The purpose of the present article is to contribute to the postphenomenological theory of technological mediation by introducing a new type of ‘human-technology’ relation named ‘transcending mediation’. Previously postphenomenology didn’t pay much attention to the role technology plays in mediating human relation to Transcendence. This was because of empirical turn and pragmatism that are anti-metaphysical in their nature. In the present paper, however, I will show that the empirical element of technology can be balanced by some metaphysical findings. Keeping this (...) in mind, I will rely on Karl Jaspers’s metaphysics of ciphers in order to demonstrate how technology mediates not only our relation to the world but also shapes human’s relation to Transcendence. As I am going to show in the present paper, this sort of mediation becomes possible because technologies are actively participating in so-called self-transcending practices. The latter, according to Karl Jaspers, are practices through which humans can elucidate one’s true self (e.g., become an Existenz). In this article, I will take a case of Smart education as a particular type of self-transcending practice and will show how contemporary AI educational systems enable and disable particular forms of becoming true self (Existenz). (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to a discussion in philosophy of technology by focusing on the epistemological status of the example. Of the various developments in the emerging, inchoate field of philosophy of technology, the “empirical turn” stands out as having left the most enduring mark on the trajectory contemporary research takes. From a historical point of view, the empirical turn can best be understood as a corrective to the overly “transcendentalizing” tendencies of “classical” philosophers of technology, such as Heidegger. (...) Empirically oriented philosophy of technology emphasizes actual technologies through case-study research into the formation of technical objects and systems and how they, for example, transform our perceptions and conceptions or pass on and propagate relations of power. This paper explores the point of convergence of classical and contemporary approaches by means of the notion of the “example” or “paradigm.” It starts with a discussion of the quintessential modern philosopher of technology, Martin Heidegger, and his thinking about technology in terms of the ontological difference. Heidegger’s framing of technology in terms of this difference places the weight of intelligibility entirely on the side of being, to such an extent that his examples become heuristic rather than constitutive. The second part of the paper discusses the methodological and epistemological import of the “example” and the form of intelligibility it affords. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein, Foucault, and Agamben, we argue that the example offers an alternative way of understanding the study of technologies from that of empirical case studies. (shrink)