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  1. Knowing and supposing in games of perfect information.Horacio Arló-Costa & Cristina Bicchieri - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (3):353 - 373.
    The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, we (...)
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  • Subjunctive conditionals and revealed preference.Brian Skyrms - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):545-574.
    Subjunctive conditionals are fundamental to rational decision both in single agent and multiple agent decision problems. They need explicit analysis only when they cause problems, as they do in recent discussions of rationality in extensive form games. This paper examines subjunctive conditionals in the theory of games using a strict revealed preference interpretation of utility. Two very different models of games are investigated, the classical model and the limits of reality model. In the classical model the logic of backward induction (...)
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