What justifies political power? Most philosophers argue that consent or democracy are important, in other words, it matters how power is exercised. But this book argues that outcomes primarily matter to justifying power.

ABSTRACT Peter Hägel's Billionaires in World Politics undoubtedly fills a gap in the literature of international relations and global governance. My comment seeks to highlight that Hägel's (2020. Billionaires in World Politics. 1st ed. Oxford Scholarship Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press) work allows us to advance our understanding of how these private actors can be understood as legitimate authorities and how they can contribute to the legitimacy of the international order. I divide my commentary into three points: the first concerns (...) the approach to billionaires from their individual agency (the individual approach), the second relates to the separation between the state and the global levels (the division approach), and the third presents questions on political legitimacy that arise from his case studies (the legitimacy question). (shrink)

International law’s legitimacy has come under serious attack lately, including, and maybe even more so, in regimes considered democratic. Reading Dworkin’s New Philosophy for International Law in the current context is a timely reminder of the centrality of the political legitimacy of international law. Interestingly, indeed, his account does not succumb to the (however progressive) cosmopolitan ideal of an international political community. Nor is it reducible to a concern for domestic justice in which political legitimacy is only self-regarding. By revisiting (...) seventeenth century international legal theories, Dworkin sends both cosmopolitans and statists back-to-back. He (re-)discovers a third way in which to conceive of statehood today: not on its own, but in a mirror-image fashion and against the background of the international institutional order without which there would be no equal sovereign States, but no individual equality either. Carrying Dworkin’s argument forward, this article identifies and discusses three of its crucial contributions with respect to the objects, subjects and institutions of international legitimacy that deserve further attention. It concludes with different proposals regarding the design and organization of other international institutions than States, both public and private, by reference to their relationship to States (and their people). According to Dworkin, this should enable us to improve not only the legitimacy of the international institutional order as whole, but also the political legitimacy of each State therein since both are mutually related. (shrink)

There are two bodies of literature, one offering theories of the legitimacy of domestic institutions like states, another offering theories of the legitimacy of international institutions like the IMF. Accounts of domestic legitimacy stress the importance of democratic procedure, while few to no theorists make democracy a necessary condition for the legitimacy of international institutions. In this paper, I ask whether this asymmetry can be defended. Is there a unified higher-order theory which can explain why legitimacy requires democracy in the (...) domestic context, but not in the international context? I argue that no proceduralist higher-order theory succeeds, and that we need to look for other solutions. (shrink)

While methodological and metatheoretical questions pertaining to feasibility have been intensively discussed in the philosophical literature on feasibility and justice in recent years, these discussions have not permeated the debate on global democracy. The overall aim in this paper is to demonstrate the fruitfulness of importing some of the advancements made in this literature into the debate on global democracy as well as to develop aspects that are relevant for explaining the role of feasibility in normative political theory. This is (...) done by pursuing two arguments. First, to advance the work on the role of feasibility, we suggest two metatheoretical constraints on normative political theorizing as intuitively plausible – the ‘fitness constraint’ and the ‘functional constraint’ – which elucidate a number of aspects relevant for determining proper feasibility constraints of an account in political theory. Second, to illustrate the usefulness of this feasibility framework, we sketch an account of global democracy consisting of normative principles which respond differently to these aspects and thus are tied to different feasibility constraints as well as exemplify how it may be applied in practice. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This is a response to the comments by Filipe Campello, Julian Culp, Klaus Dingwerth and Julian Eckl, Indira Latorre, and Uchenna Okeja within the present book symposium discussing my book Billionaires in World Politics. While disagreeing with some critiques, I welcome most of the comments as invitations for theoretical refinement and further research. I start with questions about conceptual delineations and the structural background, arguing that ‘political modernity’ is a concept that is too broad to capture the specific context (...) that allows billionaires to exercise power on the world stage. Then I address questions of agency, which are about the relationships between individual billionaires and collective actors, and the associated issue of legitimacy. The connection between billionaires and their corporations receives special attention, and is discussed in relation to legal innovations that establish individual accountability. I end with thoughts about neo-feudalism, a concept that I reject, because the political agency of billionaires remains wedded to capitalism. (shrink)

There are two ways to approach political representation. We can view each type of representation or each site of representation – namely a representative actor or institution – on an individual basis and study its internal dynamics. Alternatively, we can look at how different forms of representation and representative actors and institutions interact in a system of representation. In this article, I develop the second view. I make three contributions to the theory of representation from systemic thinking. Methodologically, I explain (...) the contours of a systemic approach to political representation. Descriptively, I propose a definition of a system of representation that captures representative pluralism, distribution of representative work and different levels of representation. Normatively, I set criteria for judging the system of representation and its individual components with systemic criteria. (shrink)