Switch to: References

Citations of:

The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn

Philosophy 49 (188):123-134 (1974)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Tweaking the Four-Component Model.Howard J. Curzer - 2014 - Journal of Moral Education 43 (1):104-123.
    By maintaining that moral functioning depends upon four components, the Neo-Kohlbergian account of moral functioning allows for uneven moral development within individuals. However, I argue that the four-component model does not go far enough. I offer a more accurate account of moral functioning and uneven moral development. My proposal retains the account of sensitivity, divides the judgment component into a theorizing component and a reasoning component, and eliminates the motivation and character components.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Huckleberry Finn’s Conscience: Reckoning with the Evasion.Steve Clarke - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics:1-24.
    Huck Finn’s struggles with his conscience, as depicted in Mark Twain’s famous novel The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, have been much discussed by philosophers; and various philosophical lessons have been extracted from Twain’s depiction of those struggles. Two of these philosophers stand out, in terms of influence: Jonathan Bennett and Nomy Arpaly. Here I argue that the lessons that Bennett and Arpaly draw are not supported by a careful reading of AHF. This becomes particularly apparent when we consider the final (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Law and Oppression: A Moral Call to Abstain From the Use of Moral Language.L. Stalnaker Benjamin - unknown
    : In this presentation, I first establish that morality is invoked to justify the existence of discriminatory or otherwise oppressive laws that harm marginalized groups. Examples that demonstrate this point will be pulled from past and present laws that target homosexual and transgender populations, ranging from anti-sodomy laws to trans bathroom bills. Next, I argue that moral language is imbued with normative and motivational force because of its association with legitimate moral judgments. Since normative judgments provide reason to act, the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I defend the widely-held view that morally worthy action need not be motivated by a desire to promote rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of luck that their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Accidentally Doing the Right Thing.Zoe Johnson King - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):186-206.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Respect for Personal Autonomy, Human Dignity, and the Problems of Self-Directedness and Botched Autonomy.Y. M. Barilan - 2011 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 36 (5):496-515.
    This paper explores the value of respect for personal autonomy in relation to clearly immoral and irrational acts committed freely and intentionally by competent people. Following Berlin's distinction between two kinds of liberty and Darwall's two kinds of respect, it is argued that coercive suppression of nonautonomous, irrational, and self-harming acts of competent persons is offensive to their human dignity, but not disrespectful of personal autonomy. Irrational and immoral choices made by competent people may claim only the negative liberty to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Empirical Identity of Moral Judgment.Victor Kumar - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):783-804.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Embodied Judgment in Hannah Arendt: From Boethius and Huck Finn to Transnational Feminisms.Katy Fulfer - 2014 - PhaenEx 9 (2):64-87.
    Feminists have found Arendt helpful in articulating a theory of judgment across cultural differences. Embodiment enters this discussion, usually, through attention to enlarged mentality. In contrast, I approach embodiment and judgment by looking at undertheorized connections with Arendt’s conception of “thinking.” Drawing on a discussion of Boethius and Huckleberry Finn, I suggest that persons are led to thinking by lived contradictions, that is, by instances in which their experiences cannot be interpreted through dominant norms in their society or culture. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Role for Virtue in Unifying the ‘Knowledge’ and ‘Caring’ Discourses in Nursing Theory.Suzanne Bliss, Dirk Baltzly, Rosalind Bull, Lisa Dalton & Jo Jones - 2017 - Nursing Inquiry 24 (4):e12191.
    A critical examination of contemporary nursing theory suggests that two distinct discourses coexist within this field. On the one hand, proponents of the ‘knowledge discourse’ argue that nurses should drop the ‘virtue script’ and focus on the scientific and technical aspects of their work. On the other hand, proponents of the ‘caring discourse’ promote a view of nursing that embodies humanistic qualities such as compassion, empathy and mutuality. In view of this, we suggest a way to reconcile both discourses despite (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Compassion Without Cognitivism.Charlie Kurth - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (35).
    Compassion is generally thought to be a morally valuable emotion both because it is concerned with the suffering of others and because it prompts us to take action to their behalf. But skeptics are unconvinced. Not only does a viable account of compassion’s evaluative content—its characteristic concern—appear elusive, but the emotional response itself seems deeply parochial: a concern we tend to feel toward the suffering of friends and loved ones, rather than for individuals who are outside of our circle of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Difficult Cases and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Belief.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.
    This paper concerns the epistemology of difficult moral cases where the difficulty is not traceable to ignorance about non-moral matters. The paper first argues for a principle concerning the epistemic status of moral beliefs about difficult moral cases. The basic idea behind the principle is that one’s belief about the moral status of a potential action in a difficult moral case is not justified unless one has some appreciation of what the relevant moral considerations are and how they bear on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Cousins of Regret.Adam Morton - forthcoming - In Anna Gottlieb (ed.), the moral psychology of regret.
    I classify emotions in the family of regret, remorse, and so on, in such a way that it is easy to see how there can be further emotions in this family, for which we happened not to have names in English. I describe some of these emotions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Revisiting Frankfurt on Freedom and Responsibility.Leonardo de Mello Riberio - 2016 - Critica 48 (142):35-56.
    De acuerdo con la explicación de la responsabilidad moral de Harry Frankfurt, un agente es moralmente responsable sólo si sus elecciones y acciones reflejadas no están constreñidas por una irresistible fuerza —ya sea de la perspectiva de primera o de tercera persona—. Argumentaré aquí que esta afirmación es problemática. Teniendo en cuenta algunos de los presupuestos de la discusión de Frankfurt, parece que hay casos según los cuales uno puede ser considerado responsable, aunque las elecciones y acciones reflejadas estén constreñidas (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Acting for the Right Reasons.Julia Markovits - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.
    This essay examines the thought that our right actions have moral worth only if we perform them for the right reasons. It argues against the view, often ascribed to Kant, that morally worthy actions must be performed because they are right and argues that Kantians and others ought instead to accept the view that morally worthy actions are those performed for the reasons why they are right. In other words, morally worthy actions are those for which the reasons why they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   79 citations  
  • A Plea for Accuses.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (2):229 - 243.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • The Majesty of Reason.Simon Blackburn - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (1):5-27.
    In this paper I contemplate two phenomena that have impressed theorists concerned with the domain of reasons and of what is now called ‘normativity’. One is the much-discussed ‘externality’ of reasons. According to this, reasons are just there, anyway. They exist whether or not agents take any notice of them. They do not only exist in the light of contingent desires or mere inclinations. They are ‘external’ not ‘internal’. They bear on us, even when through ignorance or wickedness we take (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Procedural Moral Enhancement.G. Owen Schaefer & Julian Savulescu - 2019 - Neuroethics 12 (1):73-84.
    While philosophers are often concerned with the conditions for moral knowledge or justification, in practice something arguably less demanding is just as, if not more, important – reliably making correct moral judgments. Judges and juries should hand down fair sentences, government officials should decide on just laws, members of ethics committees should make sound recommendations, and so on. We want such agents, more often than not and as often as possible, to make the right decisions. The purpose of this paper (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Distortions of Normativity.Herlinde Pauer-Studer & J. David Velleman - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):329-356.
    We discuss some implications of the Holocaust for moral philosophy. Our thesis is that morality became distorted in the Third Reich at the level of its social articulation. We explore this thesis in application to several front-line perpetrators who maintained false moral self-conceptions. We conclude that more than a priori moral reasoning is required to correct such distortions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Rationality and Moral Risk: A Moderate Defense of Hedging.Christian Tarsney - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Maryland
    How should an agent decide what to do when she is uncertain not just about morally relevant empirical matters, like the consequences of some course of action, but about the basic principles of morality itself? This question has only recently been taken up in a systematic way by philosophers. Advocates of moral hedging claim that an agent should weigh the reasons put forward by each moral theory in which she has positive credence, considering both the likelihood that that theory is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Responsibility Beyond Belief: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Dissertation,
    In this dissertation, I argue for a new conception of the epistemic condition on moral responsibility.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Embodiment of Virtue: Towards a Cross-Cultural Cognitive Science.Jake H. Davis - 2016 - In Justin E. H. Smith (ed.), Oxford Philosophical Concepts: Embodiment. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Praise, Blame and the Whole Self.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.
    What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • Moral Neuroenhancement.Brian D. Earp, Thomas Douglas & Julian Savulescu - 2017 - In L. Syd M. Johnson & Karen S. Rommelfanger (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics. Routledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Possibility of an Ongoing Moral Catastrophe.Evan G. Williams - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):971-982.
    This article gives two arguments for believing that our society is unknowingly guilty of serious, large-scale wrongdoing. First is an inductive argument: most other societies, in history and in the world today, have been unknowingly guilty of serious wrongdoing, so ours probably is too. Second is a disjunctive argument: there are a large number of distinct ways in which our practices could turn out to be horribly wrong, so even if no particular hypothesized moral mistake strikes us as very likely, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Self-Control and Akrasia.Christine Tappolet - forthcoming - In Meghan Griffith, Kevin Timpe & Neil Levy (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge.
    Akratic actions are often being thought to instantiate a paradigmatic self-control failure. . If we suppose that akrasia is opposed to self-control, the question is how akratic actions could be free and intentional. After all, it would seem that it is only if an action manifests self-control that it can count as free. My plan is to explore the relation between akrasia and self-control. The first section presents what I shall call the standard conception, according to which akrasia and self-control (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Direct Vs. Indirect Moral Enhancement.G. Owen Schaefer - 2015 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 25 (3):261-289.
    Moral enhancement is an ostensibly laudable project. Who wouldn’t want people to become more moral? Still, the project’s approach is crucial. We can distinguish between two approaches for moral enhancement: direct and indirect. Direct moral enhancements aim at bringing about particular ideas, motives or behaviors. Indirect moral enhancements, by contrast, aim at making people more reliably produce the morally correct ideas, motives or behaviors without committing to the content of those ideas, motives and/or actions. I will argue, on Millian grounds, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Damage, Flourishing, and Two Sides of Morality.Adam Morton - forthcoming - Eshare: An Iranian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1).
    I explore how considerations about psychological damage connect with moral theories.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Reasons, Reflection, and Repugnance.Doug McConnell & Jeanette Kennett - 2016 - In Alberto Giubilini & Steve Clarke (eds.), The Ethics of Human Enhancement: Understanding the Debate. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter we draw comparisons between Kass’ views on the normative authority of repugnance and social intuitionist accounts of moral judgement which are similarly sceptical about the role of reasoned reflection in moral judgement. We survey the empirical claims made in support of giving moral primacy to intuitions generated by emotions such as repugnance, as well as some common objections. We then examine accounts which integrate intuition and reflection, and argue that plausible accounts of wisdom are in tension with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Praise Without Perfection: A Dilemma for Right-Making Reasons.Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2).
    When you don’t know what to do, you’d better find out. Sometimes the best way to find out is to ask for advice. And when you don’t know what the right thing to do is, it’s sometimes good to rely on moral advice. This straightforward thought spells serious trouble for a popular and widespread approach to moral worth: on this approach, agents deserve moral praise for a right action only if they are acting on right-making reasons. The first part of (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Hume, Sympathy, and the Theater.Brian Kirby - 2003 - Hume Studies 29 (2):305-325.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Why Care? On Motivation in Care Ethics. Gardiner, Katherine Elizabeth - unknown
    Just how care moves us is the subject of Katherine Gardiner’s thesis. Gardiner wants to know how care moves us – or in philosophical terms, how it motivates us. She describes caring as a morally ‘necessary’ activity, which means that we cannot escape responding to the care appeal. However, Gardiner uses the example of ‘Pim’, who cannot care and feels really bad about it - not because he is incapable of caring, but who just can’t. She reviews several versions of (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Higher-Order Preferences and the Master Rationality Motive.Keith E. Stanovich - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):111 – 127.
    The cognitive critique of the goals and desires that are input into the implicit calculations that result in instrumental rationality is one aspect of what has been termed broad rationality (Elster, 1983). This cognitive critique involves, among other things, the search for rational integration (Nozick, 1993)—that is, consistency between first-order and second-order preferences. Forming a second-order preference involves metarepresentational abilities made possible by mental decoupling operations. However, these decoupling abilities are separable from the motive that initiates the cognitive critique itself. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Ethics Under Moral Neutrality.Evan Gregg Williams - 2011 - Dissertation,
    How should we act when uncertain about the moral truth, or when trying to remain neutral between competing moral theories? This dissertation argues that some types of actions and policies are relatively likely to be approved by a very wide range of moral theories—even theories which have never yet been formulated, or which appear to cancel out one another's advice. For example, I argue that actions and policies which increase a moral agent's access to primary goods also tend to increase (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Ethics of Investing: Making Money or Making a Difference?Joakim Sandberg - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    The concepts of 'ethical' and 'socially responsible' investment (SRI) have become increasingly popular in recent years and funds which offer this kind of investment have attracted many individual inve... merstors. The present book addresses the issue of 'How ought one to invest?' by critically engaging with the ideas of the proponents of this movement about what makes 'ethical' investing ethical. The standard suggestion that ethical investing simply consists in refraining from investing in certain 'morally unacceptable companies' is criticised for being (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Charisma and Moral Reasoning.Jessica Flanigan - 2013 - Religions 4 (2):216-229.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Autonomy and the Emotions.Christine Tappolet - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2):45-59.
    C an actions caused by emotions be free and autonomous? The so-called rationalist conception of autonomy denies this. Only actions done in the light of reflexive choices can be autonomous and hence free. I argue that the rationalist conception does not make room for akratic actions, that is, free and intentional actions performed against the agent’s best judgement. I then develop an account inspired by Harry Frankfurt and David Shoemaker, according to which an action is autonomous when it is determined (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Voluntad y responsabilidad moral.Sergi Rosell - 2013 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 38 (1):121-138.
    In this article I argue against the idea that actions are to be morally judged only for the motive or intention out of which the agent performed or intended to perform the action. Particularly, I put forward different cases by which I discuss the contrast between will or intention and consequences; between negligence and decisions under uncertainty, and outcomes; between deliberate and inadvertent acts; and between intention and action; aiming to show the additional role played by each pair’s second element (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Inverse Akrasia and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - manuscript
    The standard account of weakness of will identifies it with akrasia, that is, with action against one's best judgment. Elsewhere I have argued that weakness of will is better understood as over-readily giving up on one's resolutions. Many cases of weak willed action will not be akratic: in over-readily abandoning a resolution an agent may well do something that they judge at the time to be best. Indeed, in so far as temptation typically gives rise to judgment shift -- to (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A Feminist Defense of Moderate Moral Intuitionism.J. C. Cameron Bill - unknown
    The three integrated articles of this dissertation are concerned with the epistemic status of moral intuitions. The first article argues in favour of moderate moral intuitionism, the view that while any successful moral epistemology must be intuitionist to at least some extent, it must also take intuitions to be fallible. This is accomplished by synthesizing work by Robert Audi and George Bealer into a view of moral intuitions which is capable of overcoming some major contemporary objections against intuitionism, particularly from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Kant and the Fact of Reason.K. H. Chung Kenneth - unknown
    It is often thought that Kant abandoned his argument for the justification of morality in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals for a radically different argument in the Critique of Practical Reason. In the Groundwork, Kant appears to try to justify our commitment to the moral law on the basis of our freedom, but in the Critique, he tries to justify that commitment on the basis of what he calls the fact of reason. I assess and reject influential interpretations (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What’s the Matter with Huck Finn?Hrishikesh Joshi - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):70-87.
    This paper explores some key commitments of the idea that it can be rational to do what you believe you ought not to do. I suggest that there is a prima facie tension between this idea and certain plausible coherence constraints on rational agency. I propose a way to resolve this tension. While akratic agents are always irrational, they are not always practically irrational, as many authors assume. Rather, “inverse” akratics like Huck Finn fail in a distinctively theoretical way. What (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Responsive Government and Duties of Conscience.Robert C. Hughes - 2014 - Jurisprudence 5 (2):244-264.
    This paper defends a new argument for enabling citizen participation in government: individuals must have genuine opportunities to try to change the law in order to be able to satisfy duties of conscience. Without such opportunities, citizens who regard systems of related laws as partially unjust face a moral dilemma. If they comply with these laws willingly without also trying to change them, they commit a pro tanto wrong by willingly participating in injustice . If they disobey, or if they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Prichard, Falk, and the End of Deliberation.Robert N. Johnson - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 131-147.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Trouble with Being Sincere.Timothy Chan & Guy Kahane - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):215-234.
    Questions about sincerity play a central role in our lives. But what makes an assertion insincere? In this paper we argue that the answer to this question is not as straightforward as it has sometimes been taken to be. Until recently the dominant answer has been that a speaker makes an insincere assertion if and only if he does not believe the proposition asserted. There are, however, persuasive counterexamples to this simple account. It has been proposed instead that an insincere (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Quick and Smart? Modularity and the Pro-Emotion Consensus.Karen Jones - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):2-27.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Moral Power of Jim: A Mencian Reading of Huckleberry Finn.Jung H. Lee - 2009 - Asian Philosophy 19 (2):101 – 118.
    This paper examines the Adventures of Huckleberry Finn in the light of the early Confucian thinker Mencius, arguing in essence that Mencian theories of moral development and self-cultivation can help us to recover the moral significance of Twain's novel. Although 'ethical criticisms' of Huckleberry Finn share a long history, I argue that most interpretations have failed to appreciate the moral significance of Jim, either by focusing on the moral arc of Huck in isolation or by casting Jim in one-dimensional terms (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Agency Without Autonomy: Valuational Agency.Ranjoo Seodu Herr - 2010 - Journal of Global Ethics 6 (3):239-254.
    National minority women’s defense of nonliberal minority cultures that encompass sexist customs and rules has greatly perplexed liberal theorists. Many attempted to resolve this puzzle by attributing constrained agency to such women and dismissing their defense as unreasonable. This article argues that this liberal assessment of minority women’s position is philosophically indefensible and that the failure of mainstream liberalism to make sense of these women’s response indicates not that these women’s agency is compromised but rather that the liberal conception of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is Evil Action Qualitatively Distinct From Ordinary Wrongdoing?Luke Russell - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):659 – 677.
    Adam Morton, Stephen de Wijze, Hillel Steiner, and Eve Garrard have defended the view that evil action is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. By this, they do not that mean that evil actions feel different to ordinary wrongs, but that they have motives or effects that are not possessed to any degree by ordinary wrongs. Despite their professed intentions, Morton and de Wijze both offer accounts of evil action that fail to identify a clear qualitative difference between evil and ordinary (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Good Liberal Intentions Are Not Enough! Racism, Intentions and Moral Responsibility.Barbara Applebaum - 1997 - Journal of Moral Education 26 (4):409-421.
    Abstract The relationship of intention to moral responsibility in contemporary notions of racism is explored. It is argued that, although the moral import of efforts to reveal and recognise dominance in western society is to be lauded, the peripheral role attributed to intentions in ascriptions of racism can be counterproductive to the aim of helping dominant group members acknowledge their embeddedness in a culture which oppresses others.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Reconstructing Judgment: Emotion and Moral Judgment.Kathleen Wallace - 1993 - Hypatia 8 (3):61 - 83.
    A traditional association of judgment with "reason" has drawn upon and reinforced an opposition between reason and emotion. This, in turn, has led to a restricted view of the nature of moral judgment and of the subject as moral agent. The alternative, I suggest, is to abandon the traditional categories and to develop a new theory of judgment. I argue that the theory of judgment developed by Justus Buchler constitutes a robust alternative which does not prejudice the case against emotion. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations