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„Kant's and Strawson's Descriptive Metaphysics “

Graham Bird

In Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 67--85 (2003)

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Strawson and Kant on Being 'I'.Jan Kuneš - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (4):493-509.details Strawson developed his descriptive metaphysics in close relation to Kant’s metaphysics of experience which can be understood as a particular version of descriptive metaphysics. At the same time, Strawson rejects the foundations of Kant’s version of descriptive metaphysics which, according to him, is a species of psychology. His argument against Kant’s conception of subject, or of the ‘I’, can be found in his conception of person. A closer scrutiny of this conception of Strawson can, however, reveal that it is not (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Reply to Edward Kanterian.Graham Bird - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (2):289-300.details The reply to Kanterian offers a rebuttal of his central criticisms. It reaffirms the difference between Kant's arguments in the Aesthetic and at B 148-9; it rejects the alleged error of logic in Fischer's (and my) arguments; and it rejects Kanterian's reading of passages in the Preface (A xx-xxii) and of the Amphiboly. Beyond these specific points Kanterian assumes that Kant's project in the first Critique cannot be understood as a and so begs the question at issue. Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
(1 other version)Kant and Skepticism, by Michael N. Forster. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008. Pp. x + 154, hardcover. ISBN 9780691129877. $29.95/£l7.95. [REVIEW]Robert Stern - 2009 - Kantian Review 14 (1):141-146.details Download Export citation Bookmark
C. I. Lewis, Kant, and the reflective method of philosophy.Gabriele Gava - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (2):315-335.details If it seems unquestionable that C. I. Lewis is a Kantian in important respects, it is more difficult to determine what, if anything, is original about his Kantianism. For it might be argued that Lewis’ Kantianism simply reflects an approach to the a priori which was very common in the first half of the twentieth century, namely, the effort to make the a priori relative. In this paper, I will argue that Lewis’ Kantianism does present original features. The latter can (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations

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