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  1. (1 other version)Separating cognitive capacity from knowledge: A new hypothesis.Graeme S. Halford, Nelson Cowan & Glenda Andrews - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (6):236-242.
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  • (1 other version)Separating Cognitive Capacity from Knowledge: A New Hypothesis.Glenda Andrews Graeme S. Halford, Nelson Cowan - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (6):236.
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  • Planning Following Stroke: A Relational Complexity Approach Using the Tower of London.Glenda Andrews, Graeme S. Halford, Mark Chappell, Annick Maujean & David H. K. Shum - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • Reasoning About Relations.Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Philip Johnson-Laird - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (2):468-493.
    Inferences about spatial, temporal, and other relations are ubiquitous. This article presents a novel model-based theory of such reasoning. The theory depends on 5 principles. The structure of mental models is iconic as far as possible. The logical consequences of relations emerge from models constructed from the meanings of the relations and from knowledge. Individuals tend to construct only a single, typical model. They spontaneously develop their own strategies for relational reasoning. Regardless of strategy, the difficulty of an inference depends (...)
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  • The collapse illusion effect: A semantic-pragmatic illusion of truth and paradox.Shira Elqayam - 2006 - Thinking and Reasoning 12 (2):144 – 180.
    Two Experiments demonstrate the existence of a “collapse illusion”, in which reasoners evaluate Truthteller-type propositions (“I am telling the truth”) as if they were simply true, whereas Liar-type propositions (“I am lying”) tend to be evaluated as neither true nor false. The second Experiment also demonstrates an individual differences pattern, in which shallow reasoners are more susceptible to the illusion. The collapse illusion is congruent with philosophical semantic truth theories such as Kripke's (1975), and with hypothetical thinking theory's principle of (...)
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