Summary Research is regarded as transformations of complexes composed of knowledge, problems and (hardware and software) instruments. Sequences of such transformations are embedded in human settings in which they are given directions. Problems and the work of solving them are divided into empirical and theoretical ones. In an advanced science like physics empirical and theoretical work are interrelated by means of flows of problem-generating information. Empirical and theoretical researchers work also on problems of their own making. Residuals of knowledge which (...) cannot be systematized at the same rate as it is produced as well as clashes between new and old knowledge are potential starting points of new lines of research. (shrink)

Can research be studied in a way that is neither logical reconstruction nor empirical psychology or sociology of science? In contemporary philosophy of science this is usually denied—in spite of the recent 'paradigm shift' there. A system-philosophy approach in theory of research is outlined by means of some models : a research enterprise is viewed as a productive, innovative system, the research process as a transformation of complexes of knowledge-problems-instruments (software and hard ware). The direction this development takes is guided (...) by preconceptions about the subject matter and a programmatic conception of the discipline based on them ('internal steering factors'). The dynamics of the research process are schematized as a co-agency of 'theoretical and 'empirical' moments, which is viewed as a flow of problems, information, and conceptual frameworks. Empirically discovered pieces of knowledge may resist all attempts to explain them: the flow is disturbed, and only an extraordinary innovation on the 'theoretical' level can restore the balance. This involves a shift in perspective: a shift in the 'internal steering factors'. (In this way one type of 'scientific revolution' (Kuhn's type) is conceptualized). After a perspectival shift one will ask 'Does it constitute progress ?' Types of criteria are suggested. Although they do not apply to all research situations, they over-arch research-traditions. Eventually the above models are applied in the reflection of Research Theory on itself. Research Theory should improve our knowledge about knowledge-production. This knowledge should contribute to improving our image of science and the researcher's sensitivity—by providing better tools for concept ualizing research situations and for imagining possible alternatives. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: The general aim of this paper is to question the idea that hermeneutic and critical social sciences have to be conceived as specific embodiments of the scientific enterprise. This idea is rather implicit in Habermas’s work, but has its grounds in his thesis about the argumentative unity of all sciences, upheld for the first time in 1973. Such a point of view turns out to be untenable for two reasons. First, the indiscriminating inclusion of the hermeneutic and critical social (...) sciences in scientific enterprise raises problems of consistency with regard to the systematic guidelines of The Theory of Communicative Action. Moreover, the thesis of argumentative unity of the sciences itself is incompatible with Habermas’s methodological conception of the role of Verstehen in the social sciences developed in section 1.4 of the book. Finally, the author argues that this conception calls for another understanding of the status and role of the hermeneutic and critical disciplines, which is outlined in some detail. (shrink)