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  1. Disagreement without belief.Yonatan Shemmer & Graham Bex-Priestley - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):494-507.
    When theorising about disagreement, it is tempting to begin with a person's belief that p and ask what mental state one must have in order to disagree with it. This is the wrong way to go; the paper argues that people may also disagree with attitudes that are not beliefs. It then examines whether several existing theories of disagreement can account for this phenomenon. It argues that its own normative theory of disagreement gives the best account, and so, given that (...)
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  • An Ecumenical Matter?James Lenman - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):175-186.
    Ridge defends a form of hybrid expressivism where normative judgements are constituted by two elements, normative perspectives and representational beliefs that invoke standards our normative perspectives determine. He thinks this view will enable him to ‘offload logical complexity’ onto the latter, representational components of our judgements, thereby taming the Frege-Geach Problem and conferring a dialectical advantage over non-hybrid, ‘pure’ forms of expressivism. But this will only work if our normative perspectives are themselves consistent in ways that are resistant to such (...)
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  • It’s common sense – you don’t need to believe to disagree!Miklós Kürthy, Graham Bex-Priestley & Yonatan Shemmer - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    It is often assumed that disagreement only occurs when there is a clash (e.g., inconsistency) between beliefs. In the philosophical literature, this “narrow” view has sometimes been considered the obvious, intuitively correct view. In this paper, we argue that it should not be. We have conducted two preregistered studies gauging English speakers’ intuitions about whether there is disagreement in a case where the parties have non-clashing beliefs and clashing intentions. Our results suggest that common intuitions tell against the default view. (...)
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  • The Right Argument from Moral Disagreement.Alan H. Goldman - 2022 - Theoria 88 (4):850-867.
    Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 4, Page 850-867, August 2022.
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  • Disagreement for Dialetheists.Graham Bex-Priestley & Yonatan Shemmer - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):192-205.
    Dialetheists believe some sentences are both true and false. Objectors have argued that this makes it unclear how people can disagree with each other because, given the dialetheist’s commitments, if I make a claim and you tell me my claim is false, we might both be correct. Graham Priest (2006a) thinks that people disagree by rejecting or denying what is said rather than ascribing falsehood to it. We build on the work of Julien Murzi and Massimiliano Carrara (2015) and show (...)
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