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  1. Gödel's "slingshot" argument and his onto-theological system.Srećko Kovač & Kordula Świętorzecka - 2015 - In Kordula Świętorzecka (ed.), Gödel's Ontological Argument: History, Modifications, and Controversies. Semper. pp. 123-162.
    The paper shows that it is possible to obtain a "slingshot" result in Gödel's theory of positiveness in the presence of the theorem of the necessary existence of God. In the context of the reconstruction of Gödel's original "slingshot" argument on the suppositions of non-Fregean logic, this is a natural result. The "slingshot" result occurs in sufficiently strong non-Fregean theories accepting the necessary existence of some entities. However, this feature of a Gödelian theory may be considered not as a trivialisation, (...)
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  • Do We Need Mathematical Facts?Wojciech Krysztofiak - 2014 - History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (1):1-32.
    The main purpose of the paper concerns the question of the existence of hard mathematical facts as truth-makers of mathematical sentences. The paper defends the standpoint according to which hard mathematical facts do not exist in semantic models of mathematical theories. The argumentative line in favour of the defended thesis proceeds as follows: slingshot arguments supply us with some reasons to reject various ontological theories of mathematical facts; there are two ways of blocking these arguments: through the rejection of the (...)
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  • Hyper-Slingshot. Is Fact-Arithmetic Possible?Wojciech Krysztofiak - 2015 - Foundations of Science 20 (1):59-76.
    The paper presents a new argument supporting the ontological standpoint according to which there are no mathematical facts in any set theoretic model of arithmetical theories. It may be interpreted as showing that it is impossible to construct fact-arithmetic. The importance of this conclusion arises in the context of cognitive science. In the paper, a new type of slingshot argument is presented, which is called hyper-slingshot. The difference between meta-theoretical hyper-slingshots and conventional slingshots consists in the fact that the former (...)
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