In this article, we use the principlist approach to identify, analyse and attempt to solve the ethical problem raised by a pregnant woman's request for cesarean delivery in absence of medical indications.We use two different types of premises: factual (facts about cesarean delivery and specifically attitudes of obstetricians as derived from the EUROBS European study) and value premises (principles of beneficence and non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice).Beneficence/non-maleficence entails physicians' responsibility to minimise harms and maximise benefits. Avoiding its inherent risks (...) makes a prima facie case against cesarean section without medical indication. However, as vaginal delivery can have unintended consequences, there is a need to balance the somewhat dissimilar risks and benefits. The principle of autonomy poses a challenge in case of disagreement between the pregnant woman and the physician. Improved communication aimed to enable better informed choice may overcome some instances of disagreement. The principle of justice prohibits unfair discrimination, and broadly favours optimising resource utilisation.Available evidence supports vaginal birth in uncomplicated term pregnancies as the standard of care. The principlist approach offered a useful framework for ethical analysis of cesarean delivery on maternal request, identified the rights and duties of those involved, and helped reach a conclusion, although conflict at the individual level may remain challenging. (shrink)

In this article, we use the principlist approach to identify, analyse and attempt to solve the ethical problem raised by a pregnant woman's request for cesarean delivery in absence of medical indications. We use two different types of premises: factual and value premises. Beneficence/non-maleficence entails physicians' responsibility to minimise harms and maximise benefits. Avoiding its inherent risks makes a prima facie case against cesarean section without medical indication. However, as vaginal delivery can have unintended consequences, there is a need to (...) balance the somewhat dissimilar risks and benefits. The principle of autonomy poses a challenge in case of disagreement between the pregnant woman and the physician. Improved communication aimed to enable better informed choice may overcome some instances of disagreement. The principle of justice prohibits unfair discrimination, and broadly favours optimising resource utilisation. Available evidence supports vaginal birth in uncomplicated term pregnancies as the standard of care. The principlist approach offered a useful framework for ethical analysis of cesarean delivery on maternal request, identified the rights and duties of those involved, and helped reach a conclusion, although conflict at the individual level may remain challenging. (shrink)

Drawing on sociological and anthropological studies, the aim of this article is to reconstruct how obstetric technologies contribute to a moral conception of pregnancy and motherhood, and to evaluate that conception from a normative point of view. Obstetrics and midwifery, so the assumption, are value-laden, value-producing and value-reproducing practices, values that shape the social perception of what it means to be a “good” pregnant woman and to be a “good” mother. Activities in the medical field of reproduction contribute to “kinning”, (...) that is the making of particular social relationships marked by closeness and special moral obligations. Three technologies, which belong to standard procedures in prenatal care in postmodern societies, are presently investigated: informed consent in prenatal care, obstetric sonogram, and birth plan. Their widespread application issupposed to serve the moral goal of effecting patient autonomy. A reconstruction of the actual moral implications of these technologies, however, reveals that this goal is missed in multiple ways. Informed consent situations are marked by involuntariness and blindness to social dimensions of decision-making; obstetric sonograms construct moral subjectivity and agency in a way that attribute inconsistent and unreasonable moral responsibilities to the pregnant woman; and birth plans obscure the need for a healthcare environment that reflects a shared-decision-making model, rather than a rational-choice-framework. (shrink)

This paper presents a relational account of autonomy showing that a technological imperative impedes autonomy through undermining women’s capacity to resist use of technology in the context of labor and birth. A technological imperative encourages dependence on technology for reassurance whenever possible through creating a (i) separation of maternal and fetal interests; and (ii) perceived need to use technology whenever possible. In response I offer an account of how women might promote autonomy through cultivating self-trust and self-confidence. Autonomy is not (...) simply a matter of choosing freely and acting on our choices, it is also a matter of possessing the ability to resist social contexts undermining choice and action. An important implication of this view is that respecting autonomy requires more than simply respecting persons’ ability to make and act on choices. Respecting patient autonomy requires a recognition of patients’ need to resist factors impeding autonomy and support for that resistance. (shrink)