Newtonian theory has usually been accepted as a paradigm example of an explanation. There are two widely known analyses of what makes it so. According to one analysis, the deductive and predictive nature of the theory is what counts. The second analysis emphasizes the ability of the theory to connect widely different events and laws. The present paper proposes a third analysis stressing three characteristics. (1) The explanation includes a description which is in part of something unobserved. (2) The description (...) is true in the sense of corresponding to the facts. (3) Through the description, the explanation confers "naturalness" upon the thing explained. (shrink)

Of the three views of theoretical knowledge which form the focus of this article, the first has its source in the work of Russell, the second in Ramsey, and the third in Carnap. Although very different, all three views subscribe to a principle I formulate as ‘the structuralist thesis’; they are also naturally expressed using the concept of a Ramsey sentence. I distinguish the framework of assumptions which give rise to the structuralist thesis from an unproblematic emphasis on the importance (...) of ‘structural’ differences for the analysis and interpretation of theories belonging to the exact sciences, and I review a number of logical properties of Ramsey sentences using very simple arithmetical theories and their models. I then develop a reconstruction of the views of Russell, Ramsey, and Carnap that clarifies the interrelationships among them by appealing to aspects of the arithmetical examples that inform my discussion of Ramsey sentences. I conclude with an account of the philosophical basis of the structuralist thesis and the fundamental difficulty to which it leads. (shrink)

. — The issues of realism and ontologically more chaste views are discussed within the context of constructivist as opposed to non‐constructivist approaches to scientific theories. Although many take non‐constructivistic interpretations to require the existence of all the elements of theories, this essay argues against that conclusion. A consideration of the use of the analytic‐synthetic distinction and the greater fruitfulness of theories interpreted realistically both arrive at negative results. And since no simple criterion of reality is known, it is concluded (...) that no simple methodology for pruning or for justifying elements of theories can be found. (shrink)