ABSTRACT: I shall consider the phenomenon of believing ourselves to have at least one false belief: a phenomenon I call believed fallibility I shall first present a paradoxical argument which appears to show that believed fallibility is incoherent; second, note that this argument assumes that we are committed to the conjunction of all our beliefs; third, sketch a more intuitive notion of commitment in which we are not committed to the conjunction of all our beliefs and argue that the original (...) paradoxical argument is now defused; fourth, construct a new paradoxical argument showing that if we believe that we have at least one false belief we are committed to a contradiction, employing the preferable notion of commitment; and, fifth, suggest that perhaps we might avoid the new paradox by denying that closing our beliefs under conjunction is required by rationalityRÉSUMÉ: Je me pencherai ici sur le phénomène qui consiste à penser que nous avons au moins une opinion fausse: je nomme ce phénoméne «la croyance d’etre faillible». Je présente en premier lieu un argument paradoxal qui semble démontrer que la croyance d’être faillible est incohérente. Deuxièmement, je remarque que cet argument suppose que nous nous obligions à réaliser la conjonction de toutes nosopinions. Troisièmement, je propose une version plus intuitive de cette obligation selon laquelle nous ne sommes pas obligés de réaliser la conjonction de toutes nos opinions, et je soutiens que le paradoxe initial est alors désamorcé. Quatrièmement, je construis un nouvel argument paradoxal démontrant que, si nous croyons que nous avons au moins une opinion fausse, nous sommes obligés de nous contredire, selon la notion d’obligation que je préconise d’adopter. Cinquièmement, je suggère que nous pourrions peut-être éviter ce nouveau paradoxe en niant que la rationalité exige de soumettre nos opinions à la conjonction. (shrink)

One motivation for adopting a justice-based view of the right to self-defense is that it seems to solve the puzzle of how a victim may kill her attacker even when doing so is not predicted to protect her from the threat imposed upon her. The paper shows (a) that this view leads to unacceptable results and (b) that its solution to cases of futile self-defense is unsatisfactory. This failure makes the interest-based theory of self-defense look more attractive, both in the (...) context of futile self-defense and in general. To understand how a victim might use force in this context, one need only point to some interest of hers that is threatened, and the best candidate for such interest in cases of futile self-defense is her honor. (shrink)

US law continues its historical trend of growing more permissive towards actors who engage in violent action in purported self-defense. We draw on some informal game theory to show why this is strategically irrational and suggest rolling back self-defense doctrines like stand your ground to earlier historical precedents like duty to retreat.

Two conditions guiding permissible use of force in self-defence are proportionality and success. According to the proportionality condition the means used to prevent an attack can be permissible only if they are proportional to the interest at stake.1 According to the success condition, otherwise impermissible acts can be justified under the right to self-defence only if they are likely to succeed in preventing the perceived threat.2 These requirements should not always be interpreted narrowly. Sometimes people are permitted to kill culpable (...) aggressors in order to avoid a non-lethal harm. Sometimes people are permitted to take up arms to defend themselves against culpable aggressors they have little or no hope of .. (shrink)

Two conditions guiding permissible use of force in self-defence are proportionality and success. According to the proportionality condition the means used to prevent an attack can be permissible only if they are proportional to the interest at stake. According to the success condition, otherwise impermissible acts can be justified under the right to self-defence only if they are likely to succeed in preventing the perceived threat. These requirements should not always be interpreted narrowly. Sometimes people are permitted to kill culpable (...) aggressors in order to avoid a non-lethal harm. Sometimes people are permitted to take up arms to defend themselves against culpable aggressors they have little or no hope of defeating. (shrink)

Sometimes victims cannot defend themselves against the threat posed to them, but they can nevertheless harm or even kill their aggressors. Since they cannot defend themselves, it is unclear how such harming can be justified under the title of self-defense. According to the “Honor Solution,” by violently resisting their aggressors, victims do (partially) defend themselves because they protect their honor. Blake Hereth recently argued that this solution is incompatible with the feminist commitment that sexual assault victims ought not to be (...) shamed or dishonored. The purpose of my paper is to reject Hereth's criticism and defend the Honor Solution. (shrink)

In war a soldier behaving properly should take into account a universal requirement not to kill, to be applied strictly in dealing with civilians, but at the same time to support the exception of taking the life of enemy combatants as an act of selfdefense. This is the usual way to distinguish morally the proper treatment to soldiers and civilians. In this article the author criticizes it and outlines a different way to understand and justify the moral distinction mentioned.

The suffering of war refugees is often regarded as a wrong-less harm. Although war refugees have been made worse off in severe ways, they have not been wronged, because no one intentionally caused their suffering. In military parlance, war refugees are collateral damage. As such, nothing is owed to them as a matter of justice, because their suffering is not the result of intentional wrongdoing; rather, it is the regrettable and unintended result of necessary and proportionate wartime actions. So, while (...) the warring national or extra-national groups might help war refugees, such aid is regarded as humanitarian, not as justice.I challenge the view that war refugees are harmed but not wronged when those harms directly result from necessary and proportionate wartime actions. War refugees are innocent bystanders, and so are an exception to the principle that permits defense by any necessary and proportionate means. Just as an individual may not kill or seriously harm an innocent bystander to save herself, so too national or extra-national groups may not create refugees to win a war. If such groups do create war refugees during the legitimate pursuit of military goals, they have wronged those refugees, and so owe them recompense. (shrink)

Do noncombatants in warfare receive immunity because of their subjective or objective characteristics? Can a noncombatant be ‘weaponized’, and if so, how does this weaponization change the noncombatant's moral status as protected from direct attack? The purpose of this article is to analyze the moral issues that arise when noncombatants are made into weapons, specifically as delivery systems for biological weaponry. Examining such a tactic, I go on to explore how the problems that arise from ‘weaponized’ noncombatants illustrate deeper problems (...) in the theorization of noncombatant status. (shrink)

Over the past 20 years, there has been a huge amount of work on which things you can kill in self‐defense and why. This paper surveys that work.

ABSTRACT: I shall consider the phenomenon of believing ourselves to have at least one false belief: a phenomenon I call believed fallibility I shall first present a paradoxical argument which appears to show that believed fallibility is incoherent; second, note that this argument assumes that we are committed to the conjunction of all our beliefs; third, sketch a more intuitive notion of commitment in which we are not committed to the conjunction of all our beliefs and argue that the original (...) paradoxical argument is now defused; fourth, construct a new paradoxical argument showing that if we believe that we have at least one false belief we are committed to a contradiction, employing the preferable notion of commitment; and, fifth, suggest that perhaps we might avoid the new paradox by denying that closing our beliefs under conjunction is required by rationalityRÉSUMÉ: Je me pencherai ici sur le phénomène qui consiste à penser que nous avons au moins une opinion fausse: je nomme ce phénoméne «la croyance d’etre faillible». Je présente en premier lieu un argument paradoxal qui semble démontrer que la croyance d’être faillible est incohérente. Deuxièmement, je remarque que cet argument suppose que nous nous obligions à réaliser la conjonction de toutes nosopinions. Troisièmement, je propose une version plus intuitive de cette obligation selon laquelle nous ne sommes pas obligés de réaliser la conjonction de toutes nos opinions, et je soutiens que le paradoxe initial est alors désamorcé. Quatrièmement, je construis un nouvel argument paradoxal démontrant que, si nous croyons que nous avons au moins une opinion fausse, nous sommes obligés de nous contredire, selon la notion d’obligation que je préconise d’adopter. Cinquièmement, je suggère que nous pourrions peut-être éviter ce nouveau paradoxe en niant que la rationalité exige de soumettre nos opinions à la conjonction. (shrink)