We propose a reconstruction of the constellation of problems and philosophical positions on the nature and number of the primitives of logic in four authors of the nineteenth century logical scene: Peano, Padoa, Frege and Peirce. We argue that the proposed reconstruction forces us to recognize that it is in at least four different senses that a notation can be said to be simpler than another, and we trace the origins of these four senses in the writings of these authors. (...) We conclude that Frege, and even more so Peirce, developed new notations not to make drawing logical conclusions easier but in order to answer the needs of logical analysis. (shrink)

We propose a reconstruction of the constellation of problems and philosophical positions on the nature and number of the primitives of logic in four authors of the nineteenth century logical scene: Peano, Padoa, Frege and Peirce. We argue that the proposed reconstruction forces us to recognize that it is in at least four different senses that a notation can be said to be simpler than another, and we trace the origins of these four senses in the writings of these authors. (...) We conclude that Frege, and even more so Peirce, developed new notations not to make drawing logical conclusions easier but in order to answer the needs of logical analysis. (shrink)

Spider diagrams are based on Euler and Venn/Peirce diagrams, forming a system which is as expressive as monadic first order logic with equality. Rather than being primarily intended for logicians, spider diagrams were developed at the end of the 1990s in the context of visual modelling and software specification. We examine the original goals of the designers, the ways in which the notation has evolved and its connection with the philosophical origins of the logical diagrams of Euler, Venn and Peirce (...) on which spider diagrams are based. Using Peirce’s concepts and classification of signs, we analyse the ways in which different sign types are exploited in the notation. Our hope is that this analysis may be of interest beyond those readers particularly interested in spider diagrams, and act as a case study in deconstructing a simple visual logic. Along the way, we discuss the need for a deeper semiotic engagement in visual modelling. (shrink)

Mercier and Sperber (MS) have ventured to undermine an age-old assumption in logic, namely the presence of premise-conclusion structures, in favor of two novel claims: that reasoning is an evolutionary product of a reason-intuiting module in the mind, and that theories of logic teach next to nothing about the mechanisms of how inferences are drawn in that module. The present paper begs to differ: logic is indispensable in formulating conceptions of cognitive elements of reasoning, and MS is no less exempt (...) from taking notice of premise-conclusion structures than the commonplace theories of reasoning are. Our counterclaim is realized in terms of diagrammatic reasoning dating back to Charles Peirce’s pragmaticism. The upshot is that pragmatist logic restores the premise-conclusion structures in argumentation, supplants reason-intuition module with logical content, and validates good reasoning as an indispensable resource evident to all rational minds that claim ownership of reason and understanding. (shrink)

Expressively equivalent logical languages can enunciate logical notions in notationally diversified ways. Frege’s Begriffsschrift, Peirce’s Existential Graphs, and the notations presented by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus all express the sentential fragment of classical logic, each in its own way. In what sense do expressively equivalent notations differ? According to recent interpretations, Begriffsschrift and Existential Graphs differ from other logical notations because they are capable of “multiple readings.” We refute this interpretation by showing that there are at least three different kinds (...) of such multiple readings. While readings of the first kind do not capture any essential difference among notations but only among vocabularies, corresponding to readings of the second and the third kind two general parameters according to which notations may differ are defined: linearity vs. non-linearity, and tabularity vs. non-tabularity. This answers the question of how there can be substantially different but expressively equivalent logical notations. (shrink)

This paper presents an enrichment of the Gabbay–Woods schema of Peirce’s 1903 logical form of abduction with illocutionary acts, drawing from logic for pragmatics and its resources to model justified assertions. It analyses the enriched schema and puts it into the perspective of Peirce’s logic and philosophy.

This article investigates Charles Peirce’s development of logical calculi for classical propositional logic in 1880–1896. Peirce’s 1880 work on the algebra of logic resulted in a successful calculus for Boolean algebra. This calculus, denoted byPC, is here presented as a sequent calculus and not as a natural deduction system. It is shown that Peirce’s aim was to presentPCas a sequent calculus. The law of distributivity, which Peirce states in 1880, is proved using Peirce’s Rule, which is a residuation, inPC. The (...) transitional systems of the algebra of the copula that Peirce develops since 1880 paved the way to the 1896 graphical system of the alpha graphs. It is shown how the rules of the alpha system reinterpret Boolean algebras, answering Peirce’s statement that logical graphs supply a new system of fundamental assumptions to logical algebra. A proof-theoretic analysis is given for the connection betweenPCand the alpha system. (shrink)

We describe Peirce’s 1903 system of modal gamma graphs, its transformation rules of inference, and the interpretation of the broken-cut modal operator. We show that Peirce proposed the normality rule in his gamma system. We then show how various normal modal logics arise from Peirce’s assumptions concerning the broken-cut notation. By developing an algebraic semantics we establish the completeness of fifteen modal logics of gamma graphs. We show that, besides logical necessity and possibility, Peirce proposed an epistemic interpretation of the (...) broken-cut modality, and that he was led to analyze constructions of knowledge in the style of epistemic logic. (shrink)

This paper compares Peirce’s and Hintikka’s logical philosophies and identifies a cross-section of similarities in their thoughts in the areas of action-first epistemology, pragmaticist meaning, philosophy of science, and philosophy of logic and mathematics.

Peirce wrote in late 1901 a text on formal logic using a special Dragon-Head and Dragon-Tail notation in order to express the relation of logical consequence and its properties. These texts have not been referred to in the literature before. We provide a complete reconstruction and transcription of these previously unpublished sets of manuscript sheets and analyse their main content. In the reconstructed text, Peirce is seen to outline both a general theory of deduction and a general theory of consequence (...) relation. The two are the cornerstones of modern logic and have played a crucial role in its development. From the wider perspective, Peirce is led to these theories by three important generalizations: propositions to all signs, truth to scriptibility, and derivation to transformability. We provide an exposition of such proposed semiotic foundation for logical constants and point out a couple of further innovations in this rare text, including the sheet of assertion, correction as a dual of deduction and the nature of conditionals as variably strict conditionals. (shrink)

By way of a close reading of Boole and Frege’s solutions to the same logical problem, we highlight an underappreciated aspect of Boole’s work—and of its difference with Frege’s better-known approach—which we believe sheds light on the concepts of ‘calculus’ and ‘mechanization’ and on their history. Boole has a clear notion of a logical problem; for him, the whole point of a logical calculus is to enable systematic and goal-directed solution methods for such problems. Frege’s Begriffsschrift, on the other hand, (...) is a visual tool to scrutinize concepts and inferences, and is a calculus only in the thin sense that every possible transition between sentences is fully and unambiguously specified in advance. While Frege’s outlook has dominated much of philosophical thinking about logical symbolism, we believe there is value—particularly in light of recent interest in the role of notations in mathematics and logic—in reviving Boole’s idea of an intrinsic link between, as he put it, a ‘calculus’ and a ‘directive method’ to solve problems. (shrink)

The logic of assertive graphs (AGs) is a modification of Peirce’s logic of existential graphs (EGs), which is intuitionistic and which takes assertions as its explicit object of study. In this paper we extend AGs into a classical graphical logic of assertions (ClAG) whose internal logic is classical. The characteristic feature is that both AGs and ClAG retain deep-inference rules of transformation. Unlike classical EGs, both AGs and ClAG can do so without explicitly introducing polarities of areas in their language. (...) We then compare advantages of these two graphical approaches to the logic of assertions with a reference to a number of topics in philosophy of logic and to their deep-inferential nature of proofs. (shrink)

Charles Peirce’s alpha system \ is reformulated into a deep inference system where the rules are given in terms of deep graphical structures and each rule has its symmetrical rule in the system. The proof analysis of \ is given in terms of two embedding theorems: the system \ and Brünnler’s deep inference system for classical propositional logic can be embedded into each other; and the system \ and Gentzen sequent calculus \ can be embedded into each other.

We present a category-theoretical analysis, based on the concept of generic figures, of a diagrammatic system for propositional logic ). The straightforward construction of a presheaf category \ of cuts-only Existential Graphs provides a basis for the further construction of the category \ which introduces variables in a reconstructedly generic, or label-free, mode. Morphisms in these categories represent syntactical embeddings or, equivalently but dually, extensions. Through the example of Peirce’s system, it is shown how the generic figures approach facilitates the (...) formal investigation of relations between syntax and semantics in such diagrammatic systems. (shrink)

Charles Peirce incorporates modality into his Existential Graphs by introducing the broken cut for possible falsity. Although it can be adapted to various modern modal logics, Zeman demonstrates that making no other changes results in a version that he calls Gamma-MR, an implementation of Jan Łukasiewicz's four-valued Ł-modal system. It disallows the assertion of necessity, reflecting a denial of determinism, and has theorems involving possibility that seem counterintuitive at first glance. However, the latter is a misconception that arises from overlooking (...) the distinction between the intermediate truth values that are assigned to possibly true propositions as either X-contingent or Y-contingent. Any two propositions having the same ITV are possible together, while any two propositions having different ITVs, including those that are each other's negation, are possible individually yet not possible together. Porte shows that Ł-modal can be translated into classical logic by defining a constant for each ITV such that its implication of another proposition asserts the latter's possibility, while its conjunction with another proposition asserts the latter's necessity. These are expressed in the Alpha part of EG without broken cuts, simplifying derivations and shedding further light on Łukasiewicz's system, as long as graphs including either of the constants are properly interpreted. Ł-modal and Gamma-MR thus capture the two-sided nature of possibility as the limit between truth and falsity in Peirce's triadic conception. (shrink)

Peirce and Frege both distinguished between the propositional content of an assertion and the assertion of a propositional content, but with different notational means. We present a modification of Peirce’s graphical method of logic that can be used to reason about assertions in a manner similar to Peirce’s original method. We propose a new system of Assertive Graphs, which unlike the tradition that follows Frege involves no ad hoc sign of assertion. We show that axioms of intuitionistic logic can be (...) derived from AGs, and argue that AGs analyse and represent assertions and illocutionary content in a way which is motivated both by its logical properties and its historical connection with the ideas that led to the development of the graphical method. (shrink)

Peirce’s diagrammatic system of Existential Graphs (EGα)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$EG_{\alpha })$$\end{document} is a logical proof system corresponding to the Propositional Calculus (PL). Most known proofs of soundness and completeness for EGα\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$EG_{\alpha }$$\end{document} depend upon a translation of Peirce’s diagrammatic syntax into that of a suitable Frege-style system. In this paper, drawing upon standard results but using the native diagrammatic notational framework of the graphs, we present (...) a purely syntactic proof of soundness, and hence consistency, for EGα\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$EG_{\alpha }$$\end{document}, along with two separate completeness proofs that are constructive in the sense that we provide an algorithm in each case to construct an EGα\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$EG_{\alpha }$$\end{document} formal proof starting from the empty Sheet of Assertion, given any expression that is in fact a tautology according to the standard semantics of the system. (shrink)