John Broome defends what he calls ‘Enkrasia’, which is roughly this: Rationality requires of you that if you believe that you ought to do A, you intend to do A. He provides two arguments for Enkrasia. First, he argues for what he calls ‘enkratic reasoning’: ‘I ought to do A. So I shall do A’. Second, he also provides the following line of argument: Enkrasia is the requirement not to be akratic; akrasia is irrational; so Enkrasia is a rational requirement. (...) The purpose of this paper is to show that these two arguments are not successful. For this purpose, I argue for two things. The alleged enkratic reasoning is not a genuine rule of reasoning. And it is not appropriate to understand Enkrasia in terms of akrasia, either. (shrink)

When it comes to name-calling, structural realists have heard pretty much all of it. Among the many insults, they have been called ‘empiricist anti-realists’ but also ‘traditional scientific realists’. Obviously the collapse accusations that motivate these two insults cannot both be true at the same time. The aim of this paper is to defend the epistemic variety of structural realism against the accusation of collapse to traditional scientific realism. In so doing, I turn the tables on traditional scientific realists by (...) presenting them with a dilemma. They can either opt for a construal of their view that permits epistemic access to non-structural features of unobservables but then face the daunting task of substantiating a claim that seems to have little hope of being true or they can drop the requirement of epistemic access to non-structural features but then face a collapse to epistemic structural realism. There is thus only one well supported way to be a realist. No wonder then that many traditional scientific realists have over the years expressed views that are strikingly similar to epistemic structural realism. It is high time to let these epistemic structural realists out of the closet. (shrink)

Tradition compels me to write dissertation acknowledgements that are long, effusive, and unprofessional. Fortunately for me, I heartily endorse that tradition.

When it comes to name-calling, structural realists have heard pretty much all of it. Among the many insults, they have been called ‘empiricist anti-realists’ but also ‘traditional scientific realists’. Obviously the collapse accusations that motivate these two insults cannot both be true at the same time. The aim of this paper is to defend the epistemic variety of structural realism against the accusation of collapse to traditional scientific realism. In so doing, I turn the tables on traditional scientific realists by (...) presenting them with a dilemma. They can either opt for a construal of their view that permits epistemic access to non-structural features of unobservables but then face the daunting task of substantiating a claim that seems to have little hope of being true or they can drop the requirement of epistemic access to non-structural features but then face a collapse to epistemic structural realism. There is thus only one well supported way to be a realist. No wonder then that many traditional scientific realists have over the years expressed views that are strikingly similar to epistemic structural realism. It is high time to let these epistemic structural realists out of the closet. (shrink)

One of the main article goals are going to be especially analytical, comparing as well as deductive English language specialised reflections of this philosopher and aesthetics-studious person together with our Slovak and Czech language sources. The part of our work is going to be also concentrated on the previous conferential reflections, but an addition of the next, not only her bookish and past characteristics, but also the current Internet ones, that are an integral part of our life and inevitable information (...) sources, is going to be presented too. All these considerations´ result should be the following, closer Langer´s clarification in the 20th and 21st century aesthetics-philosophical world. Due to all the above mentioned ideas, the next article goal of the same interest relevance is going to happen the comparative current/modern authors theories of the philosophical-aesthetics art world insight, concerning the understood and reflected Susanne Langer´s part of her lifetime work so far. Our research should then be focused on closer assembling of our answer to the continually ongoing question about the philosophy of art and aesthetics´s meaning and message of this controversial american philosophical and aesthetics world figure. (shrink)

Becker argued Confucianism lacked of argumentation, dialogue and debate. However, Becker is wrong. First, the purpose of philosophical argumentation is to justify an arguer’s philosophical standpoints. Second, both Confucius’ Analects and Mencius’ Mencius were written in forms of dialogues. Third, the content of each book is the recorded utterance and the purpose of dialogue is to persuade its audience. Finally, after Confucius, Confucians’ works have either argued for those unjustified standpoints or re-argued about some justified viewpoints in the Analects.

For Latin American philosophers, the quality of their own philosophy is a recurrent issue. Why hasn’t it produced any internationally recognized figure, tradition, or movement? Why is it mostly unknown inside and outside Latin America? Although skeptical answers to these questions are not new, they have recently shifted to some critical-thinking competences and dispositions deemed necessary for successful philosophical theorizing. Latin American philosophers are said to lack, for example, originality in problem-solving, problem-making, argumentation, and to some extent, interpretation. Or does (...) the problem arise from their vices of “arrogant reasoning?” On my view, all of these answers are incomplete, and some even self-defeating. Yet they cast some light on complex, critical-thinking virtues and vices that play a significant role in philosophical thinking. (shrink)

یکی از مهم ترین مسائل فلسفی ،کلامی و عرفانی که کارکرد تربیتی مؤثر بویژه در تربیت توحیدی دارد ، تاثیر عوامل غیر معرفتی نظیر اراده ، ملکات نفسانی و الگو های رفتاری ، امیال ، عواطف و اغراض در فرآیند ادراکات آدمی از قبیل نگرش های انسان شناختی ، خدا شناختی ، جهان شناختی ، و درک او از معنای زندگی و حیات طیبه و... است. این بحث پلی ارتباطی میان دو حوزه معرفت شناسی و اخلاق محسوب می شود. این (...) مقاله بر آن است تا ضمن بررسی دقیق تر این ادعا، دیدگاه مولانا را در این خصوص جویا شود.اینکه مولوی نیز به تأثیر ساحت های غیر عقیدتی بر ساحت عقاید و باور ها معتقد بوده است ، مهم ترین سخن این نوشته است. ازاین رو مهم ترین مصادیق عوامل غیر معرفتی که موجب شفافیت یا کدورت شناخت بشری می شود ، معرفی شده و با درک آراء مولوی در این زمینه، به اهمیت عوامل غیر معرفتی در مبانی معرفتی انسان پرداخته شده است. (shrink)

In British and American anthropological literature, the ethnology of Central and Eastern European countries has shared in the plight of descriptions of this part of the world: it was seen as exotic, foreign, remote, a backwater, focused on sideline problems and situated on the periphery of this field of science. This state of affairs has been the case since at least the beginning of the Cold War as the descriptions of the national characters of Eastern Bloc communities, drafted by American (...) scholars. The ethnography of these countries was automatically aligned with the same categories of description which were applied to the characteristics of these communities. This was, in part, an effect of entirely different research traditions in the subject matter, objectives and methods of these remote parts of the science. The differences of ’cultural wholes’ did have a decisive impact on the image of ethnology. Like all these communities, Polish ethnology was perceived as a homogeneous whole, which it never was. (shrink)