Since the time of Charles Darwin, there has been concern that the theory of evolution provides fuel for skepticism. This paper presents new arguments that humanity's evolutionary origins are grounds for accepting that the universe is not as it appears to be to us. Firstly, it is argued that we should expect to have an incomplete capacity to comprehend the universe: both the mental limitations of all non-human life and the narrow interests of most humans provide evidence for this. Secondly, (...) it is argued that we should expect the universe as it appears to us to have nothing more than a relationship of correlation to the universe as it actually is: both simplicity and the huge number of ways in which the universe may be represented provide reason for evolution to produce such a correlative system. (shrink)

This is a puzzling book. On the one hand, Stoneham insists that “we cannot appreciate the contributions made by philosophers like Berkeley without coming to terms with the full breadth and detail of his thought”. On the other hand, his interpretive efforts are directed almost exclusively at the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous—a work Berkeley intended as a popular recasting of his doctrines and one that scholars generally regard as conspicuously lacking the “full breadth and detail” of his philosophy. (...) There is an evident tension between the goal of thoroughly examining Berkeley’s thought and the chosen means of focusing on the Three Dialogues. This tension arises, in large part, from the fact that Stoneham’s intended audience is not Berkeley scholars, but rather people seriously interested in philosophy and its history, yet lacking significant familiarity with Berkeley’s thought or its background in early modern philosophy. As a way to introduce advanced undergraduates or graduate students to Berkeley, the book is a reasonably successful effort, although there are some significant shortcomings. (shrink)

George Berkeley's New Theory of Vision is frequently read as a simple precursor or “half-way house” to his later metaphysics. As a result, some allege the value of the New Theory has been overlooked as critics judge it by its association with immaterialism. In this piece I examine the ongoing debate over the nature of the connection between Berkeley's early work on perception and his later immaterialist tracts. I identify four principal positions on the nature of the connection that have (...) been advanced in the scholarly literature, critically engage the evidence for and against them, and finally weigh in by arguing that an excellent case can be made for thinking that the New Theory is a half-way house to immaterialism after all. (shrink)

1. The aim of my paper is to correct the longstanding misperception of the relationship between two key figures of the Irish intellectual milieu of the seventeenth / eighteenth century: the bishop...

I draw attention to a group of thinkers in Ireland in the first half of the eighteenth century that made significant contributions to the philosophy of political economy. Loosely organized around the Dublin Philosophical Society founded in 1731, these individuals employed a similar set of assumptions and shared a common interest in the well-being of the Irish people. I focus on Samuel Madden (1686-1765), Arthur Dobbs (1689-1765), and Thomas Prior (1680–1751) and argue for two main theses. First, these Irish thinkers (...) shared a number of commonalities with the English mercantilist thinkers of the eighteenth century, and to the degree that they did, their proposals to aid Ireland and reduce poverty were largely doomed to failure. Second, these Irish thinkers also importantlydivergedfrom typical eighteenth-century mercantilist thinking in several ways. These modifications to mercantilism resulted in large part from the unusual political situation of Ireland (as a nation politically dependent on England) and helped orient their economic thinking along more institutional lines. In particular, the emphasis of the Irish on full employment and on the modification of social as well as political institutions is an early step forward in making political economy more sophisticated. (shrink)

This paper argues that a debate between Toland and Clarke is the intellectual context to help understand the motive behind the critic and the significance of Berkeley's response to the critic in PHK 60-66. These, in turn, are responding to Boyle's adaptation of a neglected design argument by Cicero. The paper shows that there is an intimate connection between these claims of natural science and a once famous design argument. In particular, that in the early modern period the connection between (...) the scientific revolution and a certain commitment to final causes, and god's design, is more than merely contingent. The details of PHK 60-66 support the idea that the critic is responding to concerns that by echoing features of Toland's argument Berkeley undermines the Newtonian edifice Clarke has constructed. (shrink)

Dewey's pragmatism rejected ‘truth’ as indicative of an underlying reality, instead ascribing it to valuable connections between aims and ends. Surprisingly, his argument mirrors Bishop Berkeley's Idealism, summarised as ‘esse est percepi’ (to be is to be perceived), whose thinking is shown to be highly pragmatist—but who retained a foundationalist ontology by naming God as the guarantor of all things. I argue that while this position is unsustainable, pragmatism could nonetheless be strengthened through an ontological foundation. Koopman's charges of foundationalist (...) ‘givenism’ in Dewey's work, and in his promotion of the scientific method, are not proven. However, Koopman's ‘genealogical pragmatism’ may develop Deweyan educational theory by addressing dilemmas around curricular study. Koopman's arguments also point towards a missing ontological piece in Dewey's theory of knowledge. In the final section of the article I offer a dialogic ontology as compatible with pragmatism. This dialogical ontology provides both an ethical foundation through interrelatedness, and a generative theory of meaning and experience, as emergent from the encounter with difference. In this framework, to be is to respond—or be responded to. I offer the metaphor of ‘realisation’ to capture the human experience implied by this ontological stance. (shrink)