- The heuristics theory of emotions and moderate rationalism.András Szigeti - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):861-884.details
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What is the Difference between Weakness of Will and Compulsion?August Gorman - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):37-52.details
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Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):385-405.details
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Gandhi's Philosophy of Nonviolence: Essential Selections.Brian C. Barnett - manuscriptdetails
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Veganism, Moral Motivation and False Consciousness.Susana Pickett - 2021 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 34 (3):1-21.details
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Desire That Amounts to Knowledge.Allan Hazlett - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):56-73.details
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Moral Worth, Credit, and Non-Accidentality.Keshav Singh - 2020 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10. Oxford University Press, Usa.details
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One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.details
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Compassion without Cognitivism.Charlie Kurth - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (35).details
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A New Defense of the Motive of Duty Thesis.Benjamin Wald - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1163-1179.details
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Responsibility Beyond Belief: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Dissertation, details
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Two ways of relating to (and acting for) reasons.Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (5):441-459.details
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Reasons, reflection, and repugnance.Doug McConnell & Jeanette Kennett - 2016 - In Steve Clarke, Julian Savulescu, C. A. J. Coady, Alberto Giubilini & Sagar Sanyal (eds.), The Ethics of Human Enhancement: Understanding the Debate. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Neuroenhancement.Brian D. Earp, Thomas Douglas & Julian Savulescu - 2017 - In L. Syd M. Johnson & Karen S. Rommelfanger (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics. Routledge.details
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The Embodiment of Virtue: Towards a Cross-cultural Cognitive Science.Jake H. Davis - 2016 - In Davis Jake H. (ed.), Oxford Philosophical Concepts: Embodiment. Oxford University Press.details
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Rationality and Moral Risk: A Moderate Defense of Hedging.Christian Tarsney - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Marylanddetails
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damage, flourishing, and two sides of morality.Adam Morton - forthcoming - Eshare: An Iranian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1).details
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Cousins of Regret.Adam Morton - forthcoming - In Gottlieb Anna (ed.), the moral psychology of regret.details
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VI. Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:105-111.details
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What’s the matter with Huck Finn?Hrishikesh Joshi - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):70-87.details
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Difficult Cases and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Belief.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.details
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Procedural Moral Enhancement.G. Owen Schaefer & Julian Savulescu - 2016 - Neuroethics 12 (1):73-84.details
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Huck Finn the Inverse Akratic: Empathy and Justice.Chad Kleist - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):257-266.details
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Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77-96.details
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Direct vs. Indirect Moral Enhancement.G. Owen Schaefer - 2015 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 25 (3):261-289.details
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Self-control and Akrasia.Christine Tappolet - 2017 - In Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith & Neil Levy (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. New York: Routledge.details
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The Possibility of an Ongoing Moral Catastrophe.Evan G. Williams - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):971-982.details
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Responsive Government and Duties of Conscience.Robert C. Hughes - 2014 - Jurisprudence 5 (2):244-264.details
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Fiction as Thought Experiment.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2014 - Perspectives on Science 22 (2):221-241.details
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The Motive of Duty and the Nature of Emotions: Kantian Reflections on Moral Worth.Michael Weber - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):183-202.details
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Agency without autonomy: valuational agency.Ranjoo Seodu Herr - 2010 - Journal of Global Ethics 6 (3):239-254.details
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Why Response-Dependence Theories of Morality are False.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):275-294.details
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Why care? On motivation in care ethics. Gardiner, Katherine Elizabeth - unknowndetails
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Subjective rightness.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.details
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Acting for the right reasons.Julia Markovits - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.details
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Inverse akrasia and weakness of will.Richard Holton - manuscriptdetails
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Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency.Karen Jones - 2003 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press. pp. 181-200.details
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Higher-order preferences and the master rationality motive.Keith E. Stanovich - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):111 – 127.details
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Distortions of Normativity.Herlinde Pauer-Studer & J. David Velleman - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):329-356.details
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Hume, Sympathy, and the Theater.Brian Kirby - 2003 - Hume Studies 29 (2):305-325.details
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Evil-revivalism versus evil-skepticism.Luke Russell - 2006 - Journal of Value Inquiry 40 (1):89-105.details
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What rationality adds to animal morality.Bruce N. Waller - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):341-356.details
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Praise, Blame and the Whole Self.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.details
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Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.details
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Is evil action qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing?Luke Russell - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):659 – 677.details
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How a Modest Fideism may Constrain Theistic Commitments: Exploring an Alternative to Classical Theism.John Bishop - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (3-4):387-402.details
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Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation.Sabine A. Döring - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.details
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Doing Moral Philosophy Without ‘Normativity’.Jorah Dannenberg - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-19.details
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Normativity, Agency, and Value: A View from Aesthetics.Dominic McIver Lopes - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):232-242.details
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Complex Akrasia and Blameworthiness.Anna Hartford - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Research 45:15-33.details
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