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  1. Natural kinds and freaks of nature.Evan Fales - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (1):67-90.
    Essentialism--understood as the doctrine that there are natural kinds--can be sustained with respect to the most fundamental physical entities of the world, as I elsewhere argue. In this paper I take up the question of the existence of natural kinds among complex structures built out of these elementary ones. I consider a number of objections to essentialism, in particular Locke's puzzle about the existence of borderline cases. A number of recent attempts to justify biological taxonomy are critically examined. I conclude (...)
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  • Two dogmas of neo-empiricism: The "theory-informity" of observation and the Quine-Duhem thesis.John D. Greenwood - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (4):553-574.
    It is argued that neither the "theory-informity" of observations nor the Quine-Duhem thesis pose any in principle threat to the objectivity of theory evaluation. The employment of exploratory theories does not generate incommensurability, but on the contrary is responsible for the mensurability and commensurability of explanatory theories, since exploratory theories enable scientists to make observations which are critical in the evaluation of explanatory theories. The employment of exploratory theories and other auxiliary hypotheses does not enable a theory to always accommodate (...)
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  • Function attributions and functional explanations.Berent Enç - 1979 - Philosophy of Science 46 (3):343-365.
    A series of explanatory hypotheses are examined under the assumption that the logical structure of function attributions is dependent on the methodological constraints which these hypotheses conform to. Two theses are argued for: (1) Given these methodological constraints, if something has the function of doing Y, then normally it is the only kind of thing that can do Y in that kind of system. (2) What distinguishes function attributions from causal attribution is not that function attributions explain the etiology of (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Principles of Biological Classification: The Use and Abuse of Philosophy.David L. Hull - 1978 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978 (2):130-153.
    In recent years two groups of taxonomists have attempted to influence the general goals and methods of biological classification. The first group, which emerged in the late 1950’s, has been called variously neo-Adansonian, numerical, computer and phenetic taxonomy. The founders of this school, Robert R. Sokal and P.H.A. Sneath, termed their unified approach to systematics “neo-Adansonian” because of the affinities which they saw between their views and those of the 18th century botanist, Michel Adanson (1727-1806). Today little mention is made (...)
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  • Popper and the 7th Approximation: The Problem of Taxonomy.Bennison Gray - 1980 - Dialectica 34 (2):129-154.
    SummaryThe conspicuous role of taxonomy and debates about taxonomy in the well‐established physical science of pedology throws into question the Popperian rejection of definition and classification.
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  • Relative essentialism.Evan Fales - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (4):349-370.
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