According to constitutivism, we can justify the authority of aims and norms on the ground that they are inescapable. Constitutivist views divide between ambitious and modest ones. According to ambitious constitutivism, the inescapability of aims grounds their unconditional authority, whereas according to modest constitutivism, the inescapability of aims only grounds their conditional authority. Either way, both forms of constitutivism share the assumption that inescapability grounds authority, which in turn presupposes that at the foundation of normativity we find aims and norms (...) that can be evaluated as having or lacking authority. In this paper I shall defend a form of constitutivism that rejects this assumption. According to this view, which I shall call Hinge Constitutivism, at the foundation of epistemic normativity we find an aim, the truth-aim, that is altogether beyond the evaluation in terms of the ordinary notion of authority. Moreover, I shall argue that to aim at truth is a condition of possibility for justifying the authority of any other aims or norms. In this sense, to aim at truth is a hinge of deliberation. (shrink)

A central element of constitutivist accounts of categorical normativity is the claim that the ultimate foundation of the relevant kind of practical authority is sourced in certain tasks, features, and aims that every person inevitably possesses and inescapably has to deal with. We have no choice but to be agents and this fact is responsible for the norms and principles that condition our agency-related activities to have anunconditional normative grip on us. Critics of constitutivism argue that it is exactly because (...) of itsinescapability that agency is a powerless source of normative authority. I investigate why our intuitionsconcerning the appeal to inescapability point into such contrary directions. Why do we feel the attraction ofgrounding categorical normativity in phenomena that not even the skeptic can ignore, on the one hand, butseem to hold dear the principle that “ought implies need not,” on the other? Instead of fully developing thethird, neutral, way of conceptualizing the relationship between inescapability and normativity that theimpasse between constitutivists and their critics suggests, this paper diagnoses the disagreement at hand.That agency is inescapable does neither guarantee nor rule out its status qua source of categoricalnormativity. Both camps of the debate overlook this option and depict their opponents as adhering to animplausible perspective of how appeals to inescapability and unconditional normativity are related. Sincethe debate relies on a false dichotomy it is not surprising that its participants so often talk past each other. (shrink)

A common feature of all versions of constitutivism is the “simple constitutivist move” to the effect that engagement in any enterprise requires respecting the constitutive standards of the enterpri...

For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is not a promising strategy for (...) grounding epistemic normativity. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold: In its first part, we work out the key features of constitutivism as presented by Christine Korsgaard. This reconstruction serves to clarify which goals Korsgaard wants to achieve with her account and which of its central claims she has to defend in particular. In the second part, we discuss whether Korsgaard can vindicate constitutivism's most central claim. To do this, we analyse two important arguments - the argument from unavoidability and the argument from (...) the abstract constitutive principle - that have been made in support of constitutivism. We show how both these arguments go amiss and conclude that at least for now, constitutivism's most central claim has not been successfully argued for. (shrink)

This essay tackles head on the argument that sees an inherent paradox in the autonomy of the will as the ground for the authority of the fundamental practical norms. It points out that only on reductive understandings of the autonomy of the will can this idea be qualified as paradoxical, thereby yielding outcomes that either contradict their premises or present autonomy under a false guise. With that done, it will proceed to offer a conception of the autonomy of the will (...) which is not vulnerable to the paradox, and which may therefore be equipped to rest the fundamental practical norms on solid ground. Throughout this discussion, I will rely on constitutivism about practical reasons to specifically defend the twofold conclusion that (a) the paradox of autonomy can be avoided and that, relatedly, (b) if autonomy is properly conceptualised, it is fully equipped and well positioned to ground the authority of the fundamental practical norms. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to provide a conceptual elucidation of the notion of constitutive normativity, which is central to Constitutivism as a first-order theory of agency, as well as to its metanormative ambitions. After introducing and clarifying the origins and scope of Constitutivism (Section 2), I focus on Christine M. Korsgaard’s version thereof (Section 3), which provides an explicit articulation of the notion of constitutive norms. Despite Korsgaard’s explicit acknowledgement that the concepts of action and agency come in (...) degree, one problematic consequence of her account is the tension between the simultaneously descriptive and normative character of constitutive norms (their double nature), and another component of Korsgaard’s constitutivist account (her Authorship View). Cases of a specific variety of “disorders of agency” are used to show that while an agent’s individual actions might fail to display Korsgaard’s required pattern of consistency, self-reflection, and self-unification (and often, morality), her agency does not fade nor is disrupted (Section 4). After discussing those cases, I suggest that Korsgaard’s acknowledgement that the notions of action and agency come in degree and her relational notion of responsibility be strengthened via the adoption of a thorough interactionist and scalar approach. While for Korsgaard the constitutive norms governing agency amount to the norms governing practical reasoning and morality, I contend that the constitutive normativity pertaining to human agency is not ‘homogeneous’ in kind: there are more norms governing agency than just the norms for practical reasoning—and, in particular, that agency necessarily involves social norms distinct from any notion of practical reasoning. I draw on a theoretical framework on the metaphysics of normativity developed within the philosophy of biology to distinguish two varieties of constitutive normativity (socially-generated and non-practice-based) (Section 5), and provide a preliminary articulation of the socially-generated constitutive normativity inspired by the speech-act-theoretical account of the performative dimension of language (Section 6). (shrink)