There is a long and successful scholarly tradition of commenting on Nietzsche’s deep affinity for the philosophy of Heraclitus. But scholars remain puzzled as to why he suggested at the end of his career, in Ecce Homo, that the doctrine he valued most, the eternal recurrence of the same, might also have been taught by Heraclitus. This essay aims to answer this question through a close examination of Nietzsche’s allusions to Heraclitus in his first published mention of eternal recurrence in (...) The Joyful Science and in a related set of notes from the period when he was formulating and defending his doctrine of eternal recurrence while writing Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The key to answering this question, it is argued, is that Nietzsche came to believe that the doctrine of eternal recurrence, when properly understood as requiring identical repetition, has to presuppose a Heraclitean reality of eternal, absolute, and universal flux. (shrink)

¿Cuál es el origen de todas las cosas? A pesar de su gran diversidad, ¿tienen una raíz común? ¿Tuvo el mundo un comienzo? ¿Cómo surgió la vida en la tierra? Tales preguntas, que aún provocan a los científicos, fueron formuladas por vez primera por los primeros pensadores griegos. Anaxágoras responde a ellas poniendo al inicio del tiempo una confusa mezcla de todas las cosas sobre la cual obró un ser llamado Intelecto, quien dio lugar al orden del mundo que hoy (...) contemplamos. Con ello, este autor presocrático comienza a plantear algunas cuestiones filosóficas que perdurarán hasta nuestros días: la constitución de la materia, la naturaleza del conocimiento sensorial e intelectual, la intervención de Dios en el mundo… Este libro pretende analizar cuidadosamente la filosofía de Anaxágoras prestando atención a los dos aspectos principales de su doctrina: la mezcla e Intelecto. Su comprensión de la realidad física como una mezcla tiene consecuencias filosóficas de gran interés y constituye quizá la más sugestiva entre las primeras concepciones de la materia. Por otro lado, Intelecto es, según Anaxágoras, quien provoca la variedad de los seres a través del movimiento. Así, nuestro filósofo distingue del sustrato material la causa de sus cambios, la cual se hallaría, además, dotada de inteligencia. Tales rasgos de la filosofía de Anaxágoras atrajeron la atención de los grandes filósofos clásicos, particularmente de Aristóteles. El segundo gran objetivo de este libro es, pues, recorrer el camino por el cual discurrieron las enseñanzas de Anaxágoras, desde que fueron expuestas por él en Atenas, justo durante el siglo que definió la preponderancia intelectual de dicha polis durante siglos, hasta que llegaron a oídos de Aristóteles, el testigo más determinante para comprender a Anaxágoras. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s perspectivism has received restricted and unrestricted interpretations. The latter take the cognitive effects of ‘perspectives’ to be pervasive and general; the former argue they are restricted to special subject matters, have limited effects, or are not essentially cognitive at all. I argue on textual grounds that Nietzsche was committed to the unrestricted view. Comparison to A.W. Moore’s treatment of perspectival representation in Points of View illuminates both the nature of perspectivism and key arguments needed to defend it. Nietzschean perspectivism (...) must deny the very possibility of absolute representations (sensu Moore), and to do so, it must block a form of argument that promises to integrate perspectival representations into progressively less restricted, and ultimately absolute, representations of the world. Such arguments depend on a strong assumption about the unity of the independent world, which Moore accepts and Nietzsche denies. Nietzsche’s pluralism about perspectives thereby turns out to rely on pluralism about the world, which shapes his understanding of us as essentially bounded cognitive agents. Nietzsche holds that the longing for absolute representation manifest in Moore, Leibniz, and many other philosophers, which aspires to overcome the limitations of perspective, amounts to ascetic self-denial about our cognitive condition. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s portrayal of Pyrrho is predominately contained in two of his notebooks from 1888, and they present a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward him. In this article, I offer an explanation for Nietzsche’s variegated observations, and contend that his interest in Pyrrho is not really founded upon his radical scepticism as one might expect. Rather, it is Nietzsche’s preoccupation with decadence in general – and its ancient Greek philosophical incarnations in particular – that drives his scrutiny of Pyrrho. I describe Nietzsche’s (...) evolving depiction of Pyrrho as one that ultimately develops into a critique, whereby Pyrrho is associated with a number of types of decadence, as well as exhibiting the characteristic traits of a decadent. I close by examining the cogency and soundness of Nietzsche’s interpretation of Pyrrho as a specific exemplar of decadence. (shrink)

With his doctrine of the “complete irresponsibility of man,” Nietzsche in different ways complicates the opposition between responsibility and irresponsibility. This article traces the different and conflicting senses of irresponsibility throughout Nietzsche’s development. First, the doctrine is shown to build on Nietzsche’s early study of Heraclitus (section I), whom Nietzsche admired for expounding and embodying a radical “innocence” that was both responsible and irresponsible in different senses. When presented as “philosophical conviction” in Human, All too Human, Nietzsche paradoxically speculates about (...) the doctrine’s incorporation out of a sense of responsibility for the future of mankind (section II). Section III shows how Nietzsche’s later writings evince an increasing awareness of this paradox by explicitly positing complete irresponsibility as his own redemptive doctrine in Twilight of the Idols. After 1881, he has come to affirm a new notion of responsibility and criticizes a weak sense of irresponsibility as the abdication of one’s task. I end by discussing the relation of these different senses of irresponsibility, and argue that the fact that Nietzsche’s texts often deliberately complicate rather than clarify such distinctions is an important reflection of how he textually takes responsibility for “complete irresponsibility” (section IV). (shrink)