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  1. Einstein’s Theory of Theories and Mechanicism.Diego Maltrana, Manuel Herrera & Federico Benitez - 2022 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 35 (2):153-170.
    One of the most important contributions of Einstein to the philosophy of science is the distinction between two types of scientific theories: ‘principle’ and ‘constructive’ theories. More recently, Flores proposed a more general distinction, classifying scientific theories by their functional role into ‘framework’ and ‘interaction’ theories, attempting to solve some inadequacies in Einstein’s proposal. Here, based on an epistemic criterion, we present a generalised distinction which is an improvement over Flores approach. In this work (i) we evaluate the shortcomings related (...)
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  • Quantisation as a method of generation: The nature and prospects of theory changes through quantisation.Niels Linnemann - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 92 (C):209-223.
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  • Scientific realism and underdetermination in quantum theory.Matthias Egg & Juha Saatsi - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11):e12773.
    This paper surveys the status of scientific realism in relation to quantum physics, focusing on the problem of underdetermination.
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  • Dispositions and the Least Action Principle.Diego Maltrana & Federico Benitez - 2022 - Disputatio 14 (65):91-104.
    This work deals with obstacles hindering a metaphysics of laws of nature in terms of dispositions, i.e., of fundamental properties that are causal powers. A recent analysis of the principle of least action has put into question the viability of dispositionalism in the case of classical mechanics, generally seen as the physical theory most easily amenable to a dispositional ontology. Here, a proper consideration of the framework role played by the least action principle within the classical image of the world (...)
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  • Barren Worlds: The Scientific Image of Ontic Structural Realism.Federico Benitez - 2022 - Disputatio 14 (65):65-90.
    This work explores issues with the eliminativist formulation of ontic structural realism. An ontology that totally eliminates objects is found lacking by arguing, first, that the theoretical frameworks used to support the best arguments against an object-oriented ontology (quantum mechanics, relativity theory, quantum field theory) can be seen in every case as physical models of empty worlds, and therefore do not represent all the information that comes from science, and in particular from fundamental physics, which also includes information about local (...)
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  • The Heuristic Power of Theory Classification, the Case of General Relativity.Diego Maltrana & Nicolás Sepúlveda-Quiroz - 2022 - Foundations of Physics 52 (4):1-24.
    In this article, we explore the heuristic power of the theoretical distinction between framework and interaction theories applied to the case of General Relativity. According to the distinction, theories and theoretical elements can be classified into two different groups, each with clear ontological, epistemic and functional content. Being so, to identify the group to which a theory belongs would suffice to know a priori its prospects and limitations in these areas without going into a detailed technical analysis. We make the (...)
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  • Structural realism and theory classification.Federico Benitez - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):734-747.
    Ontic structural realism constitutes a promising take on scientific realism, one that avoids the well‐known issues that realist stances have with underdetermination and theory change. In its most radical versions, ontic structural realism proposes a type of eliminativism about theoretical entities, ascribing ontological commitment only to the structures, and not to the objects appearing in our theories. More moderate versions of ontic structural realism have also been proposed, allowing for ‘thin’ objects in the ontology. This work connects these takes on (...)
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