Avicenna’s discussion of future contingent propositions is sometimes considered to entail metaphysical indeterminism. In this paper, I argue that his logical analysis of future contingent statements is best understood in terms of the epistemic modality of those statements, which has no consequences for modal metaphysics. This interpretation is corroborated by hitherto neglected material concerning the question of God’s knowledge of particulars. In the Taʿlīqāt, Avicenna argues that God knows particulars by knowing their complete causes, and when contrasted with the human (...) knowledge of particulars, this epistemically superior access shows that the contingency of statements about future particulars is not due to the modal properties of real particulars but to the nature of human access to them. (shrink)

This study examines a number of different answers to the question: wheredoes Avicenna demonstrate the existence of God within the Metaphysics of the Healing? Many interpreters have contended that there is an argument for God’s existence in Metaphysics of the Healing I.6–7. In this study I show that such views are incorrect and that the only argument for God’s existence in the Metaphysics of the Healing is found in VIII.1–3. My own interpretation relies upon a careful consideration of the scientific (...) order and first principles of the Metaphysics of the Healing, paying attention to Avicenna’s own explicit statements concerning the goals andintentions of different books and chapters, and a close analysis of the structure ofthe different arguments found in the relevant texts of the Metaphysics of the Healing. I conclude that Avicenna’s explicit goal in I.6–7 is to establish the properties that belong to necessary existence and possible existence, which consists, not in ademonstration of God’s existence, but in a dialectical treatment of the first principlesof metaphysics. (shrink)

RésuméDans cet article, je pose le problème suivant: quelles propositions ont un import dans la logique modale d'Avicenne? Lesquelles n'en ont pas? Partant de l'assomption que les propositions singulières et quantifiées ont un import si elles requièrent l'existence de leur sujet pour être vraies, j'analyse d'abord l'import des propositions absolues, ensuite celui des propositions modales en tenant compte des définitions d'Avicenne et des relations entre ces propositions. Cette analyse conduit aux résultats suivants: Avicenne défend l'opinion générale selon laquelle les affirmatives, (...) qu'elles soient modales ou assertoriques, ont un import alors que les négatives n'en ont pas. Il attribue un import aux propositions possibles affirmatives aussi bien dans l'interprétation externaliste que dans l'interprétation internaliste des logiciens post-Avicenniens, pourvu que le sujet ne soit pas impossible. Toutefois, la théorie n'est pas toujours claire, car Avicenne attribue un import aux propositions contenant ‘parfois non’ et aux nécessaires négatives contenant ‘tant qu'il est P’ malgré leur caractère négatif; les propositions nécessaires affirmatives contenant ‘tant qu'il est P’ sont considérées comme ayant un import alors qu'elles ne l'exigent pas. De plus, l'analyse qu'il donne des assertoriques spéciales E et O et de leurs contradictoires est erronée, ce qui ne permet pas de déterminer clairement leur import. Mais quand elles sont correctement analysées, ces propositions E et O n'ont pas d'import, alors que leurs contradictoires – les assertoriques spéciales I et A respectivement – ont un import. (shrink)

In this paper, I raise the following problem: How does Avicenna define modalities? What oppositional relations are there between modal propositions, whether quantified or not? After giving Avicenna's definitions of possibility, necessity and impossibility, I analyze the modal oppositions as they are stated by him. This leads to the following results: The relations between the singular modal propositions may be represented by means of a hexagon. Those between the quantified propositions may be represented by means of two hexagons that one (...) could relate to each other.This is so because the exact negation of the bilateral possible, i.e. ‘necessary or impossible’ is given and applied to the quantified possible propositions.Avicenna distinguishes between the scopes of modality which can be either external or internal . His formulations are external unlike al-F̄ar̄ab̄;’s ones. However his treatment of modal oppositions remains incomplete because not all the relations between the modal propositi.. (shrink)

In his Parts of Animals, Aristotle distinguishes three modes of the necessary.However, it is not clear just what these three modes are.Nor is it clear how this passage fits with other texts where A...

This study examines the Foucauldian notion of “parrhesia” within the context of curricular practices through a renewal of scholarly interest in Islamic metaphysics as represented by the Avicennean modalities of reality: necessity, contingency, and possibility. It explores the role of contingency in advancing educational practices that generate inclusive dissemination of knowledge that captures the language of Tajdeed (legitimate renovation) in Islamic education. This article argues that contingency, as a causality-oriented modality, determines whether meaning is relative or absolute, while necessity, as (...) an acknowledgment of universal truth, slips into demagoguery that can be used to canonize strict textualism and absolutism. Contingency is defined here as a practice that stimulates synthesis and dialogical understanding of knowledge. Accordingly, the study asks the following questions: How does infusing the Avicennean concept of contingency into curriculum practices offer opportunities for inclusivity and free speech? How can revisiting Islamic cosmological modalities help Muslim educators and curriculum writers move into the broader path of inclusive pedagogies? From an educational position, the article introduces a curriculum of metaphysics that advocates the implementation of contingency, which is considered essential to parrhesia and democracy. It also draws attention to an anti-metaphysical attitude that is generally present in curriculum theorizing. Accordingly, Metaphysics is invoked to challenge a state of flux or hegemonized assumptions; hence, metaphysics validates parrhesia. (shrink)