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  1. “Structural Injustice” as an analytical tool.Kirun Sankaran - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10):e12780.
    “Structural Injustice” refers to injustices that can't be attributed to particular actions by bad actors. This article surveys Iris Marion Young's influential account of structural injustice; lays out some considerations related to the concept's use as an analytical tool; and critically surveys Young's account of individual responsibility for structural injustice.
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  • Reconsidering Reparations, by Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. x + 261. [REVIEW]Megan Blomfield - 2022 - Mind 131 (524):1321-1330.
    Reconsidering Reparations is a book about global justice. Its central philosophical argument claims that a just world would be one in which everyone enjoys the capabilities that they need to relate to one another as equals; maintains that realising this vision (in the right way) would serve as reparation for the injustices of trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism; and warns that this project is threatened by the climate crisis...
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  • Structural health vulnerability: Health inequalities, structural and epistemic injustice.Ryoa Chung - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 52 (2):201-216.
    Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • Faces of Vicarious Responsibility.Rowan Mellor - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):238-250.
    This paper investigates whether responsibility could be borne vicariously. I distinguish between three different senses of responsibility: attributional responsibility, practices of holding people responsible, and substantive responsibility. I argue that it is doubtful both whether attributional responsibility could be borne vicariously, and whether it could be appropriate to hold someone vicariously responsible. However, I suggest that substantive responsibility can genuinely be borne vicariously. Getting clear on these conceptual issues has important implications for how we approach more concrete legal and political (...)
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