In diesem Aufsatz geht es mir darum, einen verantwortungsethischen Ansatz in der Konsumentenethik zu entwickeln, der jüngste Debatten zu Kollektivierungs- und Institutionalisierungspflichten zusammenführt. Erstens werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass die Zuschreibungskriterien für individuelle Kollektivierungspflichten, die am Beispiel kleinformatiger unstrukturierter Gruppen entwickelt werden, auch von großräumigen Gruppen erfüllt werden. Daher vertrete ich zweitens die These, dass jeder Einzelperson qua Mitwirkende in der,Gruppe‘ aller Konsumierenden eine je individuelle Pflicht zugeschrieben werden kann, gemeinsame Handlungen gegen ausbeuterische Marktstrukturen zu organisieren. Drittens und ausblickend werde (...) ich zeigen, dass ethischer Konsum bereits als eine politische Handlung verstanden und gerechtfertigt werden kann, die darauf abzielt, Compliance mit politischen Reformen zu signalisieren und andere dazu aufzufordern. (shrink)

In this article, I critically reassess Iris Marion Young's late works, which centre on the distinction between liability and social connection responsibility. I concur with Young's diagnosis that structural injustices call for a new conception of responsibility, but I reject several core assumptions that underpin her distinction between two models and argue for a different way of conceptualising responsibility to address structural injustices. I show that Young's categorical separation of guilt and responsibility is not supported by the writings of Hannah (...) Arendt, which Young draws on, and that it is also untenable on independent systematic grounds. Furthermore, I argue that several of Young's other criteria fail to clearly demarcate two distinct phenomena. I therefore propose to transcend Young's distinction between two models in favour of a related, but conceptually different distinction between two forms of responsibility: interactional and structural. Embracing this terminology facilitates the conceptualisation of the general features of responsibility that are shared by both forms, including their retrospective and prospective time-direction and their applicability to individual, joint and group agency. The distinction between interactional and structural responsibility also yields a more compelling general account of the role of background structures, and of blame within ascriptions of political responsibility. (shrink)