Archaeology is currently bound to a series of metaphysical principles, one of which claims that reality is composed of a series of discrete objects. These discrete objects are fundamental metaphysical entities in archaeological science and posthumanist/new Materialist approaches and can be posited, assembled, counted, and consequently included in quantitative models (e.g. Big Data, Bayesian models) or network models (e.g. Actor-Network Theory). The work by Sørensen and Marila shows that archaeological reality is not that discrete, that some objects cannot be easily (...) identified, and that perhaps reality is not always necessarily composed of discrete objects. The aim of this article is to take Sørensen and Marila’s arguments to their ultimate logical consequences: most archaeological theory today operates under the illusion of a general metaphysics. This illusion dictates not only that all of reality is composed of discrete objects, but that since reality manifests in a certain way, there has to be a methodology that accurately represents that reality. A brief discussion on the notion of “conjecture,” as conceived in certain historical theories, is also presented. (shrink)

Jednou z hlavních námitek proti parapsychologii je, že její experimenty nejsou replikovatelné. Z diskuse mezi obhájci a kritiky tohoto oboru však vysvítá, že obě strany chápou požadavek replikace odlišným způsobem. Na základě sporu o parapsychologii lze rozlišit několik typů replikace – statistickou replikaci, krátkodobě a dlouhodobě spolehlivou replikaci, dva typy nezávislé replikace, retrospektivní a prospektivní replikaci. Bez explicitního rozlišování těchto různých kritérií nelze o problému parapsychologie konstruktivně diskutovat.

In Persons, Souls and Death, David Lund (2009) presents a cumulative case argument for postmortem survival based on the ostensible explanatory power of survival in relation to data drawn from psychical research. In this paper I argue that the survival hypothesis does not satisfy at least two necessary explanatory criteria accepted and deployed by Lund. First, the data that the survival hypothesis ostensibly explains are not otherwise improbable, as much if not all of the data may be adequately accounted for (...) in terms of psychic functioning among living agents—the LAP hypothesis. Here I argue in considerable detail that Lund’s criticisms of the LAP hypothesis, like those leveled by many other survivalists, are significantly defective. Second, the survival hypothesis does not lead us to expect the data Lund outlines, so it fails with respect to predictive power. Since the “best explanation” is one that leads us to expect what is otherwise improbable, the survival hypothesis i. (shrink)

The study of mediums was part of a larger program of psychical research, begun in the late 19th century, intended to examine specifically whether human personality survives bodily death, and more generally whether the brain produces mind or consciousness, as most scientists since the late 19th century have assumed. Although a vast amount of high-quality research resulted from that effort, the study of mediumship was almost completely abandoned during the latter half of the 20th century, primarily because of the impasse (...) reached over whether the phenomena are best-interpreted as attributable to deceased agents or to living agents. In this paper the author examines some types of mediumship research that have been considered particularly important for the survival question: cross-correspondences, drop-in communicators, and proxy cases. She argues that a revival of research on mediumship, particularly with proxy sittings, could contribute importantly to present-day psychical research and, perhaps ultimately, move us beyond the current impasse. Keywords: mediumship--survival--proxy research--cross-correspondences--drop-in communicators. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the link between consciousness and quantum mechanics. Often explanations that invoke consciousness to help explain some of the most perplexing aspects of quantum mechanics are not given serious attention. However, casual dismissal is perhaps unwarranted, given the persistence of the measurement problem, as well as the mysterious nature of consciousness. Using data accumulated from experiments in parapsychology, I examine what anomalous data with respect to consciousness might tell us about various explanations of quantum mechanics. I (...) examine three categories of quantum mechanics interpretations that have some promise of fitting with this anomalous data. I conclude that explanations that posit a substratum of reality containing pure information or potentia, along the lines proposed by Bohm and Stapp, off er the best fit for various categories of this data. (shrink)

When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn't engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn't engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and political liberalism, as well as what people working in informal logic tend to say about argumentation. (...) -/- Not all misleading arguments wear their flaws on their sleeve. Each step of a misleading argument might seem compelling and you might not be able to figure out what's wrong with it. Still, even if you can't figure out what's wrong with an argument, you can know that it's misleading. One way to know that an argument is misleading is, counterintuitively, to lack expertise in the methods and evidence-types employed by the argument. When you know that a counterargument is misleading, you shouldn't engage with it open-mindedly and sometimes shouldn't engage with it at all. You shouldn't engage open-mindedly because you shouldn't be willing to reduce your confidence in response to arguments you know are misleading. And you sometimes shouldn't engage closed-mindedly, because to do so can be manipulative or ineffective. -/- In making this case, Jeremy Fantl discusses echo chambers and group polarization, the importance in academic writing of a sympathetic case for the opposition, the epistemology of disagreement, the account of open-mindedness, and invitations to problematic academic speakers. (shrink)

We review the dream ESP studies conducted since the end of the Maimonides research programme. Combined effect size estimates for both sets of studies suggest that judges could correctly identify target materials more often than would be expected by chance using dream mentation. Maimonides studies were significantly more successful than post-Maimonides studies, which may be due to procedural differences, including that post-Maimonides receivers tended to sleep at home and were generally not deliberately awakened from REM sleep. Methodological shortcomings of some (...) studies are discussed. Nevertheless, home dream ESP research has been successful and continues to be a less expensive and less labour-intensive alternative to sleep-laboratory-based research. We hope that interest in dream ESP research will be re-awakened. (shrink)

This paper attempts to formalize and to address the ‘leakproofing’ of the Singularity problem presented by David Chalmers. The paper begins with the definition of the Artificial Intelligence Confinement Problem. After analysis of existing solutions and their shortcomings, a protocol is proposed aimed at making a more secure confinement environment which might delay potential negative effect from the technological singularity while allowing humanity to benefit from the superintelligence.

This article provides a critical examination of a controversial issue that has theoretical and practical importance to a broad range of academic disciplines: Are religious experiences localized within the brain? Research into the neuroscience of religious experiences is reviewed and conceptual and methodological challenges accompanying the neurotheology project of localizing religious experiences within the brain are discussed. An alternative theory to current reductive and mechanistic explanations of observed mind–brain correlations is proposed — a mediation theory of cerebral action — that (...) has the potential for addressing what Chalmers called the “hard problem” of consciousness. (shrink)

Discussions about consciousness are complicated by the fact that participants do not share a common underlying “ordinary” consciousness. Everyday experience is founded on what Teasdale calls implicational cognition, much of which is not verbally formulated. An unacknowledged aspect of debate is individuals’ attempts to negotiate the expression of their unformulated experience. This is further complicated by the way in which a discourse, based on particular ontological assumptions, exercises an ideological control which limits what underlying aspects of experience can be formulated (...) at all. Tart’s concept of state specific sciences provides a framework within which the role of unformulated experience can be acknowledged and taken into account. Unless this is done, debates will be vitiated by participants engaging in ideological struggles and talking at cross-purposes. (shrink)

Throughout the debate on psi, skeptics have almost universally insisted on different standards for evaluating the evidence, claiming that psi represents a radical departure from our current scientific understanding. Thus, there is considerable ambiguity about what standard of evaluation psi must meet. Little attention has been paid to the possible harm to the integrity of scientific investigation from this resulting inconsistency in testing standards. Some have proposed using a Bayesian framework as an improvement on this dilemma in order to more (...) explicitly model beliefs, assumptions, and background scientific knowledge, especially when evaluating a controversial hypothesis. Recently, Kuhn’s notion of paradigms, which constrains scientific research within bound- aries believed to be most productive, has been incorporated into a Bayesian framework. Within this framework, I explore a likely paradigm or meta-theory used by skeptics that typically constrains research and makes it difficult for psi evidence to be accepted. It appears that such a paradigm would in many respects have difficulty accounting for consciousness, which is fundamental to an understanding of psi. I discuss why psi data are likely to play a key role in making progress in solving the problem of consciousness. Thus, applying different standards of evaluation to psi data is likely counterproductive. (shrink)

An attempt is made to recognize a system behind the psi effects that are evaluated in terms of hit rates. For this purpose we formulate five rules which seem to apply at least to studies of good quality with the most common chance hit rates = ½ or ¼. A problem in the statistical evaluation of the results arises from the fact that the hit rate cannot be smaller than 0 or larger than 1. This implies that the -scores of (...) an experiment, i.e. the ratio of deviation to standard deviation, and their mean values are limited as well. Since the true effect size should in principle be unbounded, its standard definition by may be expected to fail near the boundaries. Especially for one-trial experiments where the effect size is concentrated in a single choice between hit or miss, a definition is needed which is unlimited but at small enough values merges with. For such an extension, two models will be proposed, one of them with three variants. On this basis it is calculated how the measured could be related to the true effect size. A sixth rule elaborates on the scattering of the effect size and is called preliminary as it rests solely on PK experiments with random number generators. It is used to estimate the average hit rate and average -score when the limits affect the integral of the hit rate. It turns out that the average hit rate measured in one-trial experiments can be influenced by the limits of even when it is not near one of the limits. A comparison of theory and experiment favors one of the models or a variant of the other, but no definitive conclusions can be drawn because of the large uncertainties of the data and possible inadvertent errors in counting the number of experiments. (shrink)

I suppose most of us have wondered at one time or another whether a person’s apparently defining character traits are fixed, or whether people are capable of meaningful and deep change. Perhaps the issue arises most frequently in the context of intimate personal relationships, but it seems also to be a recurring topic of practical or professional concern to those studying scientific anomalies. I subscribe to several email listserves, one of which is a forum for psi researchers, and this topic (...) routinely forms the background for discussion. It usually happens in the following way. First, some intransigent skeptic (or, perhaps more accurately, passionate psi-denier) publishes something outrageous (if not libelous) about a serious and diligent member of the parapsychological research community. It might be a severe blast of ad hominem attacks lacking even the appearance of empirical support. Or, it might be an ostensibly evidence-supported critique which only the well-informed would know to be inexcusably one-sided if not blatantly dishonest. The former happens frequently to Rupert Sheldrake. The latter is a specialty of career skeptics who posture as careful researchers themselves but who sedulously avoid discussing evidence that’s most difficult to explain away.1 When a new such attack surfaces, listserve members usually respond with a furious flurry of postings about how best to respond and whether to respond at all. A related manifestation of skeptical intransigence is the manner in which Wikipedia biographies of parapsychologists, LENR researchers, and others have been hijacked by a collection of Wikipedia insiders who have rewritten the biographies, replaced accurate information with falsehoods, and thwarted all attempts to correct the misrepresentations. Here, too, victims of this treatment wonder how—or whether there’s any point in even trying—to counter the damage. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 64 Heft: 1 Seiten: 20-44.

In this article we study how reported speech markers are used as procedural resources in a laboratory based parapsychology experiment to investigate forms of anomalous communication, such as extrasensory perception. In particular, we focus on how specific activities in a key part of the experiment are mediated by the use of `you said' formulations which project that whatever is said next is a paraphrase or a verbatim report of what the recipient had said earlier. We identify two uses of reported (...) speech markers. First, they are used in utterances that initiate some form of repair, such as correction or clarification. Second, they cluster in sequential locations that mark, after a temporary suspension, the resumption of key activities in the experiment. In this we hope to contribute to the study of the institutional properties of reported speech. We conclude by discussing the ways in which broader cultural understandings of the inferential force of `you said' formulations inform their use in this institutional setting, and reflecting on the significance of these findings for parapsychological investigation of anomalous communication in this setting. (shrink)

Essay Review: Medicine To Make You Mad Anatomy of an Epidemic: Magic Bullets, Psychiatric Drugs, and the Astonishing Rise of Mental Illness in America by Robert Whitaker Henry H. Bauer Essay Review: Apparitions of the Living: The Views of William H. Harrison and Gabriel Delanne Spirits Before Our Eyes by William H. Harrison Les Apparitions Matérialisées des Vivants & des Morts. Vol. 1: Les Fantômes de Vivants [Materialized Apparitions of the Living and of the Dead. Vol. 1: Phantoms of the (...) Living] by Gabriel Delanne Carlos S. Alvarado Phantasms of the Living by Edmund Gurney, Frederic W. H. Myers, and Frank Podmore Bryan J. Williams Nonsense on Stilts: How To Tell Science from Bunk by Massimo Pigliucci Constantin Cranganu Nonsense on Stilts: How To Tell Science from Bunk by Massimo Pigliucci Hannah Jenkins The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics by David Harriman Michael Davidson Paranormal America: Ghost Encounters, UFO Sightings, Bigfoot Hunts, and Other Curiosities in Religion and Culture by Christopher D. Bader, F. Carson Mencken, and Joseph O. Baker Mark Rodeghier Loch Ness, Nessie, & Me: The Truth Revealed by Tony Harmsworth Karl P. N. Shuker Conscious Connections: About Parapsychology and Holistic Biology by Göran Brusewitz Michael Nahm Science & Spirit by Hernani Guimarães Andrade Wellington Zangari & Fatima Regina Machado The Sixth Sense Reader edited by David Howes Patric Giesler. (shrink)

We report a theory-relevant post hoc analysis of 2 Dutch retro-priming experiments that were part of a large replication project of the retro-priming experiment by Bem and colleagues. This replication project sought to investigate the role of the experimenter in psi studies. The results of the retro-priming experiments performed by student research groups at the University of Amsterdam (N=61) and of the University Groningen (N=222) however did not replicate Bem’s earlier findings of an anomalous interference of a future stimulus on (...) response times. We report the results of these two studies here, but the over-all results will be reported elsewhere. Both Dutch studies used the exact same software as Bem and colleagues. However, both studies used different questionnaires. The questionnaires asked for information that in previous research had been associated with success in psi tasks and could help us to deal with individual differences but, above all, could be used as selection criteria for participants in future studies. In the Amsterdam study, there were 14 questions, while in the Groningen there were 55. A correlation analysis revealed several significant correlations between the psi-effect in the Bem task and questionnaire items. In this paper we focus on the post-hoc research question: Is this global composition of the correlation matrix anomalous, as suggested by Generalized Quantum Theory? Rather than using the subjective number of ‘significant’ correlations as a dependent variable, we introduced 2 objective measures directly representing the correlation values in the cells to characterize the ‘Connectivity’ in the matrix. Our analysis revealed ‘Connectivity’ to be marginally significant larger (p<0.075) in Groningen and significantly larger in the Amsterdam study (p<0.025). These results are discussed in the framework of the ‘Consciousness Induced Restoration of Time-symmetry’ (CIRTS) and ‘Generalized Quantum Theory’ (GQT) that predict that as soon as there are reasons to expect replicability (or control) the extra chance psi scores will disappear or reverse. The conclusion is that these results can be seen as support, though statistically not strong, for the GQT. (shrink)

This paper presents a brief review of the debate between parapsychologists and skeptics regarding the issue of replication in experimental tests of extrasensory perception (ESP) using a sensory reduction technique known as ganzfeld. The review is followed by a basic assessment of 59 ganzfeld ESP studies reported in the period following the publication of a stringent set of methodological guidelines and recommendations by R. Hyman and C. Honorton in 1986. The assessment indicates that these 59 studies have a combined hit (...) rate of approximately 30%, which is significantly above the chance expected hit rate of 25%. A comparison of the hit rates across four ganzfeld meta-analyses, as well as across fifteen laboratories, seems to further indicate replication of the ganzfeld ESP effect by a broad group of independent researchers. Keywords: extrasensory perception (ESP)—ganzfeld—meta-analysis—psi—parapsychology. (shrink)

Paranormal beliefs (PBs), such as the belief in the soul, or in extrasensory perception, are common in the general population. While there is information regarding what these beliefs correlate with (e.g., cognitive biases, personality styles), there is little information regarding the causal direction between these beliefs and their correlates. To investigate the formation of beliefs, we use an experimental design, in which PBs and belief-associated cognitive biases are assessed before and after a central event: a magic performance (see also Mohr (...) et al., 2018 ). In the current paper, we report a series of studies investigating the “paranormal potential” of magic performances (Study 1, N = 49; Study 2, N = 89; Study 3, N = 123). We investigated (i) which magic performances resulted in paranormal explanations, and (ii) whether PBs and a belief-associated cognitive bias (i.e., repetition avoidance) became enhanced after the performance. Repetition avoidance was assessed using a random number generation task. After the performance, participants rated to what extent the magic performance could be explained in psychic (paranormal), conjuring, or religious terms. We found that conjuring explanations were negatively associated with religious and psychic explanations, whereas religious and psychic explanations were positively associated. Enhanced repetition avoidance correlated with higher PBs ahead of the performance. We also observed a significant increase in psychic explanations and a drop in conjuring explanations when performances involved powerful psychic routines (e.g., the performer contacted the dead). While the experimentally induced enhancement of psychic explanations is promising, future studies should account for potential variables that might explain absent framing and before–after effects (e.g., emotion, attention). Such effects are essential to understand the formation and manipulation of belief. (shrink)

In this article we examine periods of silence during introspective reports produced during an experimental laboratory procedure. Drawing from conversation analytic research and Sacks’s observations on silences, we argue that silences are a significant resource by which introspective accounts may be designed for the institutional requirements of the experimental setting. We identify the normative features of silence, and sketch some of the pragmatic or performative functions facilitated by silence. We conclude by considering our findings for the more general use of (...) introspective data in the study of consciousness and cognate disciplines. (shrink)