In this article I will show that the problem of embodiment goes back to the question of the mind-body split, as this has been established and discussed by the philosophical tradition. With the digital turn and the advent of ubiquitous computing the problem of embodiment has taken new forms that have led scholars to introduce the notion of a “new digital Cartesianism.” Subjectivation processes within digital culture have mostly been explained by resorting to what I will call the “E-D-R scheme,” (...) which assumes that a real detachment between the body and the mind really occurs in digital processes. Since—as I will show—this is not actually the case, I will suggest replacing this epistemological scheme with a new one, which I will call the “double-embodiment scheme,” in order to acquire a more fitting epistemological account of the underlying digital ontology. Finally, I will discuss the distinction between bodily extension and the incorporation of non-bodily objects introduced by Helena De Preester in order to show that, in the digital realm, this distinction is much more blurred and complex than she acknowledges: digital interaction requires both bodily extension and the incorporation of objects as complementary processes. (shrink)

RESUMEN Sobre la filosofía es una obra exotérica que se conserva de forma fragmentaria. Se cree que tenía tres libros. En los dos primeros Aristóteles habría realizado un compendio sobre las diferentes concepciones de la filosofía y su respectivo objeto; en el tercero habría presentado sus propias concepciones sobre los temas abordados en los libros precedentes. Los escasos fragmentos conservados y la disparidad de las fuentes por las cuales estos son transmitidos representan una dificultad para establecer cuáles son esas concepciones. (...) En este sentido, en este trabajo intentaremos demostrar que en Sobre la filosofía Aristóteles presentaba muchas de las tesis vinculadas con la concepción de la filosofía primera como el estudio de los primeros principios y causas. Para ello nos centraremos en el análisis de los fragmentos 8b, 16, 17, 27a y27b. El examen de estos fragmentos a la luz del resto del corpus nos permitirá demostrar que en Sobre la filosofía Aristóteles identifica la sabiduría con el conocimiento, los principios y las causas. ABSTRACT On Philosophy is an exoteric work that is preserved in a fragmentary mode. It is assumed that it had three books. In the first two, Aristotle would have made a compendium of the different conceptions of philosophy and its respective object. In the third book he would have presented his own conceptions on the topics approached in the previous books. The few preserved fragments and the disparity of the sources by which they are transmitted represent a difficulty for establishing which would have been these conceptions. In this sense, in this paper we will try to demonstrate that in On philosophy Aristotle presented many of the theses related to the conception of the first philosophy as the study of the first principles and causes. With this end, we will focus on the analysis of the fragments 8b, 16, 17, 27a y27b. The examination of these fragments in light of the rest of the corpus will allow us to demonstrate that in On philosophy Aristotle have identified wisdom with the knowledge of these principles and causes. (shrink)

Desperately difficult texts inevitably elicit desperate hermeneutical measures. Aristotle's De Anima, book three, chapter five, is evidently one such text. At least since the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias, scholars have felt compelled to draw some remarkable conclusions regarding Aristotle's brief remarks in this passage regarding intellect. One such claim is that in chapter five, Aristotle introduces a second intellect, the so-called 'agent intellect', an intellect distinct from the 'passive intellect', the supposed focus of discussion up until this passage.1 This (...) view is a direct descendent of the view of Alexander himself, who identified the agent intellect with the divine intellect.2 Even the staunchest defender of such a view is typically at a loss to give a plausible explanation of why the divine intellect pops into and then out of the picture in the intense and closely argued discussion of the human intellect that goes from chapter four through to the end of chapter seven.3 Revolting against an extravagant postulation of entities, Michael Wedin, for example, has argued with considerable subtlety and ingenuity that there is in fact only one intellect discussed in De Anima.4 This unified intellect is fully capable of being integrated into Aristotle's hylomorphic psychology. In order to make his case, though, Wedin is himself forced (1) to discount the importance of some texts and (2) to interpret others in a way that strains credulity. (shrink)

This article offers a Polish translation of Aristotle’s treatise, On Philosophy, of which only certain fragments and testimonies have been preserved. The translation is supplied with an introduction presenting the history of various interpretations and reconstructions of Aristotle’s work.

En el presente trabajo analizaremos los procedimientos metodológicos implementados por Aristóteles en el fragmento 16 de Sobre la filosofía, en los que postula cierta entidad que caracteriza como divina y eterna. Para dar cuenta de esa entidad, Aristóteles se vale de un argumento factible de dividirse en tres momentos: en el primero, presenta el razonamiento por el cual se debe aceptar su eternidad; en el segundo, establece la identificación entre lo divino y lo óptimo y se focaliza en las posibles (...) causas por las cuales algo cambia, y, finalmente, sobre la base de este último resultado, en el tercer momento, se centra en demostrar que lo divino es inmutable. Para hacer esto, se vale de lo que suele llamar “silogismos a partir de hipótesis”. Nuestro objetivo es examinar el uso dialéctico de este tipo de silogismos, que en la primera parte del fragmento son equiparables con lo que en la terminología de la lógica actual conocemos como modus ponens y, hacia el final del fragmento, adquieren la forma de una reducción a lo imposible. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 159 - 176 The purpose of this paper is the analysis of the Plotinian and Iamblichean reading of the Aristotelian theory of abstraction, and its relationship with the status of mathematical entities, as they were conceived within a Platonic model, according to which mathematical objects are ontological autonomous and separate.