Abstract:The aim of this paper is to create a framework which can serve as a guide to the understanding of organizational ethicality. This is done by linking ethical and organizational theory. Organizational ethicality is about “being” as well as “doing”: relevant ethical theory is therefore both substantive (agent-centred, concerned with the “good”) as well as procedural (act-centred, concerned with the “right” in the sense of the moral or just thing to do). The ethical theories of Alasdair MacIntyre and Jurgen Habermas, (...) as representatives of these two traditions, are mapped onto a framework which characterises organizations as assemblages of practices supported by a climate embedded within an organizational culture. Organizational practice is articulated and given meaning within a discourse of “sensemaking” in which narrative creates space-time links between people and events. Within that same communicative climate practices are evaluated and decisions taken. This theoretical framework is specified in such a way as to highlight the parallels with the ethical theories of MacIntyre, who uses notions of practice, tradition and the narrative unity of moral experience to create an ethical theory of the “good,” and Habermas, who spells out the process of moral argumentation by which consensus on the “just” or “right” is reached. Some possibilities for further research are suggested at the end of the paper. (shrink)

Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammer of Social Conflicts (reviewed by Christopher Zurn).

This is a constructive critique of Habermas’s account of rationality, which is central to his political theory and has sparked theoretical and empirical research across academia. Habermas and many critical theorists caricature means-ends rationality (the ability to pick good means to ends), e.g. by wrongly depicting it as egocentric. This weakens Habermas’s attempt to distinguish means-ends rationality from his hugely important and influential idea of communicative rationality (roughly, the rationality of genuine discussion). I suggest that sincerity and autonomy, rather than (...) non-egocentrism, are the key distinguishing features of communicative rationality. This shows that communicative rationality actually overlaps with means-ends rationality. Indeed, means-ends rationality is needed by critical theorists, as I exemplify by showing its use in deliberative democracy. Moreover, means-ends rationality will be present in discourse ethics, as I show with the example of moral discourse about gay marriage. My article thus challenges decades of what Habermas and critical theorists have written on means-ends and communicative rationality, but I stay broadly true to – and hopefully improve – Habermas’s account of rationality. (shrink)

Research ethics approval procedures and research ethics committees (RECs) are now well-established in most Western Universities. RECs base their judgements on an ethics code that has been developed by the health and biomedical sciences research community and that is widely considered to be universally valid regardless of discipline. On the other hand, a sizeable body of literature has emerged criticising the work of RECs, as, among other things, overly bureaucratic and unresponsive to the needs of disciplines outside the biomedical sciences. (...) This article adopts the format of a debate between a Chair of a university REC and a social science researcher as a vehicle for contrasting different perspectives on research ethics. The fictional debate allows for a productive discussion between the two sides, incorporating key insights from the recent literature and concludes with a synthesis that sketches out some ideas about how university RECs can be made more responsive and accountable. (shrink)

Resumen:El objetivo del siguiente artículo es observar los rendimientos de la hermenéutica filosófica para interpretar el problema de la confianza en nuestras relaciones sociales. En primer lugar, se identifican sus fundamentos para comprender a través de esta tradición filosófica su giro lingüístico e importancia para estudiar dicho concepto (I); en segundo lugar, se analiza desde la idea del ‘lenguaje’ y del ‘diálogo’ el problema de la confianza en las relaciones contextuales (II). Por último, se reflexiona sobre cómo la racionalidad científica (...) proyecta confianza o desconfianza en un mundo en donde cada vez sus enunciados deben comprometerse con la vida humana (III). Este artículo es relevante pues busca revalorizar a la filosofía para el análisis de un concepto que ha sido estudiado principalmente desde las ciencias sociales. En este sentido nos apoyamos en la hermenéutica filosófica en pos de observar sus posibilidades para conceptualizar y analizar la confianza en la sociedad contemporánea.Palabras clave: confianza; hermenéutica filosófica; lenguaje; ciencia; ética. (shrink)

Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay “Playfulness,‘World’-Travelling, (...) and Loving Perception” reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy. (shrink)

A critical theory of controversy would require the integration ofthe normative study of argumentation with critical studies of practices. Jiirgen Habermas has made a substantial contribution to such a project by embedding argumentation in a theory of communication, while critically engaging academic and public debates. This essay explicates core concepts in Habermas's theory of argumentation, including his distinction between theory and practice, the different validity requirements for argumentation in general, the norms of moral and ethical-political argumentation and of bargaining. Argument (...) predicaments are posited as ways to discover and assess different types of validity claims competing as "the force ofthe better argument". Habermas's criticism of "administrative power" and "communicative power" illustrates a potential yield of critical inquiry into social controversy. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article investigates Habermas's communicative ethic in relation to changes in the roles of institutions and the state. I reference Alexy, Weber and Taylor, arguing that an artificial delimitation of the public sphere as disparate from the private or religious cramps the capacity of those identified as outsiders to communicate within it. I question the ability of public reason as Habermas has outlined it to meet the challenges it faces regarding interreligious dialogue and integration in democratic societies, and I suggest, (...) instead, an approach more open to dialogue with religions in terms that are more comprehensible to them. (shrink)

This article compares Habermas’s and Taylor’s approach to the role of religious language in a liberal democracy. It shows that the difference in their approach is not simply in their theories of religious language. The contrast lies deeper, in their incompatible moral theories: Habermas’s universal discourse ethics vs Taylor’s communitarian substantive ethics. I also explore William Rehg’s defence of discourse ethics by conceding that it is based on a metavalue of rational consensus. However, I argue that Habermas’s and Rehg’s discourse (...) ethics and translation proviso are untenable. While Taylor rightly argues that there is no reason to exclude religious reason from the formal political sphere, his proposed fusion of horizons to generate a new hybrid framework is also problematic. I suggest that Taylor’s historical hermeneutics should be extended to include the narrative approach to ethical deliberation as conducive to mutual experiential understanding, and hence to achieving a fusion of horizons of the diverse worlds of citizens in a liberal democracy. (shrink)

John Dryzek's justification of deliberative democracy rests on a critique of instrumental rationality and a defence of Habermas's idea of communicative rationality. I question each stage of Dryzek's theory. It defines instrumental rationality broadly but only criticises narrow applications of it. It conflates communicative rationality with Habermas's idea of ‘discourse’ – the real motor of Dryzek's democratic theory. Deliberative democracy can be better defended by avoiding overstated criticisms of instrumental rationality, by altering the emphasis on communicative rationality, and by focusing (...) more on different models of politics than different models of rationality. Dryzek's theory can thus present deliberative democracy as a better means to better ends – a more powerful and more positive position. (shrink)

The purpose of this action research project was to examine the lived experience of university and community participants in ethical decision making in the setting of an interprofessional university-community partnership. The participatory framework for applied ethics presented by Prilleltensky, Rossiter, and Walsh-Bowers informed the research design. University and community participants in the 4-year-old partnership were interviewed about the ethical dilemmas faced in the partnership and ways of dealing with these dilemmas that often took place in the nexus of meeting the (...) community's and students' needs. An important aspect of making sound ethical decisions was the availability of multiple opportunities for discourse in an environment open to learning. (shrink)