Switch to: References

Citations of:

Blameworthiness, desert, and luck

Noûs 57 (2):370-390 (2023)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Why the Moral Equality Account of Hypocrisy Does Not Fail After All.David Chelsom Vogt - 2024 - The Journal of Ethics 28 (1):171-186.
    The Moral Equality Account of Hypocrisy (ME) is a prominent theory of why hypocrites lack moral standing to blame. Hypocrites make exceptions for themselves and thereby implicitly deny moral equality, which is an essential premise of moral standing to blame. ME has recently faced challenges from philosophers who deny that it is the hypocrite’s rejection of moral equality that causes her to lose moral standing to blame. I have distinguished three main challenges which I discuss and rebut in this article: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Responsibility, Free Will, and the Concept of Basic Desert.Leonhard Menges - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):615-636.
    Many philosophers characterize a particularly important sense of free will and responsibility by referring to basically deserved blame. But what is basically deserved blame? The aim of this paper is to identify the appraisal entailed by basic desert claims. It presents three desiderata for an account of desert appraisals and it argues that important recent theories fail to meet them. Then, the paper presents and defends a promising alternative. The basic idea is that claims about basically deserved blame entail that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Regulating Speech: Harm, Norms, and Discrimination.Daniel Wodak - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1.
    Mary Kate McGowan’s Just Words offers an interesting account of exercitives. On McGowan’s view, one of the things we do with words is change what’s permitted, and we do this ubiquitously, without any special authority or specific intention. McGowan’s account of exercitives is meant to identify a mechanism by which ordinary speech is harmful, and which justifies the regulation of such speech. It is here that I part ways. I make three main arguments. First, McGowan’s focus on harm is misguided; (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark