomenological, effects of unity can be analyzed in terms of the functional notion of access unity. The unity of consciousness in general can therefore be analyzed in terms of access unity. As a consequence, we can avoid the theoretical introduction of problematic notions such as subsumptive or phenomenal (...) unity. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark
The Structure of Consciousness.Lowell Keith Friesen - unknowndetails In this dissertation, I examine the nature and structure of consciousness. Conscious experience is often said to be phenomenally unified, and subjects of consciousness are often self-conscious. I ask whether these features necessarily accompany conscious experience. Is it necessarily the case, for instance, that all of a conscious subject's experiences at a time are phenomenally unified? And is it necessarily the case that subjects of consciousness are self-conscious whenever they are conscious? I argue that the answer to the former is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

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