This paper investigates how social enterprises navigate through the ethical complexity of social change and extends the ethical quandaries faced by social enterprises beyond organisational boundaries. Building on the emerging literature on the ethics of SEs, I conceptualise ethics as an engagement with power relations. I develop theoretical arguments to understand the interaction between ethical predispositions of a SE and the normative structure of the social system in which it operates. I applied this conceptualisation in a hierarchical and heterogeneous rural (...) Indian context to provide insights into the moral ambiguity of ethical decision-making and suggest pathways for ethical actions. Taking a qualitative case study approach, I followed an exemplary SE’s implementation process in India. I observed ethical challenges in designing the implementation process, selecting the beneficiaries and sustaining the programme. I also identified three actions of the SE—the action of recognition, the action of reposition and the action of collaboration—and developed a transformative process model. I discuss the theoretical implications of this research for SEs and recommend a critical engagement with ethical theories to address systemic problems. (shrink)

This article investigates the capacity of artificial intelligence (AI) systems to claim the right to self-determination while exploring the prerequisites for individuals or entities to exercise control over their own destinies. The paper delves into the concept of autonomy as a fundamental aspect of self-determination, drawing a distinction between moral and legal autonomy and emphasizing the pivotal role of dignity in establishing legal autonomy. The analysis examines various theories of dignity, with a particular focus on Hannah Arendt’s perspective. Additionally, the (...) article discusses the influence of societal perceptions on AI, illustrating how AI's interactions in social contexts can shape public attitudes and compliance with legal rights. Ultimately, the article emphasizes the necessity of a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between AI, dignity, and the legal framework governing human rights, stressing the significance of recognizing dignity and societal acceptance in determining AI’s right to self-determination. (shrink)

This paper argues that the concept of dignity should be understood as a concept that we use to describe an aggregate of values and qualities of a person or thing that deserves esteem and respect. The primary value that creates the right to have dignity is life. The degree of dignity a life form has depends on its place in the evolutionary scale. Human beings are the highest form of life so they possess the highest degree of dignity.

The practice of placing men and women in the same hospital room (mixed gender rooms) has been prohibited in the UK National Health Service for over a decade. However, recent research demonstrates that the practice is common and increasing in a major New Zealand public hospital. Reports and complaints show that the practice also occurs in Australia. We argue that mixed gender rooms violate the fundamental human rights of personal security and dignity. The high rates of cognitive impairment, sensory impairment (...) and frailty in hospital wards exacerbates the risk for these violations and subsequent harm. We argue for the adoption of specific national policies prohibiting mixed gender rooms and public reporting of breaches. Importantly, these guidelines can be adopted without compromising the rights of gender minorities. In the long term, hospitals should be built with single occupancy rooms. (shrink)

In this paper, I address human-induced environmental ills we face using an ubuntu-inspired ethical lens. I follow ubuntu scholars to stress the significance for moral agents to embody virtues. Virtue development is essential to carry out obligations and address human impacts on the environment. Thaddeus Metz, in particular, has drawn attention to how embodying ubuntu virtues of humility and friendliness can prompt moral agents to be other-regarding. The view I developed in this paper differs from his ubuntu-inspired account in at (...) least two significant ways. First, humans cannot be in harmonious relationships with some species such as Black Mambas, Hyenas and sea urchins even if they can interact. Second, we must acknowledge the consequentialist dimension of ubuntu ethics and prioritise the different aspects of ubuntu ‘mixed’ ethics, ranking them to offer possibilities for a more realistic recommendation to change our moral life. This paper demonstrates that the three dimensions of ubuntu ‘mixed’ ethics are fundamental because we need to think about moral consequences, right action and our virtue in accounting for our actions. (shrink)

Is there a difference between human beings and those based on artificial intelligence that would affect their ability to be subjects of dignity? This paper first examines the philosophical notion of dignity as Immanuel Kant derives it from the moral autonomy of the individual. It then asks whether animals and AI systems can claim Kantian dignity or whether there is a sharp divide between human beings, animals and AI systems regarding their ability to be subjects of dignity. How this question (...) is answered depends crucially on one’s understanding of what constitutes human dignity and autonomy, and what requirements one places upon systems in order for them to be seen as morally autonomous. (shrink)

Kant has traditionally been read as an excessively moralistic critic of lying in his ethics and politics. In response, recent scholars have noted that for Kant we have an ethical duty not to be completely candid, but rather we should practice reticence and simulate virtues even when we do not have them. This article argues that Kant extends the value of dissimulation and simulation beyond the interpersonal to society and politics. By examining three examples—politeness and decorum in society, and the (...) veiled relationships between the rich and the poor and between government and the people in politics—this article further challenges the received reading of Kant as a defender of truth at all costs and reveals him to be much more attentive to the need for pretense, reserve, and appearance than is commonly understood. (shrink)

This paper explores the new frontier within Kantian scholarship which suggests that Kant places so much special importance on the value of rational nature that the supreme principle of morality and the concept of human dignity are both grounded on it. Advocates of this reading argue that the notion of autonomy and dignity should now be considered as the central claim of Kant’s ethics, rather than the universalisation of maxims. Kant’s ethics are termed as repugnant for they place a high (...) demand on the universalisation of maxims as a universal moral principle. As a result, they argue that there is an urgent need to rescue Kant’s ethics from the controversies surrounding maxims and universalisability, and the best way to rescue his ethics is by “leaving deontology behind”. It must be left behind because the categorical imperative is not needed in order to rescue Kant’s ethics, as deontology is often overrated. Consequently, the highest duties of the human being are to ensure that his fellow human beings enjoy unhindered autonomy and receive the honour that their dignity duly deserves, as well as to look after their welfare and treat them with respect, regardless of their dispositions. I review recent literature to appraise this new frontier within Kantian scholarship. I also explore the works of philosophers, such as Herman, Korsgaard, Wood, Höffe, and, specifically, Hill, on Kant’s conception of human dignity in relation to its conception as autonomy, humanity, and the source of human rights. (shrink)

Kant has traditionally been read as an excessively moralistic critic of lying in his ethics and politics. In response, recent scholars have noted that for Kant we have an ethical duty not to be com...

This paper argues that the concept of dignity played an important role in the political thought of Edmund Burke. It seeks to show that, in contrast with the egalitarian and individual version of dignity associated with Immanuel Kant, Burke devised a conception of dignity that rested on reverence, grandeur and formality, to be manifested through institutions, customs, and social relations. Burkean dignity was thus closely linked with the ancient constitution. In his thought, dignity played an essential role in maintaining social (...) stability and ensuring wise governance. This conviction informed Burke’s opposition to the French Revolution, which he feared would destroy the conditions necessary for dignity to thrive. Unpicking Burke’s understanding of dignity thus gives us new insights into the intricacies of his political thought and another perspective on his opposition to the French Revolution. (shrink)

The paper attempts to explore the implications of Kant's moral criticism of suicide in the case of euthanasia. The paper argues that since Kant's criticism of suicide is essentially directed towards rational beings who are in full control of their rational faculty. It would hence not be applicable in case of individuals who are suffering from dementia and who have expressed a prior desire to be euthanized in such a scenario.

Ethics exists among beings that can relate to one another and who can create change in one another. Although this may appear as a simple truism, the implications of relation and change in bioethics are manifold. For instance, one can relate not only to others, but also can enter into self-relation by relating to oneself. Self-relation problematizes autonomy insofar as one does not have immediate access to all of oneself and so therefore also does not immediately fully determine oneself in (...) the way that an uncomplicated understanding of autonomy might imply. This article proceeds as a preliminary exposition of the concepts of relation and change as they apply to bioethics, particularly as they inform autonomy, action theory, and the porous subject. (shrink)

In classical literature on Islamic human rights, the concepts of dignity and honour are used interchangeably. Distinguishing modern and pre-modern conceptions of human life’s value, dignity represents a value everyone possesses simply in virtue of being human, regardless of social hierarchy or religious preference. Honour, on the contrary, demonstrates a status which someone achieves because of a religious or societal preference. I will explain this difference further, relying on the works of Peter Berger and Charles Taylor. Afterwards, I argue that (...) a large group of Muslim scholars who have tried to articulate a coherent Islamic version of human rights have neglected this crucial difference. I will focus my discussion on two scholars, Abdulaziz Sachedina and Mohammad Hashim Kamali, as examples of scholars who have neglected the difference. My conclusion is that anybody who intends to confront this topic must be clear about the difference between dignity and honour; otherwise, any argument for the compatibility or incompatibility in question is doomed to failure. (shrink)

The idea of human rights either as a moral system or as a set of legal practices does not sit well with the concept of honor. This is true for both ontological reasons and because of some reprehensible misuses of the term in constructs such as “honor killings.” Yet the absence of honor as an argument for human rights comes with a high cost in the defense of human rights generally. As Hobbes made clear in his early theory, rights—and dignity—are (...) grounded in the human capacity to make promises and in the necessity of honoring them. In his view then, honor is an essential feature of human rights and one closely linked to the human capacity for dignity. In this article, I explore how environmental human rights place a renewed emphasis on honor as a requirement for the protection of the rights of future generations. In the process, I explore the general relationship between honor, dignity, and human rights. (shrink)

The historical making of human dignity is usually understood either as a result of a progressive history of the recognition of the human being’s worthiness or as an upward equalization of ranks. Th...

This article addresses the sensitive topic of human rights issues in Indonesia through a Kantian analysis. Cases of human rights violations are a common occurrence in Indonesia. Presently, human rights violations in the country are assessed from historical and legal perspectives. However, there is little commitment or willingness on the part of the Indonesian government to protect and defend the principles of human rights. This article is attempts to utilize arguments from political philosophy that can contextualize the protection and implementation (...) of human rights in Indonesia, through an analysis of the concept of social contract in Immanuel Kant’s political philosophy. According to Kant, freedom and equality are natural rights. This article demonstrates that Kant's social contract theory is linear with his formal moral philosophy. In his explanation, ‘contract’ is unified will. Therefore, the Indonesian state with its power is responsible to implement the will of the public to ensure order and rule of law and to protect the rights and freedom of each individual. (shrink)