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  1. Socratic Pedagogy: Perplexity, humiliation, shame and a broken egg.Peter Boghossian - 2012 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 44 (7):710-720.
    This article addresses and rebuts the claim that the purpose of the Socratic method is to humiliate, shame, and perplex participants. It clarifies pedagogical and exegetical confusions surrounding the Socratic method, what the Socratic method is, what its epistemological ambitions are, and how the historical Socrates likely viewed it. First, this article explains the Socratic method; second, it clarifies a misunderstanding regarding Socrates' role in intentionally perplexing his interlocutors; third, it discusses two different types of perplexity and relates these to (...)
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  • What do the Arguments in the Protagoras Amount to?Vasilis Politis - 2012 - Phronesis 57 (3):209-239.
    Abstract The main thesis of the paper is that, in the coda to the Protagoras (360e-end), Plato tells us why and with what justification he demands a definition of virtue: namely, in order to resolve a particular aporia . According to Plato's assessment of the outcome of the arguments of the dialogue, the principal question, whether or not virtue can be taught , has, by the end of the dialogue, emerged as articulating an aporia , in that both protagonists, Socrates (...)
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  • Socrates' Avowals of Knowledge.David Wolfsdorf - 2004 - Phronesis 49 (2):75-142.
    The paper examines Socrates' avowals and disavowals of knowledge in the standardly accepted early Platonic dialogues. All of the pertinent passages are assembled and discussed. It is shown that, in particular, alleged avowals of knowledge have been variously misinterpreted. The evidence either does not concern ethical knowledge or its interpretation has been distorted by abstraction of the passage from context or through failure adequately to appreciate the rhetorical dimensions of the context or the author's dramaturgical interests. Still, six sincere Socratic (...)
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  • Socrates the Same-Sayer.Andrew Payne - 2016 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1):58-69.
    : Socrates in the Apology takes an adventurous approach to belief. Although he lacks knowledge, he holds strong beliefs about virtue and the human good. These beliefs count as wisdom only if they are supported by the ability to explain why they are true, and Socrates lacks this ability. To understand why Socrates holds these beliefs, Gorgias 481c–482c is examined. He claims there always to say the same thing and to agree with himself. His beliefs allow him to maintain a (...)
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  • The Holy and the God-Loved: The Dilemma in Plato’s Euthyphro.Dorothea Frede - 2022 - The Monist 105 (3):293-308.
    Is the holy holy because the gods love it or do the gods love it because it is holy? On the basis of this dilemma Plato works out the manifold and complex relationship between God and Morality in his dialogue Euthyphro. This dialogue not only plays a central role within Plato’s work on the question of the relationship between ethics and religion, but it also represents the starting point of the entire further Western debate about God and Morality. This article (...)
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  • The Origins of Dialectic in Ordinary Discourse.Lee Franklin - 2016 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1):88-104.
    The opening discussion of the Meno features a halting conversation in which Meno struggles at length to answer Socrates’ question, “What is Virtue?” Whereas Socrates demands a unitary account, presenting Virtue as one, Meno repeatedly speaks of Virtue in plurality. Through the opposing sides of this conflict, Plato highlights impediments that appear to prevent ordinary speakers from inquiring into nature. These include the fallibility of ordinary beliefs and statements, and the inability of ordinary speakers to countenance properties as entities in (...)
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  • Socrates, the ‘What is F-ness?’ Question, and the Priority of Definition.Justin Clark - 2022 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 104 (4):597-632.
    In the so-called ‘dialogues of definition,’ Socrates appears to endorse the ‘priority of definition.’ This principle states that an agent cannot know anything about F-ness (its instances, examples, properties, etc.) without knowing what F-ness is (the definition of F-ness). Not only is this principle implausible, it is also difficult to square with Socrates’ method. In employing his method, Socrates appeals to truths about the instances and properties of F-ness, even while pursuing definitional knowledge; meanwhile, he holds that one cannot know (...)
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  • Socratic Dynamic Theory: A Sketch.Hugh H. Benson - 1997 - Apeiron 30 (4):79 - 93.
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  • Aristotle and the Problem of Concepts.Gregory Salmieri - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
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