The emergence of cinema in the nineteenth century was contemporaneous with the rise of modern sports, both popular spectacles connected with the industrial revolution. Deleuze sees film in his Cinema books as the aesthetic expression of a specifically modern understanding of movement, in contrast to the science and philosophy of antiquity. This article uses Deleuze's analysis of cinema to characterise the aesthetic of modern sports as another ‘industrial art’ with a similarly innovative approach to space, time and movement. It also (...) shows how the aesthetic impact of a sporting match is aligned with the dimensions of Deleuze's ‘affection-image’ in cinema, which frames the world as a ‘face’ divided between absorption and agitation. (shrink)

This article revisits Krzysztof Kieślowski's films in light of Gilles Deleuze's writings on cinema. Its central argument is that, while Kieślowski's films register what Deleuze calls exhausted life, or la vie épuisée, they also offer an affirmative response to exhaustion. Deleuze's articulation of exhaustion in the context of film emerges first in Cinema 2: The Time-Image, where the term is posited as the denial of life's capacity to transform itself. In the context of Kieślowski's films and the communist milieux from (...) which they emerge, exhaustion as a film-philosophical concept acquires a socio-political specificity otherwise lacking in Deleuze. Kieślowski's films thus provide the basis for reading exhaustion as an affective correlate of what Deleuze famously calls the “crisis of the action-image”. Stressing Kieślowski's resistance to the hegemony of exhaustion – and what the director calls a “world without representation” – this article emphasizes films such as From the City of Łódź, The Scar, Camera Buff, Three Colors: Red. Reading Kieślowski and communist Poland's repressive socio-political context in light of the Deleuzian sense of exhaustion vivifies the affective dimension of the director's oeuvre. Surveying the director's earlier documentary work, his decision to transition to fiction, and his reflections on ethics and politics, this article concludes by arguing for the generative, life-affirming character of Kieślowski's cinema of exhaustion. (shrink)

Neuroscience needs theory. Ideas without data are blind, and yet mechanisms without concepts are empty. Friston's free energy principle paradigmatically illustrates the power and pitfalls of current theoretical biology. Mighty metaphors, turned into mathematical models, can become mindless metaphysics. Then, seeking to understand everything in principle, we may explain nothing in practice. Life can't live in a map.

This is a translation from the Russian of Nikolai Lossky’s review of Henri Bergson, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932). The review was published in the Parisian émigré journal Новый Град (Cité nouvelle) in 1932. In this review, Lossky criticizes Bergson for leaving some key problems of the philosophy of religion unresolved, namely that of God’s relation to the world (theism vs. pantheism), that of immortality, as well as that of evil. He also criticizes Bergson’s (...) “extreme biologism” in his explanation of morality, which, in his view, subjectivizes the objects of religion. For Lossky, the symbolic images of the Christian religion are not subjective “fabulations,” but real symbols through which God reveals himself to us. Likewise, according to Lossky, true morality cannot be explained in terms of biological adaptation, but must rely on the foundation of an objective, i.e., Platonic, axiological sphere. (Frédéric Tremblay). (shrink)

This is a translation from the Russian of Nikolai Lossky’s “Heдocтaтки гнoceoлoгiи Бepгcoнa и влiянie иxъ нa eгo мeтaфизикy” (The Defects of Bergson’s Epistemology and Their Consequences on His Metaphysics), which was published in the journal Boпpocы филocoфiи и пcиxoлoгiи (Questions of Philosophy and Psychology) in 1913. In this article, Lossky criticizes Bergson’s epistemological dualism, which completely separates intuition from reason, and which rejects reason in favor of intuition. For Bergson, reality is continuous, indivisible, fluid, etc., and reason distorts it (...) through its acts of division, abstraction, extraction, and so on. Lossky argues that this conclusion does not follow. Reason does not distort the living flow of reality; it rather provides a window unto aspects of the otherwise undivided seamless flowing organic whole. In fact, reason is itself a species of intuition in its own right, namely an intellectual intuition, the object of which is the atemporal facet of the world (the Platonic ideal realm), which is necessary for the existence of its temporal facet. Lossky thus challenges Bergson’s one-sided and self-defeating reduction of being to a flux of changes devoid of changing things. (Frédéric Tremblay). (shrink)

Borrowing conceptual tools from Bergson, this essay asks after the shift in the temporality of life from Merleau‐Ponty's Phénoménologie de la perception to his later works. Although the Phénoménologie conceives life in terms of the field of presence of bodily action, later texts point to a life of invisible and immemorial dimensionality. By reconsidering Bergson, but also thereby revising his reading of Husserl, Merleau‐Ponty develops a nonserial theory of time in the later works, one that acknowledges the verticality and irreducibility (...) of the past. Life in the flesh relies on unconsciousness or forgetting, on an invisibility that structures its passage. (shrink)

Foucault famously divided the history of twentieth-century French philosophy between a “philosophy of experience” and a “philosophy of the concept,” placing Bergson in the former camp and his teacher Canguilhem in the latter. This division has shaped the Anglophone reception of Canguilhem as primarily a historian and philosopher of biology. Canguilhem, however, was also a philosopher of life and a careful reader of Bergson. The recently-begun publication of Canguilhem’s Œuvres complètes has revealed the depth of this engagement, and a re-reading (...) of Canguilhem’s final major statement on Bergson, the 1966 essay “The Concept and Life,” has thus become necessary. The basic problem of that essay is the relationship between knowledge and life in the history of biology and philosophy, with a special place for Bergson. Canguilhem’s strong criticism of him turns, however, on a misquotation. In claiming that Bergson fails to account for the struggle of the living being to maintain a species form, Canguilhem misconstrues the crucial Bergsonian distinction between vital order and geometrical identity; he thus misses the importance that Bergson accords to general biological tendencies, rather than to the generality of the species. Despite the differences on display in the 1966 essay, it will be argued that Canguilhem’s earlier remarks on Bergson show a surprising convergence in the underlying aim of each thinker’s biological philosophy: the call for a new ontology that grasps the ordered and intelligible character of life without relying on a principle of identity. (shrink)

Reductionism relies on expectations that it is possible to make sense of the whole by studying its parts, whereas emergentism considers that program to be unattainable, partly due to the existence of emergent properties. The emergentist holistic stance is particularly relevant in biology and cognitive neuroscience, where interactions amongst system components and environment are key. Here we consider Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy as providing important insights to metaphysics of science in general, and to the reductionism vs. emergentism debate in particular. (...) An appraisal of Whitehead's perspective reveals a difficulty shared by both approaches, referred to him as “simple location”: the commitment to the idea that the nature of things is exhausted by their intrinsic or internal properties, and does not take into account relations or dynamic interactions denoting “togetherness.” In a word, that things are simply where they are. Whitehead criticizes this externalist ontological perspective in which each interacting element exists, and can be thought, without essential reference to other elements. The aim of this work is to uncover such a stance, particularly in the context of dynamical systems, and to show its shortcomings. We propose an alternative relational approach based on Whitehead's notion of “internal relations,” which we explicate and illustrate with several examples. Our work aims to criticize the notion of simple location, even in the framework of emergentist accounts, so as to contribute to a “relational turn” that will conceive “inter-identities” as “intra-identities” in which interactants are not enduring substances, but internally related processes. In sum, we argue that the notion of internal relations has a strong theoretical power to overcome some fundamental difficulties in the study of life and mind. (shrink)

Locke claims that a person’s identity over time consists in the unity of consciousness, not in the sameness of the body. Similarly, the phenomenological approach refuses to see the criteria of identity as residing in some externally observable bodily features. Nevertheless, it does not accept the idea that personal identity has to consist either in consciousness or in the body. We are self-aware as bodily beings. After providing a brief reassessment of Locke and the post-Lockean discussion, the article draws on (...) phenomenological arguments that show the body as lived, that is, lived as one’s own body, but also possibly as “other” or “strange.” Against what has been claimed in recent writing, especially in literature on Merleau-Ponty, the author argues that the “mineness” of the body and its “alterity” are not two mutually exclusive features. In the final part of the article, the author suggests that the becoming strange of one’s own body may legitimately be considered as a prominent experience of what it means to be a person. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Unterscheidung von verschiedenen Gedächtnisformen und -systemen sowie die Beziehung zwischen Gedächtnis und Leiblichkeit stehen sowohl im Fokus der kognitionswissenschaftlichen, als auch der phänomenologischen Debatte. In diesem Artikel wird versucht, beide Ansätze zum Thema in einen Dialog zu bringen. Das Leibgedächtnis wird hier zunächst phänomenologisch als der konkreteste Ausdruck des impliziten Gedächtnisses bestimmt. Basierend auf Edmund Husserls Analysen zum Zeitbewusstsein und zur leiblichen Erfahrung werden folglich die Strukturen und die Dynamik des Leibgedächtnisses hervorgehoben. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass das Leibgedächtnis sowohl (...) in den Wahrnehmungsprozessen als auch in der Gestaltung des präreflektiven leiblichen Selbstbewusstseins eine unentbehrliche Rolle spielt. Schließlich wird die Relevanz der durchgeführten phänomenologischen Analysen im Rahmen der aktuellen Debatte über Gedächtnissysteme in den Kognitionswissenschaften diskutiert. (shrink)

The twentieth century Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky was one of the earliest and most important proponents—but also critics—of Bergson’s philosophy in Russia at a time when many Russian philosophers were preoccupied with the same complex of philosophical questions and answers that Bergson was addressing. Thus, if only from the standpoint of intellectual history, Lossky is central to the study of the reception of Bergson in Russia. In this article, I present the principal historical links, points of agreement between Bergson and (...) Lossky, such as their respective anti-Kantianism, intuitivism, ontological realism, vitalism, organicism, Neo-Platonism, as well as their points of disagreement, including some of Lossky’s key criticisms of Bergson, with special emphasis on the issues of intuition, ideal being, substance and change, time, and sensible qualities. This paper is meant as an introduction to the translations of Lossky’s “Heдocтaтки гнoceoлoгiи Бepгcoнa и влiянie иxъ нa eгo мeтaфизикy” (The Defects of Bergson’s Epistemology and Their Consequences on His Metaphysics) (1913) and his review of Bergson’s, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932), which are published in the present issue of Studies in East European Thought. (shrink)

In the Essay Bergson defines personal expression as free. A free act is the expression of the conception of life found in a person’s experience of life. Given that it is different for everyone, it cannot be expressed in language. That is why Bergson considers that the act which is the most free is one that is done without any reason. It can be said that Bergson himself felt the need to ground his conception of responsibility. In the Cours II (...) he states two conditions of responsibility: freedom and discernment. The identity of a person which ensures that freedom is based in the conception of duration found in the Essay. In Matter and Memory Bergson tries to resolve the question of discernment with the help of his theory of memory. Bergson succeeded in solving the problems related to reason and to fanciful decision and solidly established the notion of responsibility while renewing the theory of freedom originally found in the Essay. (shrink)

This essay is a reappraisal of Pierre Hadot's concept of spiritual exercises in response to recent criticisms of his work. The author argues that contrary to the claims of his critics, Hadot articulates a compelling argument that spiritual exercises that employ imaginative, rhetorical, and cognitive techniques are both necessary for and successful at producing a subject in which reason is integrated into human character. Such exercises are critical for overcoming the effects of habit, as a result of which everyday conduct (...) resists rational control, and Hadot provides a nuanced account of how particular practices affect different aspects of emotion, behavior, and thought. The concept of spiritual exercises remains a viable component of theoretical frameworks for the study of religious ethics, though the author concludes that Hadot's position on habit and its role in ethical practice requires further investigation. (shrink)

When Thomas Luckmann, a pioneer of the “linguistic turn” in sociology, regarded Émile Durkheim as a source for the sociology of language, he had lifeworldly community–building in mind. However, the French sociologist himself understood language in the context ofcivil society–building. To Durkheim, language was a “social thing in the highest degree” that enabled general ideas and intermediated them to people. Abstract human ideals like the civil religion since the French Revolution could be shared through (a common) language. Thus, Durkheim took (...) the exclusive use of French in the Third Republic’s laic public education for granted, ignoring the patois in the country: This “child of the Enlightenment” considered French to be a universal language ofGesellschaftand, beyond ethno-communal elements, to work as a basis for the organic solidarity of French national civil society where the social division of labor was progressing. Durkheim’s theory was predicated on civil-linguistic, not ethnolinguistic, nationalism. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la Revue des Ressources, le 17 novembre 2014. Nous remercions Bernard Pasobrola de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Eadweard Muybridge – “Descending Stairs and Turning Around” Extrait de la série Animal Locomotion – 1884-1885 La notion de « rupture historique » ou de « dépassement » dialectique induit une conception du changement social dont la révolution française serait l'archétype. Il me paraît intéressant d'examiner à la lumière de la notion bergsonienne de (...) (...) - Philosophie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Englanninkielisen lectio praecursorian pohjalta suomennetussa artikkelissa johdatellaan väitöskirjan peruskysymykseen yleistajuisesti ja esittelevästi. Maurice Merleau-Pontyn tulkinta René Descartesin filosofiasta on omaperäinen erityisesti siksi, että hän ei pyri vain muodostamaan historiallisesti korrektia käsitystä Descartesin teoksista vaan hänen tavoitteensa on ennenkaikkea näyttää mikä Descartesin muodostamissa filosofisissa kysymyksissä ja rakenteissa vaikuttaa yhä nykyfilosofiassa. Merleau-Pontyn kriittisyys suhteessa Descartesiin ei ole vain irtiotto vaan myös uudelleenajattelua. Immateriaalisen ja materiaalisen substanssin välisen erottelun sijaan keskiöön nousee kysymys ajattelun ja eletyn kokemuksen välisestä suhteesta. Näiden kahden näkökulman välinen suhde (...) muodostaa Merleau-Pontyn mukaan Descartesin filosofian keskeisen ristiriidan: mielen ja ruumiin erottelu ja liitto sekä sulkevat toisensa ulos että implikoivat toisensa. Varhaisessa filosofiassaan Merleau-Ponty hahmottaa tätä suhdetta reflektiivisen ajattelun ja reflektoimattoman kokemuksen välisenä paradoksaalisena suhteena: reflektio perustuu reflektoimattomaan kokemukseen mutta samalla reflektoimaton vetäytyy reflektiolta. Myöhäisessä filosofiassaan Merleau-Ponty tutkii tätä rakennetta ontologisesta näkökulmasta: kyse on yhteyden ja eron rakenteellisesta suhteesta, joka ei ole vain ajattelun ja ruumiin välillä vaan myös jo kaikessa aistimellisessa kokemuksessa. Merleau-Ponty ottaa nykyfilosofian kannalta merkittävän askeleen kartesiolaisesta duaalisuudesta kohti yhteyden ja eron, kiinnitymisen ja eriytymisen, läheisyyden ja etäisyyden ontologista rakennetta. (shrink)

Bergson’s philosophy marked a turning point in Western understanding of time by differentiating quantitative time—apprehended by intelligence—from qualitative time—duration, embedded in consciousne...

Straipsnyje svarstomas laiko išsišakojimo į tris modusus klausimas, kuris aktualus klasikinėje filosofijoje, fenomenologijoje, literatūroje, struktūruojamas kino mene ir modernaus kino filosofijoje. Straipsnyje tiriamos kelios šio laiko išsišakojimo įvaizdinimo ir jo filosofinio reflektavimo trajektorijos: Tarkovskio įvaizdintas laikas, apokaliptinis laikas bei jo virsmas į laiko kristalus Deleuze’o modernaus kino filosofijoje.