Clinical fields of the “sciences of the mind” (psychotherapy, psychiatry, etc.) lack integrative conceptual frameworks that have explanatory power. Mainly descriptive-classificatory taxonomies like DSM dominate the field. New taxonomies such as Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) aim to collect scientific knowledge regarding “systems” for “processes” of the brain. These terms have a supradisciplinary” meaning if they are considered in context of Systems Science. This field emerges as a platform of theories like general systems theory, catastrophe theory, synergetics, chaos theory, etc. It (...) provides a lot of abstract concepts, constructs, methods and models. We assume that these tools also enable theoretical integration in the diversified field of clinical practice in the sciences of the mind. Additionally, systems thinking in clinical psychology improves conceptual links to currently network-oriented neurobiology. However, clear definitions of systemic terms are necessary to emerge from their mainly metaphorical use. Here we revise mainly terms like “structure”, “process” and “dynamics” as they are used already in psychology, psychoanalysis, psychopathology and psychiatry in an ill-defined way. For instance, affective-cognitive structures like “life space” or “object representations” can be seen as products of mental processing. These structures, in turn, modulate dynamics of mental processes. Additionally, we suggest a coupled network concept of emotions and motivations as the main subsystem that modulates mental dynamics that results in a qualitative systemic model of the mind. Finally, we assume that a revisited systemic approach could improve interdisciplinary understanding of the mental. ystem for mental dynamics. In this context, we assume that a revisited systemic approach could improve interdisciplinary understanding of the mental. (shrink)

Neuroscience is a multidisciplinary effort to understand the structures and functions of the brain and brain-mind relations. This effort results in an increasing amount of data, generated by sophisticated technologies. However, these data enhance our descriptive knowledge, rather than improve our understanding of brain functions. This is caused by methodological gaps both within and between subdisciplines constituting neuroscience, and the atomistic approach that limits the study of macro- and mesoscopic issues. Whole-brain measurement technologies do not resolve these issues, but rather (...) aggravate them by the complexity problem. The present article is devoted to methodological and epistemic problems that obstruct the development of human neuroscience. We neither discuss ontological questions nor review data, except when it is necessary to demonstrate a methodological issue. As regards intradisciplinary methodological problems, we concentrate on those within neurobiology and psychology. As regards interdisciplinary problems, we suggest that core disciplines of neuroscience can be integrated using systemic concepts that also entail human-environment relations. We emphasize the necessity of a meta-discussion that should entail a closer cooperation with philosophy as a discipline of systematic reflection. The atomistic reduction should be complemented by the explicit consideration of the embodiedness of the brain and the embeddedness of humans. The discussion is aimed at the development of an explicit methodology of integrative human neuroscience, which will not only link different fields and levels, but also help in understanding clinical phenomena. (shrink)

This dissertation investigates to which extent internal working models of relationships and personality characteristics of participants are transferred to computer-generated agents in a virtual social environment. For this purpose a VSE was created that was populated with several autonomous agents which interacted with each other. Participants can control one of the the agents ; one of the other agents is the spouse of the protagonist. Using this setup, a potential projection screen for the dynamics of the real-life relationship, as well (...) as for generalized internal working models was created. Chapter 1 summarizes the research question, gives an overview of the development of the VSE called "Simoland", and provides a general summary and conclusion about the dissertation. Chapters 2 - 4 each are self-contained manuscripts. Chapter 2 is a theoretical article which describes challenges and new possibilities in the implementation of psychological models into autonomous agents. Chapter 3 describes the first empirical study conducted in Simoland. This study demonstrates how intrapersonal changes in interaction behavior can be investigated in VSEs. With a sample of 236 participants I could show that both the relationship satisfaction with the real life partner, and the intimacy motive of the participant had an influence on the behavior towards the virtual spouse. Hence, it could be shown that virtual behavior indeed is connected to conditions of the real world. While the first study investigated unrestricted behavior in an open world, in Chapter 4 specific, theoretically derived scenes were created which were supposed to activate the attachment system. With a sample of 422 participants we could demonstrate interindividual differences in attachment behavior as a reaction to one of three scenes: a separation, a conflict with the virtual spouse, and a threatening situation. Both attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance significantly and meaningfully correlated with the behavior in the VSE, the physical distance between protagonist and virtual spouse, and emotional ratings. To summarize, this dissertation for the first time shows that qualities of real-life relationships, as well as internal working models of attachment, are transferred to virtual agents. Thereby new ways are opened to investigate behavior in close relationships and representations of significant others through virtual scenarios. (shrink)