Exemplification can be found in ontologies from the ancient world, such as those of Plato and Aristotle, and more recent ontologies, in particular those that take what exists to be determined by the empiricist’s Principle of Acquaintance. This study examines some of the ways in which exemplification takes different forms in these different ontologies. Exemplification has also been criticized as an ontological category. This paper examines a number of these criticisms, to see the extent to which they are viable.

There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, (...) then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic—and, I shall argue, false—crowding consequence. (shrink)

In Reason and Analysis, Prof. Brand Blanshard criticises the logical empiricist view regarding necessary statements, including the laws of logic. He distinguishes four component these of this view: (I) Necessary statements--here, the laws of logic--are resolutions or reports of linguistic usage. (II) They are conventions. (III) They are analytic (tautologies). (IV) They say nothing about the world. In this paper I first show that Prof. Blanshard is essentially right in his criticisms of (I), (II), and (IV); but that he has (...) done nothing to show that (III) is incorrect with regard to the laws of logic. Then, second, I attempt to show that even though (I), (II), and (more importantly) (IV) are false, (III) is true. That is, the laws of logic are tautologies, and yet, in a sense to be distinguished, they say something about the world. (shrink)

What one is acquainted with has always been important for the rejection or acceptance of any ontological description. Yet the relevance of acquaintance to ontology has not always been clearly stated. Some philosophers have held that they were acquainted with the simple entities of ontological analysis. They also held that if they were not acquainted with such entities, their analysis would be inadequately supported. In this paper I argue that acquaintance with ontological simples cannot be a reason for accepting or (...) rejecting any ontological analysis. At the same time, I examine what I believe to be the relevance of acquaintance to ontological description. (shrink)

Philosophers have long believed that if the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles were logically true, there would be no problem of individuation. I show (a) that if spatial relations are, as seems plausible, of such a nature that it makes no sense to say of one thing that it is related to itself, then the Principle is a logical truth, asserting that a certain kind of state of affairs is impossible because the kind of sentence purporting to express it (...) is ill-formed and (b) that even if the Principle were such a truth the problem of individuation would remain. I then examine some of what Leibniz and Wittgenstein have said about the notions of individuation, difference and nonidentity. (shrink)

Philosophers who hold that the correct ontological analysis of things includes both properties and particulars have often been pressed to "show" the particular. If we are not acquainted with them, it is argued, then we should not suppose that they exist. I argue that, while we do have good and sufficient reasons for supposing there to be particulars, we are not acquainted with them. To suppose that we are acquainted with them is to treat particulars as if they were properties (...) and to fail to realize how radically different particulars are from properties. The relevance of these matters to some considerations of "simplicity" and the principles of empiricism is explored. (shrink)

In this paper, I both propose and discuss a novel account of truthmaking. I begin by showing what truthmaking is not: it is not grounding and it is not correspondence. I then show what truthmaking is by offering an account that appeals both to grounding and what I call ‘deep correspondence’. After I present the account and show that it is an account that unifies, I put it to work by showing how it can overcome an objection to truthmaking, how (...) we can get truthmaking from correspondence, what it says about truthmaker necessitation, and how it can explain a connection between truthmaker maximalism and pluralism about truth. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend a naturalistic approach to instantiation and the Principle of Instantiation. I argue that the instantiation of an ordinary property F consists of two coordinated relationships at the levels of the manifest and scientific images, namely, constituency and entailment. Also, I offer an account of the Principle of Instantiation related to this conception of instantiation based on the notion of scientific prediction.

This paper consists of three sections. In the first one, some of the main developments in the philosophy of science through the xx century up to the present will be pointed out, and inserted them in the frame of some more general philosophical transformations, such as the so-called “linguistic turn” and “pragmatic turn”, respectively. In the second one, the established connection will be nuanced, from a revision of the work of a “classical” author such as Carnap. Finally, it will be (...) intended a kind of “balance and future perspectives”. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est consacre a l'etude de la distinction linguistique entre noms massifs (lait, mobilier, desordre, amour...) et noms comptables (chat, equipe, combat, chose...). Les premiers sont normalement invariables, tandis que les seconds s'emploient librement au singulier et au pluriel. Apres avoir etabli qu'il s'agit bien d'une distinction morpho-syntaxique, l'ouvrage discute la possibilite de caracteriser semantiquement cette distinction. Les recherches existantes ne tiennent compte, essentiellement, que des noms s'appliquant au domaine materiel. Ce travail, au contraire, examine en detail aussi bien (...) les noms concrets qu'abstraits. Il propose de redefinir les proprietes souvent attribuees aux noms massifs (references distributive et cumulative), grace, notamment, a une nouvelle notion de partie. Concernant les noms comptables, il montre qu'aucune propriete purement semantique n'est necessaire pour qu'un nom soit de ce type. L'ouvrage se termine par l'analyse des conversions (emplois massifs des noms comptables, et vice versa), et du role qu'y jouent les facteurs pragmatiques. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Indifference is a term often used to describe the sort of freedom had by the will according to the libertarian, or Molinist account. It is thought to be a univocal term. In fact, however, it is used in at least seven different ways, in a variety of domains during the early modern period. All of them have plausible roots in Descartes, but he himself uses the term in only one sense, and failure to notice this consistent use by him (...) has bedeviled interpretations of his account of the will. (shrink)

In this article I construe Russell's definite description notation as a fragment of an "ideal language"– a language in which, as Russell puts it in the "Logical Atomism" lectures, "the words in a proposition correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding fact." Russell's notation – containing as it does variables, quantifiers and the identity sign – commits him to an ontology that is lavish indeed. It thus conflicts with the spirit of the theory of descriptions, which is (...) developed in the service of ontological frugality. I make use of arguments derived from the Tractatus to show that an ideal language need not contain logical signs. I thus defend the spirit of the theory of descriptions while departing from its letter. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically examine Harre and Madden's attempt, largely as it occurs in their Causal Powers, to secure for causes and laws of nature a kind of necessity which although consistent with commonsensical empiricism and anti-idealistic philosophy of science nevertheless runs counter to the humean-positivistic tradition, which denies the existence of any distinctively "natural" or causal necessity. In the course of the paper, I reveal the multifarious nature of their account and show that each part of that account, (...) commonsensical or ontological, is inadequate. I indicate as well how the multifarious nature of the account allows and even encourages an evasive shifting about in the face of adversity, which shifting no doubt contributes to whatever illusion of adequacy is present in their treatment. (shrink)

Consider a red circle, and suppose it is a paradigmatic thing. Some philosophers maintain that a thing is ontologically analyzable into a particular exemplifying properties, those properties truly ascribed to the thing by the customary words. Our red circle, then, consists of a particular, say a; two properties, red and circle; and exemplification, a tie tying a, red, and circle into “the red circle.” Upon this analysis, a is bare, i.e., not re-recognizable as such, whereas red and circle are natured, (...) i.e., not bare, and, further, are universal, i.e., they may be exemplified by several particulars. (shrink)

Der soziotechnische Wandel bringt neue Phänomene des Zufalls hervor, die sich den üblichen Strategien des Umgangs mit Risiken und Unsicherheit entziehen. Diese Akzidenzphänomene sind prinzipiell unvorhersehbar und in ihrer komplexen Effektgesamtheit jenseits von Kalkulation und Antizipation. Eine allgemeine Verzukünftigung unseres Weltbezuges mit spezifischen weitreichenden Problemen ist die Folge und lässt klassische Agenturen des Risikomanagements und der Unsicherheitsbewältigung an ihre Leistungsgrenzen stoßen. Bruno Gransche zeigt, dass Philosophie und Zukunftsforschung gemeinsam großes Potenzial aufweisen, hier zu helfen.

Professor Weinberg, in his recention, Relation, and Induction, has critically discussed the nominalistic tradition stemming from Ockham and continuing in the work of Berkeley and Hume. In this tradition there is one fundamental principle, which however divides into two parts. The first is Whatever is distinguishable is distinct, and conversely. The second is Whatever is distinct is separable, and conversely. Weinberg argues that both and are mistaken.In this paper I propose to explore the case against nominalism. I shall suggest that (...) Weinberg's argument against, though not defective in the way some recent critics believe, depends upon a hidden premiss. I shall also suggest that the argument against, when the needed premiss is added, is but a special case of a more general argument. The latter in no way depends upon considerations concerning relational predicates, though Weinberg does in his discussion specifically introduce such considerations. Nor is that unreasonable on his part. (shrink)

Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the Ideal Language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true (...) or false. Second, that the ontological use of the Ideal Language is incompatible with the requirements of its employment in the logical study of inferences. On this basis we conclude that despite elaborations by recent proponents, the doctrine of negative facts lacks adequate support, and perhaps more importantly, it is proper ontological method to free the Ideal Language from the exigencies of a symbolism constructed for logical investigation. (shrink)

One of the more serious criticisms of the B-theory is that by denying the passage of time or maintaining that passage is a mind-dependent illusion or appearance, the B-theory gives rise to a static, block universe and thereby removes what is most distinctively timelike about time. The aim of this paper is to discuss the R-theory of time, after Russell, who Richard Gale calls “the father of the B-theory,” and explain how the R-theory can respond to the criticisms just raised, (...) and others. In the course of my discussion I shall clarify differences between versions of the A-, B- and R-theories of time, and argue that McTaggart’s conception of the B-series and more specifically, the B-relations that generate it, has been instrumental in misconstruing the A-/B-theory debate resulting in criticisms of the B-theory that can be seen to be fallacious when applied to the R-theory. (shrink)

Universals are usually considered to be universal properties. Since tropes are particular properties, if there are only tropes, there are no universals. However, universals might be thought of not only as common properties, but also as common aspects (“determinable universals”) and common wholes (“concrete universals”). The existence of these two latter concepts of universals is fully compatible with the assumption that all properties are particular. This observation makes possible three different trope theories, which accept tropes and no universals, tropes and (...) determinable universals and tropes and concrete universals. (shrink)

Consider two red disks having the same non-relational properties. That they are two and not one, it is claimed by some philosophers, can only be accounted for by claiming that each disk contains an individuator, i.e., a bare particular, which is merely numerically different from the particular in the other disk. While sucli a claim is clearly dialectical, one need not rest the case for bare particulars solely on the dialectical argument. One can, by giving an accurate phenomenological description of (...) the situation containing the two red disks, also attempt to show that one is in fact acquainted with such entities. This latter possibility, however, has recently been challenged by Trentman on the grounds that one cannot give such a description without presupposing the existence of bare particulars. (shrink)

1. Introduction. Professor Nagel's account of the “cognitive status” of scientific theories has been attacked by P. K. Feyerabend [5] and M. B. Hesse [8] in terms of his alledgedly misguided distinction between experimental laws and theories. The difficulty lies, these critics agree, in Nagel's attempt to find a stable basis for scientific theories in an observational basis of experimental laws. Both Feyerabend and Hesse note the vacillation in Nagel's account of the stability of the meaning of experimental terms and (...) in his discussion of the status of observational as opposed to theoretical terms. They find Nagel too “positivistic” and see as a first step toward a more adequate account of scientific theories the abandonment of the theoretical-observational dichotomy as having more than a pragmatic significance. Nagel's discussion of the theoretical-observational dichotomy is, I agree, inadequate in certain respects. I shall, however, suggest a quite different remedy from those of Feyerabend and Hesse, one that depends neither on a phenomenalistic reduction of theoretical entities nor on a blurring of the theoretical-observational dichotomy. (shrink)

The text of The Tractatus supports incompatible interpretations of a number of key philosophic positions. For example, the book is neither obviously nominalistic nor obviously realistic. Another difficulty is presented by the apparent. incompatibility of Wittgenstein's theses that propositions are logical pictures of facts, and that propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. There are several places in The Tractatus where these two doctrines meet head on, but the central one is the set of passages 5.54-5.5422. This paper is an exegesis (...) of these passages and a sketch of Wittgenstein's theory of judgement.In Tractatus 5.54 - 5.5422, Wittgenstein argues that statements of belief, judgement, thoughts and the like are not incompatible with the principle of finite extensionality. The passages contain a brief but obscure reductio on the possibility of non-extensional contexts, and several no less obscure corollaries. In this paper I shall explicate the content of the reductio, criticise a common but mistaken view of these passages, and draw out the consequences of some major doctrines in the Tractatus for Wittgenstein's Theory of Judgement. (shrink)

In a recent article, ‘Tensed Time and Our Differential Experience of the Past and Future,’ William Lane Craig attempts to resuscitate A. N. Prior's ‘Thank Goodness’ argument against the B-theory by combining it with Plantinga's views about basic beliefs. In essence Craig's view is that since there is a universal experience and belief in the objectivity of tense and the reality of becoming, ‘this belief constitutes an intrinsic defeater-defeater which overwhelms the objections brought against it.’ An intrinsic defeater-defeater is a (...) belief that enjoys such warrant for us that it simply overwhelms the defeaters brought against it without specifically rebutting or undercutting them. Thus, Craig claims that an effete philosophical argument like McTaggart's paradox is nothing more than ‘an engaging and recalcitrant brain teaser whose conclusion nobody really takes seriously.’ It is difficult to reconcile this statement with Craig's own writings elsewhere. For Craig has vigorously argued in at least two other articles that 'hybrid A-B theorists like McCall, Schlesinger, and Smith [who give ontological status to both A-properties and B-relations] are in deep trouble’ since they are all effectively refuted by McTaggart's Paradox. It is not Craig's inconsistency regarding the significance of McTaggart conundrum that I want to draw attention to, however. Rather I wish to raise a different issue. (shrink)

In a recent discussion of the notion of substance Miss Anscombe points out that the following three doctrines are very closely associated: the doctrine that proper names lack all connotation, are mere labels, the view that there is nothing essential to the individual, and the doctrine that individuals are bare particulars with no properties in and of themselves. In this article as well as in other writings she rejects all three of these doctrines. And, along with P. T. Geach, whose (...) position on this matter I take to be identical to hers, she defends a doctrine of proper names that is based upon this rejection. She is quite right in supposing that the notion of individuality embodied in these three doctrines is not a straw man. E. B. Allaire has recently defended the doctrine that there are bare particulars along with its corollaries about names and the nominal essence of individuals. He even thinks the doctrine can be defended on “common sense” grounds, independently of dialectical considerations. In this paper I wish to examine one of his arguments in defence of bare particulars. (shrink)